Sheffield Inc. acquired 20% of the outstanding common stock of Theresa Kulikowski Inc. on December 31, 2020. The purchase price was $1,320,800 for 50,800 shares. Kulikowski Inc. declared and paid an $0.90 per share cash dividend on June 30 and on December 31, 2021. Kulikowski reported net income of $755,000 for 2021. The fair value of Kulikowski’s stock was $29 per share at December 31, 2021. Assume that the security is a trading security.

Prepare the journal entries for Sheffield Inc. for 2020 and 2021, assuming that Sheffield cannot exercise significant influence over Kulikowski. (Credit account titles are automatically indented when amount is entered. Do not indent manually. If no entry is required, select "No Entry" for the account titles and enter 0 for the amounts.)

eTextbook and Media

List of Accounts

Prepare the journal entries for Sheffield Inc. for 2020 and 2021, assuming that Sheffield can exercise significant influence over Kulikowski. (Credit account titles are automatically indented when amount is entered. Do not indent manually. If no entry is required, select "No Entry" for the account titles and enter 0 for the amounts.)

eTextbook and Media

List of Accounts

At what amount is the investment in securities reported on the balance sheet under each of these methods at December 31, 2021? What is the total net income reported in 2021 under each of these methods?

1. Which of the following is generally false when a consolidation occurs?

           (a) The consolidated entity assumes the debts of the original corporations.

           (b) The consolidated entity takes on the rights of the original companies.

           (c) The consolidated entity obtains the original corporations’ assets.

           (d) The new corporation has independent legal status.

           (e) The original corporations continue to exist legally.

2. Which of the following is true regarding the type of intangible item that may constitute an asset?

          (a) A company name is a type of intangible item that may constitute an asset, but goodwill and a company logo are not.

          (b) Goodwill, a company name, and a company logo all constitute types of intangible items that may constitute assets.

          (c) Goodwill is a type of intangible item that may constitute an asset, but a company name and a company logo are not.

          (d) Goodwill and a company name are types of intangible items that may constitute assets, but a company logo is not.

          (e) A company name and a company logo are types of intangible items that may constitute assets, but goodwill is not.

3.

What key piece of information does an aggressor generally need in order to gain control of a target corporation through proxies?

               (a) The income statements of the target.

               (b) The list of members of the board of directors of the target.

               (c) A list of target shareholders.

               (d) A list of target officers.

               (e) The balance sheet of the target.

4.

In a consolidation, which of the following is true regarding the property of the original corporations?

                 (a) It must be held in trust for at least one year to satisfy claims of creditors.

                 (b) It is acquired by the new corporation.

                 (c) It must be sold and distributed to the respective shareholders.

                 (d) It must be placed within the jurisdiction of the secretary of state for at least one year in order to satisfy the claims of creditors.

                 (e) It must be held in trust for at least six months to satisfy claims of creditors.

5. In a consolidation, which of the following is true regarding the property of the original corporations?.

(a) It must be held in trust for at least one year to satisfy claims of creditors.

(b) It is acquired by the new corporation.

(c) It must be sold and distributed to the respective shareholders.

(d) It must be placed within the jurisdiction of the secretary of state for at least one year in order to satisfy claims of creditors.

(e) It must be held in trust for at least six months to satisfy claims of creditors.

CA5-5 WRITING (Cash Flow Analysis) The partner in charge of the Kappeler Corporation audit comes by your desk and leaves
a letter he has started to the CEO and a copy of the cash flow statement for the year ended December 31, 2017. Because he must leave
on an emergency, he asks you to finish the letter by explaining: (1) the disparity between net income and cash flow, (2) the importance
of operating cash flow, (3) the renewable source(s) of cash flow, and (4) possible suggestions to improve the cash position.

Date
President Kappeler, CEO
Kappeler Corporation
125 Wall Street
Middleton, Kansas 67458
Dear Mr. Kappeler:
I have good news and bad news about the financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2017. The good news is that net
income of $100,000 is close to what we predicted in the strategic plan last year, indicating strong performance this year. The bad
news is that the cash balance is seriously low. Enclosed is the Statement of Cash Flows, which best illustrates how both of these
situations occurred simultaneously . . .
Instructions
Complete the letter to the CEO, including the four components requested by your boss.

Question 4: (Marks: 3)

The following table represents the percentage of teenagers in some selected countries who have used marijuana and the percentage who have used other drugs.

1. Determine the correlation coefficient, rounded to two decimal places, between the percentage of teenagers who have used marijuana and the percentage who have used other drugs. Show your work.

2. Does the following statement make sense? Explain your answer.

“I found a positive correlation for the data presented in the table relating the percentage of teenagers in various countries who have used marijuana and the percentage who have used other drugs. I concluded that using marijuana causes the use of other drugs.”

•       Ringtone and Phones-R-Us are both successful companies in the cellular phone retail sales business. On the one hand, Phones-R-Us pursues a low-cost strategy and has fairly high employee turnover rates. The firm relies on a high volume of phone sales to generate revenue. On the other hand, Ringtone pursues a competitive advantage based on customer intimacy and has very loyal employees. Ringtone sells expensive, high-quality phones and relies on its employees to provide high-quality customer service to generate sales.

•       The sales representative for both companies “bring in the bacon.” As such these people are a key factor to the firms’ success. How should each company source recruits for the position?

Hello, so for a project in management accounting we were assigned a fake kayak selling/renting company that opporates in new england. The project gave us 1,000 to invest in expansion and the locations we chose are newburyport MA, new London County CT, Pawtucket RI, and South Portland ME. We decided to invest the million on propertys in these locations however our professor wants us to calculate the ROI on these investments somehow with only using internet sources so I don;t actually know how to do that.

Please tell me what the potential revenue could be and the ROI based on data about kayak sales found anywhere on the internet. Thank you.

Challenge Exercise 7-1 (Part Level Submission)

Conklan Company manufactures outdoor fireplaces. For the first 9 months of 2020, the company reported the following operating results while operating at 80% of plant capacity:

Cost of goods sold was 80% variable and 20% fixed; operating expenses were 70% variable and 30% fixed.

In October, Conklan Company receives a special order for 3,800 fireplaces at $62 each from Langston’s Landscape Company. Acceptance of the order would result in an additional $6,400 of shipping costs but no increase in fixed operating expenses.

(c)

Before Conklan could give Langston’s Landscape Company an answer, they received a special order from Benson Building & Supply for 14,300 fireplaces. Benson is willing to pay $65 per fireplace but they want a special design imbedded into the fireplace that increases cost of goods sold by $67,210. The special design also requires the purchase of a part that costs $4,800 and will have no future use for Conklan Company. Benson Building & Supply will pick up the fireplaces so no shipping costs are involved. Due to capacity limitations, Conklan cannot accept both special orders. Which order should be accepted? Document your decision by preparing an incremental analysis for Benson’s order. (Enter loss using either a negative sign preceding the number e.g. -2,945 or parentheses e.g. (2,945).)

The intangible assets section of Pronghorn Corporation’s balance sheet at December 31, 2022, is presented here.

The patent was acquired in January 2022 and has a useful life of 10 years. The copyright was acquired in January 2016 and also has a useful life of 10 years. The following cash transactions may have affected intangible assets during 2023.

(b)

Prepare journal entries to record the 2023 amortization expense for intangible assets. (Credit account titles are automatically indented when amount is entered. Do not indent manually. If no entry is required, select "No Entry" for the account titles and enter 0 for the amounts.)

Integrative Case 3.4

The Antitrust Case on the AT&T-T Mobile Merger

Mike W. Peng

In 2011, the second-largest US mobile wireless carrier AT&T (with a 25% market share) proposed to merger with the fourth-largest carrier T-Mobile, which had a 15% market share and was a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsch Telekom. Antitrust authorities blocked this merger. Why?

The Merger

In March 2011, Dallas-based AT&T announced that it had reached an agreement with Deutsch Telekom. (DT) to purchase DTs holy into US subsidiary, T-Mobile USA, four $39 billion. The tub for concentrations in mobile wireless telecommunication services in the US the counter for more than 90% of the market share. Of the big four, the second range AT&T had about 25% market share, and the fourth-ranked T-Mobile had 15%. The largest player was Verizon with 31%, and the third was Sprint Nextel at 20%. Although some small carriers competed in certain regions, no carriers other than the big four competed nationally. After the proposed merger, the combined AT&T and T-Mobile would become the nation’s largest wireless carrier, commanding more than 40% of market share, with 132 million customers and 72 billion in revenues. The scale and scope of the merger would require regulatory approval. AT&T indicated its willingness to sell off certain assets if necessary, and plan to complete merger in one year.

AT&T argued that the merger would allow AT&T to expand 4G LTE broadband to another 55 million Americans, reaching a total of 97% of the population and especially benefit in rural areas currently without broadband coverage. Because T-Mobile was losing money and suffering from its poor economies of scale, and it (and its parent company DT) had been unable to upgrade its networks and invest in 4G broadband. While AT&T was booming and adding customers, T-Mobile was losing customers- it was the only major carrier that did not offer the iPhone. But T-Mobile possessed some hard-to-substitute resources: spectrum. Spectrum represented finite resources auctioned by the federal communications commission (FCC). Exhausting its own spectrum, AT&T could benefit from tapping into T-Mobile’s underutilize spectrum. Accelerating 4G wireless deployment would not only generate new jobs due to AT&T’s own investment, but would also stimulate broader job creation and civil engagement due to better access to more affordable and more widespread wireless broadband services.

A variety of labor, environmental, and business groups supported the merger. These groups pointed to AT&T’s record and commitments to labor and environmental standards, and appreciated the investment and the jobs the merger would bring. Also, civil rights groups applauded the additional boost and civil engagement that could be facilitated by more widespread broadband. Governors of 26 states wrote letters to support the merger.

However, other diverse groups were opposed to this merger. Not surprisingly, Verizon and Sprint did not like the deal, because it would make them weaker. Sprint would become a distant third, so clearly it would not appreciate the outcome.  Verizon would lose its top position, but it would still be a strong player in a new duopoly. Internet companies did not like the merger either, because the merger would leave them with fewer service providers to negotiate with for getting their content and applications to customers. The computer and communication industry Association- which included eBay, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo as its members- was opposed to the merger. Consumer groups argued that the merger would raise prices and stifle innovation by consolidating so much of the wireless industry in one firm.

On the core issue of whether increasing AT&T’s market power would hurt consumers, AT&T pointed out that the average inflation-adjusted price for wireless services in the United States fell by 50% from 1999 to 2009, according to the government accountability office. AT&T also argued that in many markets AT&T would still be competing with four or more rivals, so taking T-Mobile (which was losing customers anyway) out of the mix would not dent competition. If AT&T could not acquire T-Mobile (which had sizable infrastructure, such as cellular towers and significant spectrum), then AT&T might be forced to build its own infrastructure, which would be an unnecessarily costly undertaking and social waste, especially in crowded urban areas such as San Francisco. But even if AT&T went head-to-head with infrastructure building, it would still suffer from a shortage of spectrum, while T-Mobile, at the same time, could not fully utilize its spectrum- clearly a waste of finite resources.

The Antitrust Case

In August 2011, the US department of justice filed a lawsuit alleging that this merger would reduce competition and violate antitrust law. DOJ alleges that the “anticompetitive harm” of this merger would include:

(a) actual and potential competition between AT&T and T-Mobile would be of limited; (b) competition in general likely will be lessened substantially; (c) prices are likely to be higher than they otherwise would; (d) the quality and quantity of services are likely to be less than they otherwise would due to reduce incentives to invest in capacity and technology improvements; and (e) innovation and product variety likely will be reduced.

In particular, given T-Mobile’s positioning as a self-styled “ disruptive pricing” provider, “AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile,” alleged DOJ, “would eliminate the important price, quality, product variety, and innovation competition that an independent T-Mobile brings to the marketplace.” In addition, DOJ argued:

The substantial increase in concentration that would result from this merger, and the reduction in the number of nationwide providers from 4 to 3, likely will lead to lessened competition due to an enhanced risk of anticompetitive coordination. Certain aspects of mobile wireless communications services markets, including transparent pricing, little buyer-side market power, and high barriers to entry and expansion, make them particularly conductive to coordination.

In conclusion, DOJ argued that the proposed merger would violate section 7 of the Clayton act and that it should be stopped. In the lawsuit, DOJ also sued T-Mobile and DT as co-defendants. On behalf of the US government, DOJ was the sole plaintiff in its first complaint filed on August 31, 2011. In its first amended complaint filed on September 16, DOJ was joined by the states of New York, Washington, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania as co-plaintiffs. And it’s second amended complaint filed on September 30, Puerto Rico joined as a co-plaintiff. The case was officially the United States et al. v. AT&T Inc. et al.

AT&T was not a stranger to antitrust lawsuits. Today’s AT&T is the direct result of the first United States vs AT&T antitrust lawsuit. Because of its monopoly and long-distance (land-line) telephone, the original AT&T (“Ma Bell”) was forced by DOJ to break up into Sevan regional bell operating companies (known as “Baby Bells”) in 1983. Between 1983 and 2005, today’s AT&T was one of these Baby Bells named Southwestern Bell Corporation between 1983 and 1995, and shortened to SBC between 1995 and 2005. Due to its successful market performance, SBC emerged as a leading offspring of the original AT&T (Verizon was another leading off-spring). In 2005, SBC spent $16 billion to purchase its former parent company, AT&T corporation- a Baby Bell acquiring Ma Bell. Quitting in the SBC name, the merged entity named itself AT&T Inc. and took on the iconic AT&T branding (including it’s logo and its stock ticker “T”, which simply sounds for “telephone”). Before the filing of the second United States versus AT&T case, the economist asked: “Could the bid for T-Mobile be a sign that monopoly Ma is trying to return from her grave?”

The Outcome

In November 2011, the FCC issued its opinion and joined DOJ in opposing the merger. In December 2011 (before the antitrust case went on trial), AT&T gave up the merger and DOJ dismissed the case. A triumphant DOJ announced:

Consumers won today… Had AT&T acquire T-Mobile, consumers in the wireless market place would have faced higher prices and reduce innovation. We sued to protect consumers who rely on competition in this important industry. With the parties’ abandonment, we achieved that result.

A frustrated AT&T noted in its press release:

[Dallas, Texas, December 19, 2011] AT&T Inc. (NYSE: T) said today bad after a thorough review of options it has agreed with Deutsch Telekom AG to end its bid to acquire T-Mobile USA, which began in March of this year.

The actions by the federal communications commission and the Department of Justice to block this transaction did not change the realities of the US wireless industry. It is one of the most fiercely competitive industries in the world, with a mounting need for more spectrum that has not diminished and must be addressed immediately. The AT&T and T-Mobile USA combination would have offered an interim solution to the spectrum shortage. In the absence of such steps, customers will be harmed and needed investment will be stifled.

“AT&T will continue to be aggressive in leading the mobile Internet revolution,” said Randall Stephenson, AT&T chairman and CEO. “Over the past four years we have invested more in our networks than any other US company. As a result, today we deliver best-in-class mobile broadband speeds- connecting smartphones, tablets, and emerging devices at a record pace- and we are well underway with our nationwide 4G LTE deployment.

“To meet the needs of our customers, we will continue to invest,” Stephenson said. “However, adding capacity to meet these needs will require policymakers to do two things. First, in the near term, they should allow the free markets to work so that additional spectrum is available to meet the immediate needs of the US wireless industry, including expeditiously approving our acquisition of unused Qualcomm spectrum currently pending before the FCC. Second, policymakers should enact legislation to meet our nation’s longer-term spectrum needs.

“ The mobile Internet is a dynamic industry that can be a critical driver in restoring American economic growth and job creation, but only if companies are allowed to react quickly to consumer needs and market forces’, Stephenson said.

The fine prints in the deal included DOJ’s blessing of AT&T and T-Mobile’s collaboration in roaming. The more significant (or, if you will, the more bizarre) outcome was that as per AT&T’s original deal with DT, in the event of merger failure, AT&T would pay T-Mobile $3 billion as a break-up fee and give T-Mobile $1 billion worth of AT&T-held wireless spectrum. In short, the US government reduced the competitiveness of a US firm by forcing a US firm to subsidize the wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign firm.

In the name of preserving (domestic) competition, the US government preserved a (foreign) competitor. “The problem is,” noted one expert at Slate, “ T-Mobile doesn’t want to be a competitor anymore. It’s parent company DT wants out of the US market.” As the weakest among the big four, T-Mobile only added 89,000 new customers between 2009 and 2011, while the industry took in 33 million new customers. By essentially giving up since March 2011, T-Mobile lost 467,000 lucrative contract customers during the merger process. By focusing on its terms of exit, T-Mobile turned its attention away from network upgrades and improvements. DOJ and FCC cannot force T-Mobile to be in business, just like no one can force customers to sign up for plans they do not want. By breathing a new lease on life into T-Mobile, that was exactly what DOJ and FCC did: forcing T-Mobile to be in business against its (and it’s parents company’s) own wishes. The same expert at Slate continued:

Sure, companies like T-Mobile and Sprint can offer cheaper plans, but the success of Verizon and AT&T shows price is not our primary concern when it comes to wireless service. We want shiny smartphones and big, powerful, reliable networks… Rather than stay for competition, the merger would have intensified the war between the two giants, AT&T and Verizon. And for those people for whom price is paramount, there would remain not only Sprint, but a slew of smaller, regional providers like Leap and MetroPCS.

In 150 words or more complete the following (use outside sources/ information if possible):

Defend this merger as T-Mobile‘s or Deutsch Telekom’s CEO (both firms were co-defendants in this case).

Integrative Case 3.4

The Antitrust Case on the AT&T-T Mobile Merger

Mike W. Peng

In 2011, the second-largest US mobile wireless carrier AT&T (with a 25% market share) proposed to merger with the fourth-largest carrier T-Mobile, which had a 15% market share and was a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsch Telekom. Antitrust authorities blocked this merger. Why?

The Merger

In March 2011, Dallas-based AT&T announced that it had reached an agreement with Deutsch Telekom. (DT) to purchase DTs holy into US subsidiary, T-Mobile USA, four $39 billion. The tub for concentrations in mobile wireless telecommunication services in the US the counter for more than 90% of the market share. Of the big four, the second range AT&T had about 25% market share, and the fourth-ranked T-Mobile had 15%. The largest player was Verizon with 31%, and the third was Sprint Nextel at 20%. Although some small carriers competed in certain regions, no carriers other than the big four competed nationally. After the proposed merger, the combined AT&T and T-Mobile would become the nation’s largest wireless carrier, commanding more than 40% of market share, with 132 million customers and 72 billion in revenues. The scale and scope of the merger would require regulatory approval. AT&T indicated its willingness to sell off certain assets if necessary, and plan to complete merger in one year.

AT&T argued that the merger would allow AT&T to expand 4G LTE broadband to another 55 million Americans, reaching a total of 97% of the population and especially benefit in rural areas currently without broadband coverage. Because T-Mobile was losing money and suffering from its poor economies of scale, and it (and its parent company DT) had been unable to upgrade its networks and invest in 4G broadband. While AT&T was booming and adding customers, T-Mobile was losing customers- it was the only major carrier that did not offer the iPhone. But T-Mobile possessed some hard-to-substitute resources: spectrum. Spectrum represented finite resources auctioned by the federal communications commission (FCC). Exhausting its own spectrum, AT&T could benefit from tapping into T-Mobile’s underutilize spectrum. Accelerating 4G wireless deployment would not only generate new jobs due to AT&T’s own investment, but would also stimulate broader job creation and civil engagement due to better access to more affordable and more widespread wireless broadband services.

A variety of labor, environmental, and business groups supported the merger. These groups pointed to AT&T’s record and commitments to labor and environmental standards, and appreciated the investment and the jobs the merger would bring. Also, civil rights groups applauded the additional boost and civil engagement that could be facilitated by more widespread broadband. Governors of 26 states wrote letters to support the merger.

However, other diverse groups were opposed to this merger. Not surprisingly, Verizon and Sprint did not like the deal, because it would make them weaker. Sprint would become a distant third, so clearly it would not appreciate the outcome.  Verizon would lose its top position, but it would still be a strong player in a new duopoly. Internet companies did not like the merger either, because the merger would leave them with fewer service providers to negotiate with for getting their content and applications to customers. The computer and communication industry Association- which included eBay, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo as its members- was opposed to the merger. Consumer groups argued that the merger would raise prices and stifle innovation by consolidating so much of the wireless industry in one firm.

On the core issue of whether increasing AT&T’s market power would hurt consumers, AT&T pointed out that the average inflation-adjusted price for wireless services in the United States fell by 50% from 1999 to 2009, according to the government accountability office. AT&T also argued that in many markets AT&T would still be competing with four or more rivals, so taking T-Mobile (which was losing customers anyway) out of the mix would not dent competition. If AT&T could not acquire T-Mobile (which had sizable infrastructure, such as cellular towers and significant spectrum), then AT&T might be forced to build its own infrastructure, which would be an unnecessarily costly undertaking and social waste, especially in crowded urban areas such as San Francisco. But even if AT&T went head-to-head with infrastructure building, it would still suffer from a shortage of spectrum, while T-Mobile, at the same time, could not fully utilize its spectrum- clearly a waste of finite resources.

The Antitrust Case

In August 2011, the US department of justice filed a lawsuit alleging that this merger would reduce competition and violate antitrust law. DOJ alleges that the “anticompetitive harm” of this merger would include:

(a) actual and potential competition between AT&T and T-Mobile would be of limited; (b) competition in general likely will be lessened substantially; (c) prices are likely to be higher than they otherwise would; (d) the quality and quantity of services are likely to be less than they otherwise would due to reduce incentives to invest in capacity and technology improvements; and (e) innovation and product variety likely will be reduced.

In particular, given T-Mobile’s positioning as a self-styled “ disruptive pricing” provider, “AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile,” alleged DOJ, “would eliminate the important price, quality, product variety, and innovation competition that an independent T-Mobile brings to the marketplace.” In addition, DOJ argued:

The substantial increase in concentration that would result from this merger, and the reduction in the number of nationwide providers from 4 to 3, likely will lead to lessened competition due to an enhanced risk of anticompetitive coordination. Certain aspects of mobile wireless communications services markets, including transparent pricing, little buyer-side market power, and high barriers to entry and expansion, make them particularly conductive to coordination.

In conclusion, DOJ argued that the proposed merger would violate section 7 of the Clayton act and that it should be stopped. In the lawsuit, DOJ also sued T-Mobile and DT as co-defendants. On behalf of the US government, DOJ was the sole plaintiff in its first complaint filed on August 31, 2011. In its first amended complaint filed on September 16, DOJ was joined by the states of New York, Washington, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania as co-plaintiffs. And it’s second amended complaint filed on September 30, Puerto Rico joined as a co-plaintiff. The case was officially the United States et al. v. AT&T Inc. et al.

AT&T was not a stranger to antitrust lawsuits. Today’s AT&T is the direct result of the first United States vs AT&T antitrust lawsuit. Because of its monopoly and long-distance (land-line) telephone, the original AT&T (“Ma Bell”) was forced by DOJ to break up into Sevan regional bell operating companies (known as “Baby Bells”) in 1983. Between 1983 and 2005, today’s AT&T was one of these Baby Bells named Southwestern Bell Corporation between 1983 and 1995, and shortened to SBC between 1995 and 2005. Due to its successful market performance, SBC emerged as a leading offspring of the original AT&T (Verizon was another leading off-spring). In 2005, SBC spent $16 billion to purchase its former parent company, AT&T corporation- a Baby Bell acquiring Ma Bell. Quitting in the SBC name, the merged entity named itself AT&T Inc. and took on the iconic AT&T branding (including it’s logo and its stock ticker “T”, which simply sounds for “telephone”). Before the filing of the second United States versus AT&T case, the economist asked: “Could the bid for T-Mobile be a sign that monopoly Ma is trying to return from her grave?”

The Outcome

In November 2011, the FCC issued its opinion and joined DOJ in opposing the merger. In December 2011 (before the antitrust case went on trial), AT&T gave up the merger and DOJ dismissed the case. A triumphant DOJ announced:

Consumers won today… Had AT&T acquire T-Mobile, consumers in the wireless market place would have faced higher prices and reduce innovation. We sued to protect consumers who rely on competition in this important industry. With the parties’ abandonment, we achieved that result.

A frustrated AT&T noted in its press release:

[Dallas, Texas, December 19, 2011] AT&T Inc. (NYSE: T) said today bad after a thorough review of options it has agreed with Deutsch Telekom AG to end its bid to acquire T-Mobile USA, which began in March of this year.

The actions by the federal communications commission and the Department of Justice to block this transaction did not change the realities of the US wireless industry. It is one of the most fiercely competitive industries in the world, with a mounting need for more spectrum that has not diminished and must be addressed immediately. The AT&T and T-Mobile USA combination would have offered an interim solution to the spectrum shortage. In the absence of such steps, customers will be harmed and needed investment will be stifled.

“AT&T will continue to be aggressive in leading the mobile Internet revolution,” said Randall Stephenson, AT&T chairman and CEO. “Over the past four years we have invested more in our networks than any other US company. As a result, today we deliver best-in-class mobile broadband speeds- connecting smartphones, tablets, and emerging devices at a record pace- and we are well underway with our nationwide 4G LTE deployment.

“To meet the needs of our customers, we will continue to invest,” Stephenson said. “However, adding capacity to meet these needs will require policymakers to do two things. First, in the near term, they should allow the free markets to work so that additional spectrum is available to meet the immediate needs of the US wireless industry, including expeditiously approving our acquisition of unused Qualcomm spectrum currently pending before the FCC. Second, policymakers should enact legislation to meet our nation’s longer-term spectrum needs.

“ The mobile Internet is a dynamic industry that can be a critical driver in restoring American economic growth and job creation, but only if companies are allowed to react quickly to consumer needs and market forces’, Stephenson said.

The fine prints in the deal included DOJ’s blessing of AT&T and T-Mobile’s collaboration in roaming. The more significant (or, if you will, the more bizarre) outcome was that as per AT&T’s original deal with DT, in the event of merger failure, AT&T would pay T-Mobile $3 billion as a break-up fee and give T-Mobile $1 billion worth of AT&T-held wireless spectrum. In short, the US government reduced the competitiveness of a US firm by forcing a US firm to subsidize the wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign firm.

In the name of preserving (domestic) competition, the US government preserved a (foreign) competitor. “The problem is,” noted one expert at Slate, “ T-Mobile doesn’t want to be a competitor anymore. It’s parent company DT wants out of the US market.” As the weakest among the big four, T-Mobile only added 89,000 new customers between 2009 and 2011, while the industry took in 33 million new customers. By essentially giving up since March 2011, T-Mobile lost 467,000 lucrative contract customers during the merger process. By focusing on its terms of exit, T-Mobile turned its attention away from network upgrades and improvements. DOJ and FCC cannot force T-Mobile to be in business, just like no one can force customers to sign up for plans they do not want. By breathing a new lease on life into T-Mobile, that was exactly what DOJ and FCC did: forcing T-Mobile to be in business against its (and it’s parents company’s) own wishes. The same expert at Slate continued:

Sure, companies like T-Mobile and Sprint can offer cheaper plans, but the success of Verizon and AT&T shows price is not our primary concern when it comes to wireless service. We want shiny smartphones and big, powerful, reliable networks… Rather than stay for competition, the merger would have intensified the war between the two giants, AT&T and Verizon. And for those people for whom price is paramount, there would remain not only Sprint, but a slew of smaller, regional providers like Leap and MetroPCS.

In 150 words or more complete the following (use outside sources/ information if possible):

Defend AT&T’s position as its CEO.