Question

In: Economics

Suppose that the Sacramento River Cats can segment their fans into young fans and senior citizens....

Suppose that the Sacramento River Cats can segment their fans into young fans and senior citizens. Young fans have the demand curve P=120-10G(MR=120-20G). Senior citizens have the demand curve P=60-10G(MR=60-20G). Assume that MC=0. (a)What are the equilibrium price and quantity if the monopoly charges both groups the same price?(b)What are the equilibrium price and quantity for each group if the River Cats can segment the market?(c)Calculate producer surplus in each case.

Solutions

Expert Solution

Solution :-

(a) :-

Young fans have the demand curve :-

P=120-10G(MR=120-20G).

Inverse demand curve for Young fans :-

G = ( 120 - P)/10

Senior citizens have the demand curve :-

P= 60-10G(MR=60-20G).

Inverse demand curve for Senior citizens :-

G = ( 60 - P)/10

Assume that MC = 0

if the monopoly charges both groups the same price Then total demand in the market :-

G' = G + G

= (120 - P)/10 + ( 60 - P)/10

= [( 120 - P) + ( 60 - P) ]/10

= ( 120 - P + 60 - P)/10

G' = ( 180 - 2P)/10

Then,

G' = (90 - P)/5......The inverse demand curve for market

5G' = 90 - P

[ P = 90 - 5G' ]....... demand curve for the market

Now,

Total revenue = P x G'

= ( 90 - 5G') x G'

= 90G - 5G'^2

MR = differentiation of total revenue with respect to G' = 90 - 10G'

We have,

MC = 0

At Optimal condition :-

MR = MC

90 - 10G' = 0

90 = 10G'

G' = 90/10

[G' = 9 ]

equilibrium quantity G' = 9

So, The demand curve equation

P = 90 - 5G'

Put G' = 9

P = 90 - 5 x 9

= 90 - 45

[ P = 45 ]

Equilibrium price P = 45

(b) :-

The equilibrium price and quantity for each group if the River Cats can segment the market :-

When there are different prices for the two segments :-

For Young fans :-

MR =120-20G

MC =0

Optimal condition -

MR = MC

120 - 20G = 0

120 = 20G

G = 120/20

[ G* = 6 ]

So, The equilibrium quantity for Young fans is

G* = 6

Now, The demand curve for Young fans :-

P* = 120 - 10G

Put G = 6

P* = 120 - 10 x 6

= 120 - 60

[ P* = 60 ]

Equilibrium price for Young fans P* = 60.

For senior citizens :-

MR = 60-20G

MC = 0

Optimal condition -

MR = MC

60 - 20G = 0

60 = 20G

G = 60/20

[ G** = 3 ]

Equilibrium quantity for senior citizens G** = 3

Now, The demand curve for senior citizens :-

P** = 60 - 10G

Put G = 3

P** = 60 - 10 x 3

= 60 - 30

[P** = 30 ]

Equilibrium quantity for senior citizens P** = 30

(c) :-

producer surplus in each case.

Here, cost is zero

Then,

Producer surplus = profit

When there was a uniform price in the market :-

Producer surplus = P x G'

We know P = 45, G' = 9

Producer surplus = 45 x 9

= 405

When price is not uniform :-

Producer surplus from Young fans segment

= P* x G*

= 60 x 6........( P* = 60 , G* = 6)

= 360

Producer surplus from senior citizens segment

= P** x G**

= 30 x 3......( P**= 30, G** = 3)

= 90

Total producer surplus = 360 + 90

= 450


Related Solutions

Suppose that the BIG CATS  can segment their fans into young fans and senior citizens. Young fans...
Suppose that the BIG CATS  can segment their fans into young fans and senior citizens. Young fans have the demand curve P=120-10G (MR=120-20G). Senior citizens have the demand curve P=60-10G (MR=60-20G). Assume that MC=0. What are the equilibrium price and quantity if the monopoly charges both groups the same price? What are the equilibrium price and quantity for each group if the BIG Cats can segment the market? Calculate producer surplus in each case.
It is found that 60% of American victims of healthcare fraud are senior citizens. Suppose that...
It is found that 60% of American victims of healthcare fraud are senior citizens. Suppose that I have randomly sampled 100 victims, and I am looking at the count, x, of how many of those victims were senior citizens. Find the following: a. the mean, variance and standard deviation of the distribution b. the probability that at least 50 are senior citizens c. the probability that 75 of them are senior citizens d. the probability that less than 55 of...
3) Suppose a firm sells to senior citizens and others at a single price of $10....
3) Suppose a firm sells to senior citizens and others at a single price of $10. At this price it sells 20,000 units total (4,000 to seniors; 16,000 to others). It estimates that at the $10 price, seniors have an elasticity of -3 while others have an elasticity of -1.5. a) How could this firm change its pricing strategy to increase profits while holding its overall level of production constant and continuing to use only linear (per unit) prices? Be...
Suppose we are studying the effects of expanded income supplement for senior citizens on their health....
Suppose we are studying the effects of expanded income supplement for senior citizens on their health. We use the two-group, to-period differences-in-differences setup, with working-age citizens as our control group.Which of the following is a key assumption for the validity of this identification strategy? a. After the intervention, the average health trends would be the same for both groups. b. In the absence of the intervention, theaverage health outcomes would be the same for both groups. c. Before the intervention,...
1. Suppose that the citizens of Hungary can purchase all the oil they desire at the...
1. Suppose that the citizens of Hungary can purchase all the oil they desire at the going international price (the supply curve of oil is perfectly elastic). If the Hungarian government levies a tax on oil, who bears the burden? Illustrate your answer with a supply and demand diagram. Assume the demand curve is downward sloping.
Suppose that a paper mill earns $700,000 when it pollutes a river, and that it can...
Suppose that a paper mill earns $700,000 when it pollutes a river, and that it can abate pollution at a cost of $140,000. The effects of pollution are confined to a single farmer, who earns $530,000 if the water is clean and $230,000 if it is polluted. Assume that bargaining is frictionless and that the parties will split the gains from any agreement equally. a. What agreement will the mill and the farmer negotiate if the mill has the right...
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT