Two firms produce differentiated products with demand curves p1=a−q1−bq2 and p2=a−q2−bq1. They both face constant average...

Two firms produce differentiated products with demand curves p1=a−q1−bq2 and p2=a−q2−bq1.

They both face constant average and marginal cost c and their profit functions are Π1=(p1−c)q1 and Π2=(p2−c)q2.

Solve the Cournot game.

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Rahul Sunny answered 8 months ago

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