In: Economics
There are two types of drivers on the road today, Speed Racers with a 5% chance of anaccident per year, and Low Riders with a 1% change per year. There are an equal number of SpeedRacers and Low Riders. The cost of an accident is $12,000. Assume that there is free entry into theinsurance market, the insurers always know the relative shares of each type in the population, andfirms are risk-neutral. Assume that your income is $12,000 in the absence of an accident.
If,U(Y) =√Y, would be a premium of $100 for the cheaper policy that covers onefourth of the losses (pays out $3000) allow both contracts to be sold? (Remember, their income is$12,000 if the bad event does not happen.)
First we consider the case of no-insurance
Income in case of accident=12000-12000=0
Utility in case of accident=U(0)=0^0.5=0 utils
Income in case of no accident=12000
Utility in case of no accident=U(12000)=12000^0.5=109.5445 utils
Now take the case of insurance
Income in case of accident=12000-300-12000+3000=2700
Utility in case of accident=U(2700)=2700^0.5=51.9615 utils
Income in case of no accident=12000-200=$11700
Utility in case of no accident=U(11700)=11700^0.5=108.1665 utils
Consider the case of Speed Racers
Expected utility without insurance=0.05*U(0)+0.95*U(12000)
Expected utility without insurance=0.05*0+0.95*109.5445=104.0673 utils
Expected utility with insurance=0.05*U(2700)+0.95*U(11700)
Expected utility with insurance=0.05*51.9615+0.95*108.1665=105.3563 utils
Since expected utility is higher in case of insurance. Speed Racers will buy the insurance
Consider the case of Low Riders
Expected utility without insurance=0.01*U(0)+0.99*U(12000)
Expected utility without insurance=0.01*0+0.99*109.5445=108.4491 utils
Expected utility with insurance=0.01*U(2700)+0.99*U(11700)
Expected utility with insurance=0.01*51.9615+0.99*108.1665=107.6045 utils
Since expected lower is higher in case of insurance. Low Riders will not buy the insurance
Contracts will not be sold to both type drivers. Only Speed Racers will buy it.