Question

Current U.S. military doctrine recognizes four categories of power available to a nation: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Upon examination, it is apparent that only a nation/state can wield these elements of power; they would be beyond the reach of weaker powers or organizations. How then, can these lesser entities influence the powerful? Five “underdog” strategies are outlined as alternative sources of power for the weak. If you are trying to influence the national policy of the United States, which of these five strategies do you feel would be the most effective? Why?

Answer 1

One of the most influential “underdog” strategies to alter or affect the policy of the United States isguerilla warfare or terrorism. The definition of terrorism is the exact solution for fighting a morepowerful nation; where a weaker non-governmental actor uses violence to produce terror. These non-state actors do not wish to win the overall war, but more simply to influence policies, ideologies andpolitical agendas. Clausewitzian trinity, further complicating the formulation and application process within the strategic paradigm, shown below:

In terms of the military element, technology would change the basic nature of weapons and modes of transportation, the former stable for a hundred years, the latter for a thousand.

It is a fairly big break with traditional counterinsurgency techniques that concentrated on locating and destroying the guerrillas and often relied heavily on punishing the local population for guerrilla activity as the sole means of separating the guerrilla from his base of support. Discussion of some representative modern counterinsurgency theorists follows:
Callwell:British Colonel Charles E. Callwell wrote Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice at the end of the nineteenth century. This was a guide for the conduct of colonial wars. Callwell distinguished three broad categories of small wars, which he defined as any war in which one side was not a regular army. His categories were: campaigns of conquest or annexation; campaigns to suppress insurgents; and campaigns to punish or overthrow dangerous enemies.
Trinquier: Roger Trinquier published Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency in 1961. Trinquier served with the French paras in Indochina and Algeria. Those experiences shaped his views, and his theory heavily reflects French counterinsurgency practice in the 1950’s. Trinquier argued that nuclear weapons were decreasing the significance of major traditional wars. The new form of war, which he called modern warfare (always in italics for emphasis), featured guerrilla war, insurgency, terrorism, and subversion.

Galula: David Galula wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice in 1964. He postulated a simple construct for counterinsurgencies that emphasized the political nature of the conflict, especially the relationship between the insurgent and his cause. His definition of “insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means” was designed to emphasize that insurgencies could start before the use of force.

Kitson: Frank Kitson wrote Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping in 1971. He added details to the basic structure of counterinsurgency theory already constructed by the French. Like the other theorists Kitson recognized that counterinsurgency is a multi-discipline job. He warned against abuses, but recommended that heavy force be used early to squash an insurgency while still in a manageable state. The military campaign must be coordinated with good psychological operations.