Question
In: Economics
Suppose there are two types of demanders, casual: P = 500 − Q and hardcore: P...
Suppose there are two types of demanders, casual: P = 500 − Q and hardcore: P = 500 − 0.5Q; while the cost to serve all consumers is given by C(Q) = 200Q. For simplicity, we’ll assume there is just a single consumer of each type.
1. Find the optimal two part pricing scheme when all prospective customers must be offered the same fixed access fee and per-unit price.
2. Find the optimal two part pricing scheme when the firm is able to treat each demand segment as distinct from the other and therefore may offer a different access fee and per-unit price to each group.
Solutions
Rahul Sunny answered 8 months agoRelated Solutions
12. Suppose a monopoly firm faces the market demand Q = 500 – p and has...
12. Suppose a monopoly firm faces the market demand Q = 500 – p
and has cost function C = 100 + Q2 . Find the firm’s profit, CS,
PS, and DWL for the following scenarios:
a. The monopoly firm charges a single price
b. The monopoly firm perfectly price discriminate
c. The monopoly firm adopts a block-pricing schedule with 2
quantity blocks
Gene P has two alleles - P and p; gene Q has two alleles - Q...
Gene P has two alleles - P and p; gene Q has two alleles - Q and
q.
If an PQ/pq female is crossed with a
pq/pq male, what percent of the offspring would have
genotype pq/pq if...
A) the genes were completely
linked (no crossing-over at all; recombination frequency =
0; 1 mark)
B) the genes are 10 map units apart (1
mark)
C) the genes are 24 map units apart (1
mark)
For either part (B) or (C)...
Suppose there are only two types of cars in the used car market q=0 and q=1....
Suppose there are only two types of cars in the used car market
q=0 and q=1. Half the cars are q=0 and the other half are q=1.
Buyers still cannot tell the quality but they are aware of the
quality distribution. Sellers are willing to accept any price p
>0, but prefer to receive a higher price. If buyers do not know
q, then they are willing to pay p=10000*Q+500 where Q is the
average quality of the cars in...
Suppose there are only two types of cars in the used car market q=0 and q=1....
Suppose there are only two types of cars in the used car
market q=0 and q=1.
Half the cars are q=0 and the other half are
q=1.
Buyers still cannot tell the quality but they are aware
of the quality distribution.
Sellers are willing to accept any price p≥0, but prefer
to receive a higher price.
If buyers do not know q, then they are willing to pay
p=10000*Q+500
where Q is the average quality of the cars in the...
A company sells two types of life insurance policies (P and Q) and one type of...
A company sells two types of life insurance policies (P and Q)
and one type of health insurance policy. A survey of potential
customers revealed the following:
i) No survey participant wanted to purchase both life
policies.
ii) Twice as many survey participants wanted to purchase life
policy P as life policy Q.
iii) 45% of survey participants wanted to purchase the health
policy.
iv) 18% of survey participants wanted to purchase only the
health policy.
v) The event that...
1.) Suppose that the statement form ((p ∧ ∼ q)∨(p ∧ ∼ r))∧(∼ p ∨ ∼...
1.) Suppose that the statement form ((p ∧ ∼ q)∨(p ∧ ∼ r))∧(∼ p ∨
∼ s) is true. What can you conclude about the truth values of the
variables p, q, r and s? Explain your reasoning
2.Use the Laws of Logical Equivalence (provided in class and in
the textbook page 35 of edition 4 and page 49 of edition 5) to show
that: ((∼ (p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ (∼ p ∧ ∼ r)) ∧ s) ≡ ((r...
1. Suppose that the market demand is described by P = A – B(Q+q) where P...
1. Suppose that the market demand is described by P = A – B(Q+q)
where P is the market price, Q is the output of the incumbent firm,
and q is the output of the potential entrant to the market. The
incumbent’s total cost function is C(Q) = c1Q, whereas the cost
function of the
entrant is C(q) = c2q+F.
a. If the entrant firm observes the incumbent producing Q* units of
output and expects
this output level to be...
Suppose S = {p, q, r, s, t, u} and A = {p, q, s, t}...
Suppose S = {p, q, r, s, t, u} and A = {p, q, s, t} and B = {r,
s, t, u} are events.
x p q r s t u
p(x) 0.15 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1
(a) Determine what must be p(s).
(b) Find p(A), p(B) and p(A∩B).
(c) Determine whether A and B are independent. Explain.
(d) Arer A and B mutually exclusive? Explain.
(e) Does this table represent a probability istribution of any
random variable? Explain.
(c) (¬p ∨ q) → (p ∧ q) and p (d) (p → q) ∨ p...
(c) (¬p ∨ q) → (p ∧ q) and p
(d) (p → q) ∨ p and T
I was wondering if I could get help proving these expressions
are logically equivalent by applying laws of logic.
Also these 2 last questions im having trouble with.
Rewrite the negation of each of the following logical expressions
so that all negations
immediately precede predicates.
(a) ¬∀x(¬P(x) → Q(x))
(b) ¬∃x(P(x) → ¬Q(x))
Suppose the demand for donuts in Bethlehem is; P = 10 – Q where Q =...
Suppose the demand for donuts in Bethlehem is;
P = 10 – Q where Q = qA + qB
There are only two firms that sell donuts in Bethlehem, Firm A
and Firm B. Each firm has the same cost function;
TC = 2 + q
a. Determine the Cournot equilibrium.
b. Explain why the intersection of the best-response functions
is the Cournot equilibrium.
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