Consider a market for used cars. There are many sellers and even more buyers. A seller...

Consider a market for used cars. There are many sellers and even more buyers. A seller values a high quality car at 800 and a low quality car at 200. For any quality, the value to buyers is m times the value to sellers, where m > 1. All agents are risk-neutral. Sellers know the quality of their own car, but buyers only know that 2/3 of the cars are low quality and the remaining 1/3 of them are high quality. For what values of m do all sellers sell their used cars?

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Rahul Sunny answered 2 years ago

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