Assume there are two firms in two different industries. The marginal cost of the first firm...

Assume there are two firms in two different industries. The marginal cost of the first firm is $30, and its price is $38. The marginal cost of the second firm is $22, and its price is $26. Calculate first the Lerner Index for each firm. Then use it to calculate the markup factor for each firm. Which firm has a higher markup factor over marginal cost?

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Rahul Sunny answered 2 weeks ago

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