INDIAN STUDENTS DATA FILE (MINITAB)

1. What is the probability of students between CGPA 8 and 9?
2. What is the probability of students above GRE 325 score?
3. What is the GRE score middle 50% students?
4. What is the TOEFL score of top 10% students?
5. What is the CGPA of top 10% students?

A student researcher compares the heights of American students and non-American students from the student body of a certain college in order to estimate the difference in their mean heights. A random sample of 18 American students had a mean height of 69.9inches with a standard deviation of 2.79inches. A random sample of 12 non-American students had a mean height of 63.8 inches with a standard deviation of 2.31 inches. Determine the 98% confidence interval for the true mean difference between the mean height of the American students and the mean height of the non-American students. Assume that the population variances are equal and that the two populations are normally distributed.

Step 1 of 3 :  

Find the point estimate that should be used in constructing the confidence interval.

A student researcher compares the heights of American students and non-american students from the student body of a certain college in order to estimate the difference in their mean heights. A random sample of 18 American students had a mean height of 70 inches with a standard deviation of 3.03 inches. A random
sample of 12 non-american students had a mean height of 66.1 inches with a standard deviation of 2.35 inches. Determine the 99% confidence interval for the true mean difference between the mean height of the American students and the mean height of the non-american students. Assume that the population variances are equal and that the two populations are normally distributed. Find the margin of error to be used in constructing the confidence interval.

7. A group of university students are interested in comparing the average age of cars owned by students and the average age of cars owned by faculty. They randomly selected 25 cars that are own by students and 20 cars that are owned by faculty. The average age and standard deviation obtained from the students’ cars are 6.78 years and 5.21 years, respectively. The sample of faculty cars produced a mean and a standard deviation of 5.86 years, and 2.72. A. Construct and interpret a 90% confidence interval for the difference between the average age of students’ cars and average age of faculty cars. B. At α = 0.05, is there enough average to conclude that on average faculty cars are newer than students’ cars? Use the p-value method.

he scores of students on the ACT (American College Testing) college entrance examination in a recent year had the normal distribution with mean μ = 18 and standard deviation σ = 6. 100 students are randomly selected from all who took the test.

a. What is the probability that the mean score for the 100 students is between 17 and 19 (including 17 and 19)?

b. A student is eligible for an honor program if his/her score is higher than 25. Find an approximation to the probability that at least 15 students of the 100 students are eligible for the honor program.

c. If the sample size is 4 (rather than 100), what is the probability that more than 50% (not include 50%) students are eligible for the honor program?

A survey of 280 SPC students was taken at registration. Of those surveyed:

• 62 students had signed up for a Math course
• 54 students had signed up for a Language Arts course
• 32 students had signed up for a Humanities course
• 23 students had signed up for both a Math and Language Arts course
• 9 students had signed up for both a Math and Humanities course
• 10 students had signed up for both a Language Arts and Humanities course
• 3 students had signed up for all three courses

How many students had not signed up for any of these three courses?

A survey of 1,064 tourists visiting Orlando was taken. Of those surveyed:

• 280 tourists had visited LEGOLAND
• 287 tourists had visited Universal Studios
• 93 tourists had visited both the Magic Kingdom and LEGOLAND
• 59 tourists had visited both the Magic Kingdom and Universal Studios
• 72 tourists had visited both LEGOLAND and Universal Studios
• 45 tourists had visited all three theme parks

• 99 tourists did not visit any of these theme parks

How many tourists only visited the Magic Kingdom (of these three)?

2) A study was conducted to determine whether there were significant differences between medical students admitted through special programs (such as retention incentive and guaranteed placement programs) and medical students admitted through the regular admissions criteria. It was found that the graduation rate was 89.7% for the medical students admitted through special programs. Be sure to enter at least 4 digits of accuracy for this problem!

If 9 of the students from the special programs are randomly selected, find the probability that at least 8 of them graduated.         prob = -------- At least 4 digits!

If 9 of the students from the special programs are randomly selected, find the probability that exactly 6 of them graduated. prob = ------------ At least 4 digits!

Would it be unusual to randomly select 9 students from the special programs and get exactly 6 that graduate?

no, it is not unusual

yes, it is unusual

If 9 of the students from the special programs are randomly selected, find the probability that at most 6 of them graduated. prob = --------------At least 4 digits!

Would it be unusual to randomly select 9 students from the special programs and get at most 6 that graduate?

yes, it is unusual

no, it is not unusual

Would it be unusual to randomly select 9 students from the special programs and get only 6 that graduate?

No, it is not unusual

Yes, it is unusual

Volume-Volume percent:

10 mL ice cold 4 % acetic acid in 95 % ethanol (v/v)

1. how many mL of acetic acid and how many mL of ethanol is needed to make 10 mL mixture of the two

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey case

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey

112S.Ct.2791 (1992)

[This decision upheld the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, upheld numerous provisions of a Pennsylvania law restricting abortions, and invalidated a portion of that law. The following excerpt—a portion of the opinion of the Court announced by Justices 0 'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter—is provided/or its insights into the concept of stare decisis. The remainder of the case is presented in Chapter 12.]

The examination of the conditions justifying the repudiation of Adkins by West Coast Hotel and Plessy by Brown is enough to suggest the terrible price that would have been paid if the Court had not overruled as it did. In the present case, however, as our analysis to this point makes clear, the terrible price would be paid for overruling. Our analysis would not be complete, however, without explaining why overruling Roe's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare

decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law. To understand why this would be so it is necessary to understand the source of this Court's authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the country's understanding of itself as a constitutional Republic.

            The root of American governmental powers is revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are

rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.

The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would be no judicial

act at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required. Because not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decision on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.

The need for principled action to be perceived as such is implicated to some degree whenever this, or any other appellate court, overrules a prior case. This is not to say, of course, that this Court cannot give a perfectly satisfactory explanation in most cases. People understand that some of the Constitution's language is hard to fathom and that the Court's Justices are sometimes able to perceive significant facts or to understand principles of law that eluded their predecessors and that justify departures from existing decisions. However upsetting it may be to those most directly affected when one judicially derived rule replaces another, the country can accept some correction of error without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court.

In two circumstances, however, the Court would almost certainly fail to receive the benefit of the doubt in overruling prior cases. There is, first, a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the country's belief in the Court's good faith. Despite the variety of reasons that may inform and justify a decision to overrule, we cannot forget that such a decision is usually perceived (and perceived correctly) as, at the least, a statement that a prior decision was wrong. There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior

rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.

That first circumstance can be described as hypothetical; the second is to the point here and now. Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.

The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way, its decision requires an equally rare precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional reactions; others may proceed from principles worthy of profound respect. But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question....

The country's loss of confidence in the judiciary would be underscored by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure. Some cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who refuses to work to undermine the decision or to force its reversal. The price may be criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence. An extra price will be paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision's results when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who nevertheless struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law. To all those who will be so tested by following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for nothing. The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete. From the obligation of this promise this Court cannot and should not assume any exemption when duty requires it to decide a case in conformance with the Constitution. A willing breach of it would be nothing less than a breach of faith, and no Court that broke its faith with the people could sensibly expect credit for principle in the decision by which it did that.

It is true that diminished legitimacy may be restored, but only slowly. Unlike the political branches, a Court thus weakened could not seek to regain its position with a new mandate from the voters, and even if the Court could somehow go to the polls, the loss of its principled character could not be retrieved by the casting of so many votes. Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.

The Court's duty in the present case is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already divisive issue of governmental power to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its divisiveness no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today.

Question

1. How do you think the Judges in Planned Parenthood would have decided Woods, and vice versa?

1. Types of Contracts. Professor Dixon was an adjunct professor at Tulsa Community College (TCC) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Each semester, near the beginning of the term, the parties executed a written contract that always included the following provision: “It is agreed that this agreement may be cancelled by the Administration or the instructor at anytime before the first class session.” In the spring semester of Dixon’s seventh year, he filed a complaint with TCC alleging that one of his students, Meredith Bhuiyan, had engaged in disruptive classroom conduct. He gave her an “incomplete” grade and asked TCC to require her to apologize as a condition of receiving a final grade. TCC later claimed, and Dixon denied, that he was told to assign Bhuiyan a grade if he wanted to teach in the fall. Toward the end of the semester, Dixon was told which classes he would teach in the fall, but the parties did not sign a written contract. The Friday before classes began, TCC terminated him. Dixon filed a suit in an Oklahoma state court against TCC and others, alleging breach of contract. Did the parties have a contract? If so, did TCC breach it? Explain. [Dixon v. Bhuiyan, 10 P.3d 888 (Okla. 2000)]

FACTS-Professor Dixon was an adjunct professor at Tulsa Community College (TCC) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Each semester, near the beginning of the term, the parties executed a written contract that always included the following provision: “It is agreed that this agreement may be cancelled by the Administration or the instructor at anytime before the first class session.” In the spring semester of Dixon’s seventh year, he filed a complaint with TCC alleging that one of his students, Meredith Bhuiyan, had engaged in disruptive classroom conduct. He gave her an “incomplete” grade and asked TCC to require her to apologize as a condition of receiving a final grade. TCC later claimed, and Dixon denied, that he was told to assign Bhuiyan a grade if he wanted to teach in the fall. Toward the end of the semester, Dixon was told which classes he would teach in the fall, but the parties did not sign a written contract. The Friday before classes began, TCC terminated him. Dixon filed a suit in an Oklahoma state court against TCC and others, alleging breach of contract. ISSUE-Did the parties have a contract? If so, did TCC breach it? Explain. RESOLUTION-[Dixon v. Bhuiyan, 10 P.3d 888 (Okla. 2000)]

How did the court answer the questions? What did the court decide? EXPLANATION-Do you agree with the court? Why or why not? Can you change any facts to give a different result?