Two AH-64 attack helicopters were on an armed reconnaissance
mission patrolling a vast mountainous area in Afghanistan by
following the terrain at low altitude, so they would not be a
visual target for any Taliban hostiles, and also utilizing the
hills and forests as natural sound barriers to muffle their rotors.
Randomly, one of the aircraft would “pop up” so it could visually
inspect the surroundings for suspicious activities.
On this late afternoon as one “popped up” the pilot spotted
activity within the range of his missiles. From his pre-mission
briefing he knew there were Afghan government forces operating in
the territories as well as civilians from surrounding villages
going about their normal daily affairs. He knew that friendly
forces in the area had no capability of controlling his aircraft
for attacks, so he was responsible for ensuring the safe delivery
of all aviation ordnance. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated
there were possible Taliban troop movements in the area as well as
the possibility of an ISIS enemy armored column moving through. The
type of weapons that he would select to fire depended on the target
type. For a troop convoy he would use either his 30mm main gun or
anti-personnel rockets, while for an armored column he would use
armor piercing hellfire missiles. If he decided that he was facing
a troop convoy, he’d decide between the helicopter’s 30 mm main gun
and the anti-personnel rockets depending on the size of the convoy.
Obviously, if he believed that the activity was caused by
friendlies (allies or civilians), he wouldn’t fire at all.
• If the pilot decided the target was an enemy troop convoy,
then the military strategists would score the battle damage
assessment (BDA) on the troop convoy as being “worth” 250
units.
• If he was wrong and, instead, it turned out to be an ISIS
armored column, then the BDA was rated at 350 units because while
the rockets could effectively immobilize the convoy, they would not
achieve destruction of the targets.
• On the other hand, if a tragic mistake was made and the
target turned out to be friendly combatants, the BDA would be rated
as -500 units
• Yet, if they appeared to be civilian, BDA would be rated at
-200. The smaller “penalty” for a strike on civilians was since
oftentimes apparent civilians did turn out to be Taliban
combatants.
• Likewise, if he decided that the observed activity was
caused by an armored column, he would select the anti-armor
missiles. If in fact, the activity was caused by an ISIS armored
column, the BDA would be rated at 600 units while if it was a troop
column, the BDA would be rated at 200 units because of the minimal
effect on a troop column compared to rockets.
• In the unfortunate event that the activity was caused by
civilians, the strike would be assessed at -100 units.
• While if he accidentally struck friendly Afghan army
combatants, the BDA would be assessed at – 300 units.
The pilot was excited at the unexpected appearance of a
possible target of opportunity and conducted a Collateral Damage
Estimate call with a ground analyst to ensure that rules of
engagement were followed before executing a strike. Then, with an
adrenalin rush, he feverishly prepared for action having
momentarily forgotten all the information provided to him and the
other attack helicopter’s pilot during that morning’s intelligence
briefing.
Q1. Determine how he would have identified the cause of the
activity he spotted (civilian, Afghan army, Taliban or armored
ISIS) depending on his attitude toward risk.
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Moments later, his years of training and experience kicked in
and his professionalism took over. Based on what he was able to see
combined with the intelligence briefings he received, he put the
probability of the activity to be caused by friendly forces at 0.05
and by civilians at 0.15. However, he thought there was a great
likelihood that the activity was caused by enemy forces and he
estimated the probability of it being caused by a Taliban convoy at
0.5 and by an armored ISIS column at 0.3.
Q2. What course of action would maximize his expected
MU’s?
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Fully aware of the negative consequences of firing on friendly
forces or civilians, the Department of the Army decided to ask the
Pentagon to request a special earmark, requiring Congressional
approval, in next year’s budget for the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA) to issue an RFP for the development of a
technology to help air crews improve their ability of identifying
friends from foes in battle conditions. Such an approval will
require persuasive argument as well as analysis of the potential
benefit that such a technology would have on improving the military
utility of the attack helicopter.
Q3 How would you optimistically quantify the military utility
of having such a technology developed?
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Having successfully argued the benefits of such a technology,
the Pentagon awarded a “proof of concept” contract to a major
defense contractor, to develop a sensor capability for the attack
helicopters for their aircrews to enhance their targeting
decisions. As part of the contract, the contractor delivered 25
prototypes that allowed the use of a battery of sensors to better
“see” potential targets. The signals from these sensors, which
included radar and forward looking infrared imagery consolidated to
provide a composite picture.
The prototypes were put through extensive testing and
eventually, to validate the test results, were deployed on
helicopters. No technology is perfect, but the track record of
these sensor fusion prototypes was excellent as given by the
following track record:
• Of the times the sensor had indicated the presence of a
threat (troops or armor), 65% of the time it correctly identified
Taliban troop convoys and 90% of the time it correctly identified
ISIS armored columns.
• Conversely, when the sensor indicated the presence of a
threat, 1% of the time the “threat” consisted of Afghan government
forces and 5% of the time civilians.
Q4 Based on this performance, should the Army issue a major
procurement contract to equip all Apaches with this new
technology?
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Although the use of the sensors is tempting, it also exposes
the helicopter to counter measures and increases the probability
that the hunter will become hunted. If the pilot chose to use the
sensors, then the resulting benefits would have to be balanced
against the risk of coming under fire.
• If the activity spotted using the sensors is actually a
friendly force or civilians, then there is no risk of coming under
fire.
• However, if that activity is actually a Taliban convoy, then
chance of being hit is only 1%.
• On the other hand, if it is an armored ISIS column, then he
will come under fire from imbedded anti-air defense artillery and
his chance of being hit will be 10%.
• If he’s hit, he will not be able to act upon the sensor
information.
• If he isn’t hit, he will not know that he came under fire
and go through the normal protocols as though nothing had
happened.
Q5 How do the sensor-use probabilities impact the decision to
procure them for the Apache force?