Question

Case2: Disneyland in Europe

Between 1988 and 1990 three $150 million amusement parks opened in France. By 1991 two of them were bankrupt and the third was doing poorly. Despite this, the Walt Disney Company went ahead with a plan to open Europe’s first Disneyland in 1992. Far from being concerned about the theme park doing well, Disney executives were worried that Euro Disneyland would be too small to handle the giant crowds. The $4.4 billion project was to be located on 5,000 acres in Seine-et-Marne 20 miles east of Paris. And the city seemed to be an excellent location; there were 17 million people within a two-hour drive of Euro Disneyland, 41 million within a four-hour drive, and 109 million within six hours of the park. This included people from seven countries: France, Switzerland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain. Disney officials were optimistic about the project. Their US parks, Disneyland and Disneyworld, were extremely successful, and Tokyo Disneyland was so popular that on some days it could not accommodate the large number of visitors. Simply put, the company was making a great deal of money from its parks. However, the Tokyo park was franchised to others—and Disney management felt that it had given up too much profit with this arrangement. This would not be the case at Euro Disneyland. The company’s share of the venture was to be 49 per cent for which it would put up $160 million. Other investors put in $1.2 billion, the French government provided a low-interest $900 million loan, banks loaned the business $1.6 billion, and the remaining $400 million was to come from special partnerships formed to buy properties and to lease them back. For its investment and management of the operation, the Walt Disney Company was to receive 10 per cent of Euro Disney’s admission fees, 5 per cent of food and merchandise revenues, and 49 per cent of all profits. The location of the amusement park was thoroughly researched. The number of people who could be attracted to various locations throughout Europe and the amount of money they were likely to spend during a visit to the park were carefully calculated. In the end, France and Spain had proved to offer the best locations. Both countries were well aware of the park’s capability for creating jobs and stimulating their economy. As a result, each actively wooed the company. In addition to offering a central location in the heart of Europe, France was prepared to provide considerable financial incentives. Among other things, the French government promised to build a train line to connect the amusement park to the European train system. Thus, after carefully comparing the advantages offered by both countries, France was chosen as the site for the park. At first things appeared to be off to a roaring start. Unfortunately, by the time the park was ready to open, a number of problems had developed, and some of these had a very dampening effect on early operations. One was the concern of some French people that Euro Disney was nothing more than a transplanting of Disneyland into Europe. In their view the park did not fit into the local culture, and some of the French press accused Disney of “cultural imperialism.” Others objected to the fact that the French government, as promised in the contract, had expropriated the necessary land and sold it without profit to the Euro Disneyland development people. Signs reading “Don’t gnaw away our national wealth” and “Disney go home” began appearing along roadways. These negative feelings may well have accounted for the fact that on opening day only 50,000 visitors showed up, in contrast to the 500,000 that were expected. Soon thereafter, operations at the park came under criticism from both visitors and employees. Many visitors were upset about the high prices. In the case of British tourists, for example, because of the Franc exchange rate, it was cheaper for them to go to Florida than to Euro Disney. In the case of employees, many of them objected to the pay rates and the working conditions. They also raised concerns about a variety of company policies ranging from personal grooming to having to speak English in meetings, even if most people in attendance spoke French. Within the first month 3,000 employees quit. Some of the other operating problems were a result of Disney’s previous experiences. In the United States, for example, liquor was not sold outside of the hotels or specific areas. The general park was kept alcohol free, including the restaurants, in order to maintain a family atmosphere. In Japan, this policy was accepted and worked very well. However, Europeans were used to having outings with alcoholic beverages. As a result of these types of problems, Euro Disney soon ran into financial problems. In 1994, after three years of heavy losses, the operation was in such bad shape that some people were predicting that the park would close. However, a variety of developments saved the operation. For one thing, a major investor purchased 24.6 per cent (reducing Disney’s share to 39 per cent) of the company, injecting $500 million of much needed cash. Additionally, Disney waived its royalty fees and worked out a new loan repayment plan with the banks, and new shares were issued. These measures allowed Euro Disney to buy time while it restructured its marketing and general policies to fit the European market. In October 1994, Euro Disney officially changed its name to “Disneyland Paris.” This made the park more French and permitted it to capitalize on the romanticism that the word “Paris” conveys. Most importantly, the new name allowed for a new beginning, disassociating the park from the failure of Euro Disney. This was accompanied with measures designed to remedy past failures. The park changed its most offensive labor rules, reduced prices, and began being more culturally conscious. Among other things, alcohol beverages were now allowed to be served just about anywhere. The company also began making the park more appealing to local visitors by giving it a “European” focus. Ninety-two per cent of the park’s visitors are from eight nearby European countries. Disney Tomorrowland, with its dated images of the space age, was jettisoned entirely and replaced by a gleaming brass and wood complex called Discovery land, which was based on themes of Jules Verne and Leonardo da Vinci. In Disneyland food services were designed to reflect the fable’s country of origin: Pinocchio’s facility served German food, Cinderella’s had French offerings, and at Bella Notte’s the cuisine was Italian. The company also shot a 360-degree movie about French culture and showed it in the “Visionarium” exhibit. These changes were designed to draw more visitors, and they seemed to have worked. Disneyland Paris reported a slight profit in 1996, and the park continued to make a modest profit through to the early 2000s. In 2002 and 2003, the company was once again making losses, and new deals had to be worked out with creditors. This time, however, it wasn’t insensitivity to local customs but a slump in the travel and tourism industry, strikes and stoppages in France, and an economic downturn in many of the surrounding markets.

Questions

What is Walt Disney Company shown as multinational enterprises (MNE) characteristics?

Disney instead of licensing some other firm to build and operate the park and settling for a royalty, it takes wholly ownership strategy in the firm, why?

Are Walt Disney and Euro Disney indicate the same strategy of MNE?

Before going ahead with Euro Disney, was there an external environmental analysis from Disney? Clarify.

answer about 800 words.

Answer 1

Walt Disney company has multinational characteristics as it has business operations in various countries and its business operations are locally adapted as well as centrally coordinated with maintaining brand identity and similar services across different locations in different countries.

Disney instead of licensing takes wholly ownership as it can have more control over the business operations and monitor the business regularly for making it more customer friendly and profitable. If it gives licensing rights to another firm then it cannot maintain control over complete business operations. With wholly ownership it has more flexibility for making any changes if the strategies need modification.

Walt Disney and Euro Disney maintained same strategy of MNEs since both organisation operated with common characteristics of Walt Disney as well as doing changes depending on local customer demands and preferences. Walt Disney controlled the investment and operations while the services and benefits are provided as per local demand and culture.

There was external environment analysis going for Euro Disney. The location, demand by customers, feasibility of starting Disneyland, popularity for the brand were assessed. The cultural preferences were not checked and economic factors that later impacted the business and changes were made to its strategy in the region for making it compatible with local demands and culture, increasing profitability and garnering support of local political and legal systems apart from social cultural trends.