Question

In: Finance

Social insurance programs are not subject to adverse selection. A. True B. False C. Uncertain

Social insurance programs are not subject to adverse selection.

A. True

B. False

C. Uncertain

Solutions

Expert Solution

True

The social insurance programs are supported by governments so it is not subject to adverse selection.


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