Question

Why do single - menber district tend to create a two part system in the governments that implement them?

Why do Proportional representation systems lead to more numerous and more disciplined parties?

Answer 1

Why do single - menber district tend to create a two part system in the governments that implement them?

A single-member district or single-member electoral district is an electoral district that returns one officeholder to a multi-member body like a legislature. This is also often referred to as single-winner voting, or winner takes all. The alternatives are multi-member districts, or a body's election as one constituency by the whole electorate. For certain nations, such as Australia and India, lower house members are elected from single-member districts; and upper house members are selected from multi-member districts. For several other nations, such as Singapore, parliamentarians can be elected from both single-member districts and multi-member districts. Single-member district supporters have argued that it facilitates a closer link between the representative and voters, which improves transparency, which is a check on misconduct which corruption. It is argued in countries that have multi-member constituencies that the electoral connection is lost. In Israel, for example, the country as a whole is a single constituency and a representatives are selected by party-lists.

It has been argued that districts with one Member appear to support two-party structures (with some national parties). Named Duverger's law, this theory was also empirically confirmed by the cube rule, which demonstrates how the winning party is mathematically over-represented in the final chamber of representatives in a first-past-the-post system. Supporters view this effect as beneficial, as parliamentary governments are typically more stable in two-party systems, and minorities do not have undue power to break a coalition. First-past-the-post minimizes the influence of third parties and thus arguably keeps out opposition. Critics of two-party systems argue that two-party systems provide less choice for voters, generate disproportionate focus on topics that control more marginal seats, and do not fully remove the possibility of a representative chamber (or hanging parliament) that can also give the independents excessive influence and lead to even greater instability.

Why do Proportional representation systems lead to more numerous and more disciplined parties?

Proportional representation (PR) characterizes electoral systems in which electoral inequalities are proportionately represented in the elected body.[1] If n percent of the electorate chooses a single political party as their choice, then roughly n percent of the seats will be held by that party.[2] The nature of these systems is that all votes contribute to the outcome — not only a majority. The most prevalent methods of proportional representation also involve the use of multi-member electoral districts (also called super-districts), since one seat can not be filled proportionally. In reality, PR systems which achieve the highest proportionality tend to include districts with large seats

The need to secure the confidence of the House creates a powerful incentive to impose party discipline, which has important advantages—but it can also be abused. If party leaders insist that even routine votes on ordinary legislation are matters of confidence, MPs can be made to act like pawns of the executive. This problem does not arise in a presidential system, where the tenure in office of members of congress is decoupled from the fate of the president (because they are separately elected for fixed terms). Party discipline displaces deliberation from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and its staff. It turns Parliament into a glorified electoral college and showcase for partisan competition. At the same time, the media focus on leaders and question period theatrics exacerbates the personalization of politics, leaving much of the work of Parliament invisible. The parties themselves become public relations vehicles for candidates. Once elected, MPs have few opportunities to vote their conscience or initiate legislation and debate. The desire to win a Cabinet post reinforces party discipline and further empowers leaders. Political leaders would learn to work together, as competition between parties will be balanced by understanding the need for election-to-election cooperation. This will lower opportunities for constant lobbying and the use of wedge topics. For third parties, elections will cease to be life-or-death fights. Strategies for bringing rivals out of business indefinitely will get fewer. A group that won a quarter of the vote could expect a reciprocal measure of Parliamentary power. Therefore, instead of devoting all their energies to undermining the government, smaller parties may attempt to use their power to demonstrate their ability to achieve results. Policymaking will be less likely to take place between elections and large areas of consensus could be established where parties could work together to achieve longer-term objectives.