What factors does a cosmetics company need to consider when designing its marketing channel for a new low-priced line of cosmetics?

* I also need a reference for this answer.

Consider the following production possibilities schedule for two goods- Tshirts and running shoes:

A) Suppose that this economy is currently producing 1000 running shoes per month (on its ppf). At this allocation what is the opportunity cost of producing 2000 more tshirts. Show the calculaitons

B) What are some differences between a PPF that is curved outward and one that is a straight line? Explain.

Describe the three types of appeals used in marketing communications messages and develop three different advertisements for the same brand of a product of your choice, each using a different appeal.

*I also need a reference for this answer.

What is dealignment? Has this occurred in American politics, and if so, when?

Which forms of mass media traditionally have been the most relied on? Which forms have grown in importance? Define policy formulation and provide two examples of instances where this takes place. What is the role public opinion plays in a representative democracy?

What product flow metrics should retail markets analyze when assessing the impact of COVID-19 on grocery product categories such as grab-and-go/convenience items?  

Amidst the current pandemic, how can supermarkets adjust their supply chain/logistics strategies on grocery product categories such as grab-and-go/convenience items?

Amidst the current pandemic, how can supermarkets adjust how they go to market on grocery product categories such as grab-and-go/convenience items?

1. Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. What is the equilibrium price of rutabagas?

2. Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. What is the equilibrium quantity of rutabagas?

3. Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. Suppose the government assesses a rutabaga tax of $5 per box on the sellers of rutabagas. What is the after-tax equilibrium quantity of rutabagas?

4. Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. Suppose the government assesses a rutabaga tax of $5 per box on the sellers of rutabagas. What is the after-tax price paid by the consumers of rutabagas

5. Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. Suppose the government assesses a rutabaga tax of $5 per box on the sellers of rutabagas. What is the after-tax price received by the sellers of rutabagas?

6.

Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. Suppose the government assesses a rutabaga tax of $5 per box on the sellers of rutabagas. What is the relative burden of this rutabaga tax between buyers and sellers?

7.

Suppose the market demand for rutabagas is Q_D = 10 - 0.25P and the Q_S = 0.15P, where P is the price per box of rutabagas and Q measures the quantity of boxes. Suppose the government assesses a rutabaga tax of $5 per box on the buyers (rather than the sellers) of rutabagas. which of your previous answers would change? Mark any (between 0 and 4) correct answers.

Question 1 [40 pts] – Free Rider Problem –Game Theoretic Modeling

Consider two individuals who are deciding to pay for a public good or not. The value of the public good is 10 for each individual and the cost of the public good is 12 TL.

• If they both vote yes and agree to pay, they will share the cost equally and the public good is provided.
• If only one vote yes and agrees to pay, full cost will be borne by this individual and the public good will be provided.
• If they both opt out from paying by voting no, no funds will be collected and the public good will not be provided.

Given the valuation for the public good, cost and the cost sharing mechanism above and our knowledge about public goods this decision process is depicted as a simultaneous form game below.  [Note on notation: the first payoff in each cell corresponds to the payoff of the row player, Individual 1. The second payoff in each cell corresponds to the payoff of the column player, Individual 2.]

Modeling: – Using Game Theory

1. (5 pts) Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable. Check the payoffs (net benefit; benefit after costs) from each outcome and note that while writing the payoffs of the game these two characteristics of pure public goods is used. Refer to these characteristics first and explain how these characteristics are incorporated into the game.

2. (4 pts) Explain why this problem about the provision of a public good can be represented using game theory; say as opposed to the problem of an individual deciding to buy a t-shirt for himself or not.

One-Shot Game: Impossibility of reaching the cooperative outcome.

3. (2 pts) What is Individual 1’s best response to other player choosing to pay for the public good? Briefly explain.
4. (2 pts) Explain what a dominant action is and then indicate if there is a dominant action here for any player.

5. (2 pts) Solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Explain your work.

6. (5 pts) Evaluate the Nash equilibrium of the game. Is this equilibrium socially efficient? Explain by referring to the market failure we encounter with the public goods.

7. (5 pts) Can the two individuals just promise each other to vote yes and then sustain the promised cooperative outcome in this game that is played once? Show that each individual has an incentive to cheat and vote no instead when the other is sticking to its promise.

a) Explain what is meant by exchange rate overshooting/undershooting.

b) There are two (2) ways that authorities may try to finance increased government expenditure (G):

i. By printing extra money and using the money directly to finance its expenditure

ii. By borrowing — that is by selling bonds to economic agents

c) In the Dornbusch model the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition is assumed to be hold continuously, that is, if the domestic interest rate is lower than the foreign interest rate then there need to be an equivalent expected rate of appreciation of the domestic currency to compensate for the lower domestic interest rate." Explain this statement.

explain the WTO principle rules

Pertain to entities receiving federal funds?

Explain the different types of trade restrictions and how they affect consumer and producer surplus overall.

Explain protectionism in your own words.

What are the three main forms and briefly explain each.

List some pros and cons of protectionism (0.5 points) explain each one with your own words.