Please see attached file and the link below and respond to following questions:

1. Is climate change really a problem?

2. How much investment should firms really put into reducing emissions.

3. From a strategic standpoint, what are the practical implications of these changes/predicted changes?

Sea transport has a relatively green image because ships emit less carbon dioxide per tonne and per kilometre than rail, truck or air transport. Yet, given its scale and rapid growth, it’s a major source of carbon emissions. Maritime transport emits around 1,000 million tonnes of CO? a year and is responsible for about 2.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The international law Despite being a major contributor to climate change, the powerful shipping industry has successfully lobbied to be excluded from obligations to reduce emissions under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, the 2015 Paris Agreement. There are also no sector-wide emission reduction targets in maritime shipping under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In other key policy spaces, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there are no obligations imposed on either states or shipping corporations to reduce maritime emissions. Countries could potentially set emissions targets domestically, but they rarely set sectoral targets, especially for sectors that are heavily exposed to international trade. In this context, the shipping industry has been particularly footloose in its response to climate change. It is therefore a cause for celebration that decades of negotiation have now yielded this agreement. The deal requires all IMO countries to reduce shipping emissions by 50% compared with 2008 levels. Ships will be required to be more energy-efficient and to use cleaner energy such as solar and wind electricity generation. Currently, the shipping industry is overwhelmingly reliant on dirty, carbon-rich fuels such as heavy diesel. Some stormy seas ahead The climate deal has been described as “historic”, but not all countries are on board. Some, particularly island nations that are vulnerable to sea level rise, wanted a “far, far more ambitious” target. Others, including the United States, Brazil, Panama and Saudi Arabia, are strongly against it. Reconciling these differences will be a difficult task for the IMO. It has always been technically difficult to accurately calculate the precise amount of fuel used during shipping operations. It’s even harder to allocate maritime emissions to specific countries. Contributing to the potential confusion is the use of “flags of convenience”. This is where a ship’s owners register the vessel in a country other than their own, and fly the flag of the country where registered. This is usually done to disguise the relationship between the vessel and its actual owner, due to the attractive, lower regulatory burdens that some open registries offer. Shipping corporations could also use flags of convenience to avoid mandatory emission reduction targets. The way forward As a result of the climate deal, states will eventually need to introduce domestic laws setting emission reduction targets for their shipping industry. These targets could also be applied to ships that call at their ports. The good news is that there is potential synergy between such regulation and existing laws, such as the European Union regulation that requires ship owners and operators to monitor, report and verify CO? emissions from certain vessels that dock at European ports. Read more: Five ways the shipping industry can reduce its carbon emissions The new climate deal has the potential to change the way shipping companies operate. It presents an opportunity for the shipping industry to become part of the solution rather than the problem when it comes to climate change. It’s also a strong signal to other international industries, such as the aviation sector, that have largely escaped emissions reduction targets. If we can reduce emissions in such a large and complex sector as marine transport, it bodes well for the capacity of international frameworks to tackle other difficult problems.

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float (p. 371) and then click on "Create Thread" to post your answers to the following questions: Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way?

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way?

China’s Managed Float

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way? i dont want picture of answer

China’s Managed Float

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way? i dont wanna picture of answers, please add some personal comment about case

China’s Managed Float

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Introduction to Speech

Just Need the questions answerd in paraged format. Thanks!

Cultural Diversity in the United States - Culture Shock: The Arrival of the Hmong

            Imagine that you were a member of a small tribal group in the mountains of Laos. Village life and the clan were all you knew. There were no schools, and you learned everything you needed to know from your relatives. U.S. agents recruited the men of your village to fight Communists, and they gained a reputation as fierce fighters. When the U.S. forces were defeated in Vietnam, your people were moved to the United States so they wouldn’t be killed in reprisal.

            Here is what happed. Keep in mind that you have never seen a television or newspaper and that you have never gone to school. Your entire world has been the village. They put you in a big house with wings. It flew. They have you strange food on a tray. The Sani-Wipes were hard to chew. After the trip, you were placed in a house. This was an adventure. You had never seen locks before, as no one locked up anything in the village. Most of the village homes didn’t even have doors, much less locks.

            You found the bathroom perplexing. At first, you tried to wash rice in the bowl of water, which seemed to be provided for this purpose. But when you pressed the handle, the water and the rice disappeared. After you learned what the toilet was for, you found it difficult not to slip off the little white round thing when you stood on it. In the village, you didn’t need a toilet seat when you squatted in a field to use the bathroom. When you threw water on the electric stove to put out the burner, it sparked and smoked. You became afraid to use the stove because it might explode. And no one liked it when you tried to plant a vegetable garden in the park.

            Your new world was so different that, to help you adjust, the settlement agency told you (Fadiman 1997):

To send mail, you must use stamps.

The door of the refrigerator must be shut.

Do not stand or squat on toilet since it may break.

Always ask before picking your neighbor’s flowers, fruit or vegetables.

In colder areas you must wear shoes, socks and appropriate outer wear. Otherwise, you may become ill.

Always use a handkerchief or a tissue to blow your nose in public places or inside a public building.

Picking your nose or ears in public is frowned upon in the United States.

Never urinate in the street. This creates a smell that is offensive to Americans. They also believe that it causes disease.

To help the Hmong assimilate, U.S. officials dispersed them across the nation. This, they felt would help them to adjust to the dominant culture and prevent a Hmong subculture from developing. The dispersal brought feelings of isolation to the clan and village based Hmong. As soon as they had a chance, the Hmong moved from these towns scattered across the country to live in areas with other Hmong, the major one being in California’s Central Valley. Here they renewed village relationships and helped one another adjust to the society they had never desired to join.

Please answer the following questions:

Do you think you would have reacted differently if you have been a displaced Hmong?

Why did the Hmong need one another more in the U.S. neighborhoods to adjust to their new life?

What culture shock do you think a U.S. born 19 year old Hmong would experience if his or her parents decided to return to Laos?

Using the information in the chapter related to ethnicity in chapter six, was it wrong for the U.S. officials to separate the Hmong to “help” them assimilate?

Regarding language, do you believe the Hmong continued to communicate in their mother tongue (even if they already knew to speak English) either in their isolated places or when they arrived back to reunite in Central Valley California? Would American born Hmong use the mother tongue too, communicate in English, or both?

Question 1

The Affordable Care Act benefited health insurance companies by providing them with more paying customers and new government subsidies.

Question 1 options:

Question 2

Immigration reform efforts are complicated by the complexity and interconnectedness of the issues raised by immigration policy.

Question 2 options:

Question 3

Foreign policy conflicts tend to center around differences in material interests between competing groups.

Question 3 options:

Question 4

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policymakers have increasingly embraced reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers.

Question 4 options:

Question 5

Which of these incentives do health insurance companies have?

Question 5 options:

Question 6

Which of these factors has given elected officials a reason to pursue healthcare reform?

Question 6 options:

Question 7

Which factor contributes most to rising costs for healthcare providers like doctors, hospitals, and clinics?

Question 7 options:

Question 8

Which of these immigration policies would a liberal be much more likely than a conservative to support?

Question 8 options:

Question 9

Which of these two groups are most likely to AGREE on a plan to provide amnesty for illegal immigrants?

Question 9 options:

Question 10

Which of these facts demonstrates a commitment to the Wilsonian tradition of foreign policy?

Question 10 options:

Save

Question 11

Which of these actions would fit within the Global Meliorist tradition of foreign policy?

Question 11 options:

Question 12

Which of these factors most seriously complicates the implementation of U.S. foreign policy?

Question 12 options:

Case study:

A Few Good People: Several years ago a very successful CEO and principal stockholder in a chemical company came to speak to the students at William and Mary. Our speaker is an entrepreneur who was involved with the start-up of his company. He is financially very successful and at the time he spoke to W&M students he was a member of the advisory board of a business school in his home city. Our speaker revealed that he is quite comfortable making economic trade-offs between fines for chemical pollution of the environment and business profitability. If the expenses related to fines plus the costs of paying-off any officials are less than the gains to be had from low-cost, high-pollution production, he believes the decision is simply a matter of evaluating the cash flows. Our speaker has business operations in many parts of the world and he indicated that getting around pollution problems is often more complicated than simply paying fines. In many countries it is helpful or even necessary to bribe government officials. Bribes might be paid to high-ranking officials who can influence the legislative process or make decisions to approve plant operations and locations. Bribes might also be paid to local officials to overlook violations or to avoid enforcing existing laws. Of course, it goes without saying, the bribes only make business sense if the financial advantages gained are greater than the cost of the bribes. Our speaker complained that under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA) the United States in addition to civil penalties can impose criminal penalties for certain "corrupt" practices possibly including some of the bribery practices described above. He noted that other countries regard these business practices as civil problems that may or may not result in fines. He argued that on a "level playing field" the United States should not subject him to exposure to jail-time when business people from other countries can pay for their premeditated transgressions with fines. Our speaker also identified new international business opportunities by naming countries more welcoming to chemical production because of their lax, unenforced, or non-existent environmental restrictions. He ended his remarks by welcoming inquiries from interested students. He was, as he said, always on the watch for a "few good people" to add to his staff. Our guest was controversial. Some students were upset that such a politically incorrect speaker could have slipped by the speakers' committee. They asked, “How could we expose students to such a pernicious influence?” Other students found themselves more interested in the speaker's formula for success. The speaker did surprise most people in the audience both with his candor and his business practices. As the event progressed the speaker became aware that he was not receiving the admiration and appreciation he expected. Towards the end of his time, he became far less comfortable discussing his leadership, and he has not returned.

Question:

1. When this executive interviews prospective new hires for his company, what qualities do you think he is seeking in those "few good people" to whom he extends offers?
2. Subsequent to passing the FCPA in 1977, the United States has influenced more than 30 other nations to pass comparable legislation. While the speaker clearly saw the FCPA as being anti-business, it is safe to assume that many other businesses (especially large and influential businesses) did not oppose the FCPA (otherwise, it almost certainly would not have passed the U.S. Congress). The FPCA is an example of a “social contract.” This legislation is not applicable to any practice that is found to be corrupt, rather it is written to address specific corrupt practices included in the FCPA such as bribing foreign officials to influence their decision to make purchases (e.g., airplanes). Discuss why business leaders and companies other than the speaker in the case who are involved in global commerce would support the FCPA (and disagree with the speaker).

3) Parrot Inc. acquired an 85% interest in Sparrow Corporation on January 2, 2014 for $42,500 cash when Sparrow had Capital Stock of $15,000 and Retained Earnings of $25,000. Sparrow's assets and liabilities had book values equal to their fair values except for inventory that was undervalued by $2,000. Balance sheets for Parrot and Sparrow on January 2, 2014, immediately after the business combination, are presented in the first two columns of the consolidated balance sheet working papers.

Required: Compute the following and then complete the attached consolidated balance sheet working papers.

a.) Compute implied FV

b.) Determine the excess of FV over BV acquired (if any)

c.) Allocate any excess of FV over BV acquired as appropriate

d.) Complete the attached Consolidated Balance Sheet immediately after the business combination on January 2, 2014.

Isabella traveled to a neighboring state to investigate the purchase of an interior design firm. Her expenses included travel, legal, accounting, and miscellaneous expenses. The total was $51,000. She incurred the expenses in January and February of 2018. In each of the following scenarios, what can Isabella deduct in 2018?

In your computations, round the per-month amount to the nearest dollar. If an amount is zero, enter "0".

a. Isabella was in the interior design business and did not acquire the interior design firm.
$

b. Isabella was in the interior design business. She acquired the interior design firm and began operating it on August 1, 2018.
$

c. Isabella did not acquire the interior design firm and was not in the interior design business.
$

d. Isabella acquired the interior design firm but was not in the interior design business when she acquired it. Operations began on May 1, 2018.
$