Question

Weston v. Cornell University New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, 136 A.D.3d 1094, 24 N.Y.S.3d 448 (2016). Weston v. Cornell University In the Language of the Court ROSE, J. [Judge] * * * * Defendant [Cornell University in Ithaca, New York] appointed plaintiff [Leslie Weston] to an associate professorship in 1998 for an initial term of five years. The 1998 offer letter described the position as being “with tenure,” but it stated that, although no problems were anticipated, the offer of tenure would have to be confirmed by defendant’s review process shortly after plaintiff’s arrival on campus. For a variety of reasons, plaintiff delayed her tenure submission for five years and, when she finally submitted it, she was not awarded tenure. In 2003, defendant gave plaintiff a two-year extension of her appointment, this time as an “associate professor without tenure,” to allow her an opportunity to improve and resubmit her tenure package. Plaintiff resubmitted her request for tenure in 2005, but it was again denied, resulting in her eventual termination. Plaintiff then commenced this action [in a New York state court] seeking * * * to recover for breach of contract. * * * Following the completion of discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint * * *. The Supreme Court [a New York state trial court] denied that portion of the motion seeking dismissal of the breach of contract claim. Defendant now appeals. Contrary to defendant’s argument, Supreme Court properly found that issues of fact exist as to whether defendant’s 1998 offer letter reflects an intent to assure plaintiff that she would be granted tenure. * * * The terms of the letter are ambiguous. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly relied upon extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.Footnote Based upon the affidavit of the then-chair of defendant’s department who hired plaintiff and wrote the 1998 offer letter, as well as correspondence from the dean and associate dean of the college in which plaintiff’s department was located, Supreme Court appropriately declined to award summary judgment to defendant with respect to the 1998 offer of tenure. However, we must agree with defendant’s alternative argument that the terms of its original offer were materially modified by plaintiff’s acceptance of its 2003 offer to extend her appointment. Defendant’s 2003 letter offering to extend her appointment unambiguously replaced the “with tenure” language contained in the 1998 offer letter by restating her job title as “associate professor without tenure.” Defendant also points to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which she explicitly acknowledged that she understood the 2003 letter to be a modification of the original terms of her employment agreement and agreed—albeit reluctantly—to the new terms. Significantly, plaintiff further admitted that defendant was “not guaranteeing her tenure in any case after this letter.” [Emphasis added.] In response to this prima facie showing by defendant, plaintiff contends that, regardless of what she agreed to in 2003, her oft-repeated assertions of her belief that defendant still owed her tenure based upon the original letter suffice to preclude summary judgment. Aside from plaintiff’s own opinions on the matter, however, there is nothing in the record to indicate that any alleged guarantee of tenure remained beyond the date of the 2003 letter. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff’s subjective beliefs and unsupported arguments regarding the 2003 modification of her employment agreement are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the breach of contract cause of action. ORDERED that the order is modified * * * by reversing so much thereof as partially denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment; said motion granted in its entirety and breach of contract cause of action dismissed.

Legal Reasoning Questions

What did the plaintiff seek in this action? What was the legal ground for her claim?

What was her principal contention regarding the offers and acceptances at the center of this case?

Why did the trial court deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim?

Why did the appellate court modify the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion?

Answer 1

Answer:

1. The plaintiff seeks restitution of her contract which she was offered by the defendant in 1998, under the impression that she has a tenure of five years in her present job and the terms and conditions of her old contract are still active. She claimed that the University has breached the contract.

The legal ground for her claim was to seek recovery for the breach of contract.

2. Her principal contention regarding the offer and acceptance at the center of this case was that she thought that the 2003 letter is the slight modification of the original terms of her employment agreement and she accepted it.

3. The Trial Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because according to the trial court the original 1998 employment agreement for tenure was intentionally and materially modified by the later 2003 employment agreement to make the plaintiff agreed to the contract with the university on the impression that the terms and conditions are similar. The agreement had ambiguous wordings and it causes breach of contract by the university.

4. The Appellate Court modified the denial of the defendant’s summary judgment because the court found that the new contract signed in 2003 did not give the impression that she would get tenure. In the new employment contract of 2003, her job title was mentioned as ‘Associate professor without tenure’. Therefore, the appellate court ruled in favor of the university.

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