In: Economics
Answer:
1):- This can be illustrated in a game-theoretic environment in a normal form game with the following pay-off matrix. There are 2 players in this game, {Company 1, Company 2} and the strategy set is {Sink wide well, Sink narrow well}. The pay-offs are spoken to in each of the cells of the matrix for each firm with their as well as their counterpart's strategy.
Clampett wide well | Clampett narrow well | |
TEXplor wide well | (1M, 1M) | (16M, -1M) |
TEXplor narrow well | (-1M, 16M) | (14M, 14M) |
2):- Consider TEXplor first. On the off chance that Clampett decides to sink a wide well, TEXplor earns a higher payoff by sinking a wide well ( 1> - 1). Similarly, if Clampett decides to sink a narrow well, TEXplor earns a higher payoff by sinking a wide well. In this manner, independent of what Clampett decides to do, TEXplor sinks a wide well, making it its dominant strategy.
Next consider Clampett. Following the same argument as above, Clampett also always decides to sink a wide well, regardless of what TEXplor does. Hence, sinking a wide well is its dominant strategy.
3):- Each firm will adopt to sink wide well as it gives them the optimal pay-off/profit independent of the rival's strategy.
4):- Truly, there exists a Nash equilibrium which is for both to Sink wide well and earn a pay-off of 1 million each (1,1). There is no tendency here for each one to redirect to any other strategy.
5):- Collusion is conceivable in this game since it will bring a larger payoff to both the organizations. On the off chance that both the organizations decide to plot and sink narrow wells, both will get a payoff of GHC 14 Million, which is a lot larger than the equilibrium payoff of GHC 1 Million. Subsequently, if there's a high probability of future interaction between the two firms, collusion can be sustained.
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