Question

In: Economics

In this situation you have two firms that face separate marginal abatement cost functions of MAC1...

In this situation you have two firms that face separate marginal abatement cost functions of MAC1 = 6.5 and MAC1 = 4.5, where A is units of abatement that occur by a firm. Both companies can sell up to two units of output and each unit of output generates one unit of pollution. The price for each unit of output is $15.00 that yields a revenue of $30 dollars per period. Each company is required to hold a permit for each unit of pollution generated. The government issues 2 permits and each company hold 1 permit.

a. Using each marginal abatement cost functions, explain the strategy for Firm 1. Would they buy and additional permit or sell a permit when the price for permits is $3.00? Explain. Using each marginal abatement cost functions, explain the strategy for Firm 2. Would they buy and additional permit or sell a permit when the price for permits is $3.00? Explain.

c. If the price for permits increases to $5.00, what is the strategy for Firm 1? Will there be a tradable permit market system if the price for permits is $5?

Solutions

Expert Solution

Given that,

MAC1 = 6.5A

MAC2 = 4.5A

Marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 1 = 6.5 * 1

= $6.5

Marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 2 = 4.5 * 1

= $4.5

Above calculations indicates that the marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 1 is $6.5 that is higher than the Marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 2, i.e. $4.5.

(a) Firm 1 will buy the permit,

This is because the price of permit is $3 and the Marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 1 is $6.5.

Hence, by the purchase of permit it can save $3.5($6.5 - $3).

(b) Firm 2 will also buy the permit,

This is because the price of permit is $3 and the Marginal abatement cost of 1 unit for Firm 2 is $4.5. So by the purchase of permit it can save $1.5($4.5 - $3).

(c) If the price of Permit increases to $5, then

firm 1 will still purchase it because its own marginal cost of abatement of 1 unit is $6.5 which is greater than $5.

As there will be trade at $5, so there will be a tradeable permits market.


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