Question

In: Economics

Suppose there are two types of demanders, casual: P = 500 − Q and hardcore: P...

Suppose there are two types of demanders, casual: P = 500 − Q and hardcore: P = 500 − 0.5Q; while the cost to serve all consumers is given by C(Q) = 200Q. For simplicity, we’ll assume there is just a single consumer of each type.

1. Find the optimal two part pricing scheme when all prospective customers must be offered the same fixed access fee and per-unit price.

2. Find the optimal two part pricing scheme when the firm is able to treat each demand segment as distinct from the other and therefore may offer a different access fee and per-unit price to each group.

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