In: Computer Science
4. In the key change operation of 20.15.7 Key Changes, suppose the manager simply transmitted delta2 = oldkey XOR newkey to the agent.
Principle behind the proposed quantum cryptography protocol. The final single bit value is calculated from many bits through a pair of numbers {i,j} announced by the receiver, Bob. The upper panel corresponds to the actual scheme, in which Bob measures the wave-like nature of the received light sent by Alice to learn the final bit value. Notice that the value of {i,j} might be controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve) through the signal (II) fed to Bob's measurement process M, so looking at this panel alone, the security is ambiguous. If Bob now measures the particle-like nature of the received light, he no longer learns the final bit but can still exactly produce the same pair {i,j} Lower panel: Here it is seen that {i,j} is directly randomized by the random number generator. Therefore, the possibility that Bob could have measured the particle-like nature of the received light ensures that the randomness of {i,j} is not rigged by Eve. Credit: Toshihiko Sasak
—Cryptography – the art and science of providing secure communications – typically employs three methods to authenticate users and prevent data theft: secret key (symmetric) cryptography, which uses a single key for both encryption and decryption; public key (asymmetric) cryptography which uses different keys for encryption and decryption; and hash functions, which employs a mathematical transformation to irreversibly encrypt information. That being said, quantum cryptography relies on the laws of quantum mechanics to secure private information exchange, specifically through quantum key distribution (QKD) of a random bit sequence, in which an attempt to eavesdrop on the encoded quantum states causes a detectable disturbance in the communications signal. Historically, high-precision monitoring of the disturbance decreases efficiency – but recently, scientists at The University of Tokyo, Stanford University and National Institute of Informatics (Tokyo) proposed a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle.
ll number of bits can be simultaneously read, and the receiver to determine how a single bit is to be calculated. Since an eavesdropper is unable to learn the entire sequence it is impossible to correctly guess the bit value. Moreover, the proposed QKD protocol demonstrated a novel way of utilizing it for secure communication by spreading quantum information coherently over hundreds of quantum systems, such as optical pulses– and because the resulting quantum effect survives under significant noise, the researchers state that their results will facilitate the simple and efficient use of conventional lasers for QKD.
Prof. Masato Koashi discussed the paper that he, Prof. Yoshihisa Yamamoto and Dr. Toshihiko Sasaki published in Nature, first addressing the challenges of defining a quantum key distribution protocol in which non-orthogonal quantum states and random bit calculation to prevent an eavesdropper from correctly determining the bit value by independently bounding leaked information. "This is the point where our new QKD scheme differs from conventional QKD, which relies on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and allows an eavesdropper to read the signal but leaves a trace that the legitimate users can counter by observing the trace," Koashi tells Phys.org. "Our new QKD protocol works on a different principle that prevents eavesdropping attempts rather than detecting them. The challenge was to conceive of a QKD based on such a different principle."
Koashi points out that encoding many raw key bits on quantum
systems coherently such that only a few bits can be read out at the
same time had some issues as well. "The idea of using a weak
coherent pulse train instead of individual photons itself was
introduced in 2003, in the form of a QKD scheme called differential
phase shift (DPS) QKD. The problem was the lack of a security proof
to show that DPS QKD achieves a good key rate."Another challenge was
determining that a practical implementation using a laser pulse
train achieves a key rate comparable to a decoy-state QKD
protocol, in which several different photon intensities are
used instead of one to compensate for the security loophole that
arises when the sender uses multi-photon sources rather than a
single-photon source to transmit quantum information. "The
challenge here was to determine how to use a mundane laser, rather
than more exotic light sources such as a single-photon source, for
QKD," Koashi explains. "The laser is cheap and can emit pulses in a
rapid sequence – for example, 109 pulses per second –
but its drawback is the photon number randomness in a single pulse:
a laser pulse sometimes includes two or more photons, so if we use
laser pulses for a QKD scheme employing a photon as an information
carrier, such multi-photon pulses are exploited by an eavesdropper
because additional photons are available." He concludes that since
the decoy-state QKD protocol incorporates additional monitoring
steps to infer how much an eavesdropper may have exploited
multi-photon pulses, it was one of the best answers so far – but
since the complicated monitoring steps in the decoy-state QKD is
tedious, a QKD scheme which does not use a single photon as a
carrier, but uses more of the wave-like property of light, would be
preferable. "In that case, we wouldn't need to worry when the laser
emits two or more photons. That said," he acknowledges "while DPS
QKD – which utilizes a weak coherent pulse train instead of
individual photons – is one example of such an attempt, there is no
security proof showing that this scheme works well."