COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

.

Required Questions

Question 01: You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

.

Question 02: Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

4 Questions – Answer all Total Marks: 25

1.   Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

2. Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

.

Required Questions

Question 01: You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

.

Question 02: Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

Required Questions –

Question 01: Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

Question 02: Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

Required Questions –

Question 01: Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study

INTRODUCTION Koss Corporation is a Milwaukee company whose principal business is the design, manufacture, and sale of stereo headphones and related accessories. Michael Koss is the CEO; his father, John Koss, founded the company in 1958. The company has trademarks and patents for its products to differentiate itself from the competition. Koss Corp. has a six-man Board of Directors, including Michael and his father. John is 81 years old and serves as chairman of the Board. Michael is 57 years old and serves as vice chairman, president, CEO, COO, and CFO. The other Board members have served 25 years. Neither Michael nor the other Board members have financial backgrounds. Michael graduated college with an anthropology degree. Although Koss Corp. is a multimillion dollar company, it only employs 73 people, which auditors consider a “small business.” Michael has worked for Koss Corp. since 1976, and earns a base salary of $295,000; his total compensation, including options, is over $800,000. THE ACCOUNTING FUNCTION The accounting work was handled by Sujata “Sue” Sachdeva, vice president of finance, secretary, and principal accounting officer—in a small business, employees typically have more than one responsibility. Sue, whose family was from India, had been employed at the company for 17 years. She was a trusted and valued employee and earned about $200,000 per year. She had two assistants: Julie Mulvaney, senior accountant, and Tracy Malone, junior accountant. Sue told friends and coworkers that her family was very wealthy and held a very high social status in India. She reported that she and her husband spent their wedding night in the Taj Mahal. It was important for her and her family to live in the best area, attend the best schools, and socialize with the recognized society members of Milwaukee. Sue served on several charity boards, organized lavish parties for their events that cost millions of dollars, and purchased all items that did not sell at the charity auctions she organized. Sue also had a reputation as a demanding boss: Her assistants were required to help her with the charity events, and Sue took them out to lunch almost daily. Julie and Tracy also went to Sue’s house to help her unpack and store the many expensive items she purchased. Sue loved designer clothing, shoes, and accessories and purchased over 20,000 items in a five-year period from 2004 to 2009. She purchased so many items that they did not fit in her house. So, she rented a storage unit and a two-office suite to store her unused purchases. In addition, Sue made some purchases that she never picked up from the retailers. Sue could not pay for all of these purchases with her $200,000 salary or her physician husband’s $600,000 salary. Her job at Koss Corp. provided her with an extra opportunity to obtain the funds necessary to support her lavish lifestyle: She committed the fraud over at least a five-year period to fulfill her compulsive shopping disorder. THE FRAUD Sue started stealing from the company with relatively small thefts that increased over the years. She partially hid the alleged theft in cost of goods sold (COGS) and indicated the increase in COGS was due to rising material costs. She also overstated assets and other expenses and understated liabilities and sales. Sue embezzled $34 million over a five-year period beginning in 2004; only the embezzled amounts from 2005 forward were documented, even though she had been allegedly embezzling since 1997. The fraud was uncovered when American Express notified Michael Koss about an unusual, ongoing practice: Sue paid her personal credit card balances with several large wire transfers from a Koss Corp. bank account. The following amounts represent the fund’s embezzled by Sue: 2005 - $2,195,477 2006 - $2,227,669 2007 - $3,160,310 2008 - $5,040,968 2009 - $8,498,434 2010 - $10,286,988 (two quarters) Sue wired an average of $500,000 per month from Koss Corp. bank accounts to pay for her personal credit card bills. Sue colluded with her senior accountant Julie to embezzle the money. Julie maintained she just made the journal entries and cash transfers based on Sue’s orders, noting that Sue was a “powerful, imperious, overbearing, determined, and willful superior.” FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES Koss Corp., like most businesses, had a system of internal controls designed to protect the company’s assets. The fraudulent activities that occurred included large payments by check or wire transfer, misuse of petty cash, an outdated computerized accounting system, unprepared account reconciliations, and minimal management review of financial statements. PAYMENTS BY CHECK OR WIRE TRANSFER Michael approved invoices of $5,000 or more for payment. Yet processing wire transfers and cashier’s checks outside of the accounts payable system did not require his approval. This flaw in Koss Corp.’s internal control system allowed Sue and Julie to cover up the embezzlement. Over the total 12-year embezzlement period, Sue wrote over 500 cashier’s checks, totaling over $17.5 million, from Park Bank. Julie did not have the authority to sign checks at Park Bank, although she often ordered and processed the checks for Sue without Michael’s knowledge or authorization. So as not to draw attention to these checks, they were often made payable to initials, such as “N-M,” for Neiman Marcus or “S.F.A.” for Saks Fifth Avenue. Julie helped Sue initiate and authorize wire transfers of Koss Corp. funds to Sue’s personal creditors for over $16.3 million without requiring or obtaining Michael’s approval. PETTY CASH Most organizations maintain a petty cash fund to facilitate small, incidental expenses. Petty cash balances and transactions are usually small. Given the insignificance of petty cash, management and auditors spend very little time reviewing these accounts. Sue used petty cash as another vehicle to obtain funds: more than $145,000 over five years. COMPUTERIZED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM A computerized accounting system and the related software were designed to prevent certain unintentional (or intentional) errors. For example, entering an out of balance entry is not possible in most computerized accounting systems. Koss Corp.’s computerized accounting system, however, was almost 30 years old and did not have sufficient controls. Koss Corp.’s accounting system could not lock out changes made after the end of the month, and there was no audit trail. Sue and Julie made undetected post- closing changes to the accounting records without Michael’s approval or knowledge. Julie covered up Sue’s embezzlement by forging entries to match the company cash account balance with the cash on hand balance in the bank and “holding back” receivables to match the amount of the cash shortfall. In addition, Julie did not record Internet sales or sales from the company’s retail outlet in order to cover up the cash shortfall. RECONCILIATIONS Other checks and balances in accounting systems include account reconciliations that are prepared by the accounting staff. Account reconciliations were not prepared or maintained at Koss Corp. Reconciliations that were performed were prepared by Sue or Julie, so they were not correct; they also initiated or recorded all accounting entries. MANAGEMENT REVIEW Sue provided Michael with financial statements and reports that were prepared from the fraudulent accounting records, and Michael did not review them in great detail. Because he trusted Sue, Michael did not fully review the financials before approving them. THE AUDITORS Grant Thornton, a national firm based in the U.S., was the auditor for Koss Corp. at the time. Over the five-year period, Koss Corp. paid Grant Thornton $625,000 to audit their financial results. Grant Thornton classified Koss Corp. as a non-accelerated filer. The fraud was never detected during the audit for several reasons: (1) Grant Thornton reviews the company’s financials to make sure that every account balance aligns with accounting standards. Because Sue and Julie were balancing the books to counteract the fraud, nothing seemed suspicious. (2) Lax oversight ran rampant at Koss Corp. Because Michael trusted Sue, he believed all her numbers were correct. Sue knew the questions the auditors would ask and the documents they would review. Because Sue knew the July 1 year-end would bring scrutiny to June’s records, she never moved any money in June. Grant Thornton viewed Koss Corp. as a small audit of a well-run company with low risk and an excellent training ground for new auditors. CONCLUSION Sue embezzled over $34 million in a five-year span. She betrayed the trust of her boss, Michael, as well as the company’s employees and shareholders.

QUESTION:

What were the responsibilities of the following entities or individuals for the fraudulent activities? What are the possible consequences?

a. American Express
b. Park Bank
c. Sue Sachdeva
d. Michael Koss
e. Julie Mulvaney

INTRODUCTIONThe vice president at your company, Columbia Holdings, has given you a new assignment: “Recently I asked the folks at Patterson Manufacturing to develop a strategy for improving their profitability. They have responded with a proposal. I want you to evaluate the proposal: Is it viable? Is it sustainable? Visit their operations and bring back a recommendation.”As you travel to the site you review a brief history of the firm. Patterson Manufacturing was founded in a small northeastern city more than a century ago. Wesley Patterson started the firm alongside a fast-moving stream that provided mechanical power to drive cutting tools, grinders, lathes, and polishers. These tools were used to produce precision parts other manufacturers needed. The firm quickly established a reputation for producing high-quality products to exacting tolerances. The firm prospered.Wesley studied the industries he served to develop new products that could fill his customers’ emerging needs. He often met with customers to design unique products for them. He referred to his approach as providing “customer-driven creative solutions.” He also kept abreast of new manufacturing materials and technology to ensure his products were of the highest quality.The firm grew steadily and, by 1925, was (and still is) the community’s largest employer. Wesley donated the land that is now the city’s central park. He also paid for constructing the first municipal buildings. More recently, the company was the primary donor for the construction of the municipal library and the local hospital. And the taxes paid by the firm and its employees are responsible for an excellent array of community services, including the Patterson Sports Complex and Patterson Community Center. The Great Depression in the 1930s brought hard times to the company, yet none of its employees were discharged. Instead, the firm and its employees cooperated to spread the available work among its employees by reducing each individual’s working hours (and wages). During that time, the firm also suspended paying dividends to its owners. After the company returned to prosperity in the 1940s, it continued to emphasize customer-driven creative solutions, and its loyal workforce enthusiastically overcame product design challenges. Wesley passed leadership of his business to his son, who later passed it down to Wesley’s grandson, and then to Wesley’s great granddaughter, Jessica Patterson. But five years ago, when Jessica wanted to retire, there was no heir willing to take over the business. Consequently, the plant was sold to your employer, Columbia Holdings.BACKGROUNDColumbia invests in family-owned businesses with a strong presence in niche markets. Columbia retains existing management and local business practices but provides centralized services, such as finance, accounting, insurance, IMA EDUCATIONAL CASE JOURNAL VOL. 6, NO. 4, ART. 1, DECEMBER 20131ISSN 1940-204XPatterson ManufacturingShane MoriarityUniversity of Oklahoma and Unitec New ZealandAndrew Slessor Unitec New Zealand

and corporate-level management. Patterson has remained profitable since the acquisition, but its return on investment has been declining. Your first stop at the Patterson complex is a meeting with the controller. He provides some additional background: “Jessica, like her predecessors, spent most of her time with customers developing new products to meet customer needs. She didn’t concern herself with costs. Customers were willing to pay for products that solved problems. Upon Jessica’s retirement, Columbia appointed Paul, our former production manager, to CEO. Paul has done wonders in rationalizing and standardizing our product lines. He substantially reduced manufacturing costs, which led to record profits in the two years following the sale of the company. Those early results have apparently set high expectations for our continuing performance. Our proposal will help move us toward meeting those expectations,” he said.“Our proposal is to stop manufacturing our largest-selling product, the Gudgeon EH40, and instead acquire it from an overseas supplier,” continued the controller. “This product currently represents 30% of our total sales revenue and production volume. But sales have been declining because competitors are offering a similar product at lower prices. We think that by reducing our price by 5% we can increase our unit sales volume by 15%. The increased volume coupled with a lower product cost from the offshore supplier should nearly double our firm-wide profit.”The controller also provided some supporting documents. Exhibit 1 summarizes operations for the five years since Patterson Manufacturing was sold to Columbia Holdings. Year 1 represents the first full year after Jessica retired, and Year 5 is the year that just past. Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 provide an income statement for Year 5, the current employee staffing levels by job title, and a detailed price proposal from the overseas supplier.The controller continued: “The analysis is pretty straightforward. Sales of the Gudgeon EH40 were $27 million last year. The direct material costs came to $14.3 million, while overhead costs of $4.2 million were allocated to the product. But only $2.9 million of the overhead will be avoided if we stop manufacturing the Gudgeon EH40. The remaining overhead costs are nearly all fixed and not subject to reduction in the near future. Our direct selling costs consist mostly of an 8% commission paid to sales representatives. In addition, there’s a $2 million advertising allowance devoted to promoting the Gudgeon EH40 in trade magazines.”He also said, “By outsourcing the Gudgeon EH40, we can release three administrative managers, eight administrative support staff, 128 general production personnel, and 10 supervisors.The firm will incur a one-time charge of $1 million for severance pay and pension contributions for dismissed employees. We’ll also need to spend $200,000 for the construction of receiving facilities for the outsourced product.”The controller continued: “The supplier’s cost quotation (Exhibit 4) needs to be adjusted for the expected 15% increase in volume. The cost for materials and labor will increase proportionately, but the overhead and ‘other’ costs are unlikely to be affected. The supplier’s mark-up will be 10% of the new total cost. In addition to the product cost, Patterson will incur transportation costs to get the product from the manufacturer to our warehouse. The transportation costs are variable and would have been $0.6 million for the volume of product in Year 5.”THE TASKAfter his brief overview, the controller hands you the exhibits and says, “You should go through the numbers yourself to ensure that my projection for the increase in profit is correct.” As you make your way to an empty office to review the numbers, the marketing manager approaches you. She pleads, “Don’t let them do this. The proposed action will deal a devastating financial blow to our community. Wesley Patterson would have never approved such a move. He loved this town.

Exhibit 1:
Patterson Manufacturing Five-Year Summary of Operations

Total Revenues

Net Income

Domestic Sales

International Sales

Sales of Established Products*

Sales of New Products*

Research and Development

Return on Assets

Number of Employees

Year 5

$90.2

$3.1

$74.7

$15.5

$73.9

$16.3

$0.9

2.0%

480

Year 4

$94.9

$3.8

$76.9

$18.0

$75.1

$19.8

$1.1

2.3%

485

Year 3

$99.1

$4.4

$79.3

$19.8

$74.4

$24.7

$1.5

2.7%

502

Year 2

$106.2

$7.3

$85.0

$21.2

$76.3

$29.9

$1.2

4.1%

492

Year 1

$111.4

$7.5

$88.1

$23.3

$76.6

$34.8

$1.3

4.2%

510

Note: Dollar figures are in millions.
*Established products are those that have been marketed for five years or more. New products have been marketed for less than five years.

Exhibit 2:
Summary Income Statement for Patterson Manufacturing

Sales

Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)

Gross Margin

Administrative Costs

Selling Costs

Operating Income

Year 5

$90.2

74.3

15.9

1.6

11.2

$ 3.1

Note: Dollar figures are in millions. Interest expense and income taxes are only shown on Columbia’s consolidated financial statements.

Exhibit 3:
Distribution of Current Patterson Employees by Job Title

Job Title

Administrative Manager

Administrative Staff

Production Supervisor

General Production Personnel

Number of Employees

10

24

29

417

Average Salary Per Employee

$45,000

32,000

50,000

37,000

Exhibit 4:
Off-Shore Supplier’s Price Proposal for the Volume of Product in Year 5

Material Costs $12.7

Labor Costs 1.8

Overhead Costs 2.7

Other 1.5

Total 18.7

Profit Mark-Up (10%) 1.9

Total Price $20.6

Note: Dollar figures are in millions. The total price is quoted for supplying the quantity of product Patterson sold in Year 5. The quoted price is FOB the supplier’s manufacturing plant.

Questions:

1. Using the controller’s projections, prepare an analysis of the expected effect of outsourcing the product on Patterson’s profitability.

2. Would it be a viable alternative to produce the product locally and lower the price to achieve the increase in sales volume?

3. Does the firm have an obligation to maintain employment levels in the town?

4. What risks are associated with the proposal?

5. Make a recommendation to your vice president on whether the proposal should be accepted. Provide your reasoning and any suggestions for additional or alternative actions that Patterson should take.

Kaelea, Inc., has no debt outstanding and a total market value of $165,000. Earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT, are projected to be $9,900 if economic conditions are normal. If there is strong expansion in the economy, then EBIT will be 24 percent higher. If there is a recession, then EBIT will be 31 percent lower. The company is considering a $46,500 debt issue with an interest rate of 5 percent. The proceeds will be used to repurchase shares of stock. There are currently 5,500 shares outstanding. Assume the company has a market-to-book ratio of 1.0.
a. Calculate return on equity, ROE, under each of the three economic scenarios before any debt is issued, assuming no taxes. (Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)

b. Calculate the percentage changes in ROE when the economy expands or enters a recession, assuming no taxes. (A negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to the nearest whole number, e.g., 32.)

Assume the firm goes through with the proposed recapitalization and no taxes.

c. Calculate return on equity, ROE, under each of the three economic scenarios after the recapitalization. (Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)

d. Calculate the percentage changes in ROE for economic expansion and recession. (A negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)

Assume the firm has a tax rate of 40 percent.

e. Calculate return on equity, ROE, under each of the three economic scenarios before any debt is issued. Also, calculate the percentage changes in ROE for economic expansion and recession. (A negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)
f. Calculate return on equity, ROE, under each of the three economic scenarios after the recapitalization. Also, calculate the percentage changes in ROE for economic expansion and recession, assuming the firm goes through with the proposed recapitalization. (A negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. Do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)

1. This is especially valuable when we have subsets of measurements that are highly correlated. In that case it provides few variables that are weighted linear combinations of the original variables that retain the explanatory power of the full original set. A. Correlation analysis B. Affinity analysis C. Variance Analysis D. Principal Component Analysis

2. These are very helpful for data reduction. The information they convey can assist in combining categories, in choosing the variables to remove, and in assessing the level of information overlap between variables. A. Dimension Reduction B. Confusion Matrix C. Data Summaries D. Correlation tables

3. The Classical Statistical approach has focused on this objective A. fitting the best model to the data in an attempt to learn about the underlying relationship in the population. B. Predicting new observations C. Predicting the outcomes of new cases D. All the above

4. This provides the estimate of true classification and misclassification rates. If we have large enough dataset and neither class is rare this can provide reliable estimates. A. Classification matrix B. Lift charts C. Naive rule D. None of the above

5. The default cutoff value in two-class classifiers is A. 0.5 B. 1.0 C. 1.5 D. 2.0

6. When the benefits and costs of correct and incorrect classification are known or can be estimated, this chart is still useful presentation and decision tool A. Lift Chart B. Bar Chart C. Matrix Chart D. Scatter Chart

7. In all discussions of this, we assume the common situation in which there are two classes, one of much greater interest than the other. Data with more than two classes do not lend themselves to this procedure A. Overfitting B. Outliers C. Oversampling D. Jittering

8. This measure gives a percentage score of how predictions deviate (on average) from the actual values. A. RMSE B. SSE C. MAE D.MAPE  

9. This is the presence of two or more predictors sharing the same linear relationship with the outcome variable. Estimates of regression coefficients are likely to be unstable because of this A. Multicollinearity B. Parsimony C. Correlated variables D. None of the above

10. Three popular iterative search algorithms are forward selection, backward elimination and A. Multiple Linear Regression B. Simple Linear Regression C. Stepwise Regression D. None of the above

Forecast an Income Statement

Following is the income statement for Medtronic PLC for the year ended April 29, 2016.

Use the following assumptions to prepare a forecast of the company's income statement for FY2017.

Instructions:

Round answers to the nearest whole number.

Use rounded answers for any subsequent computations.

Do not use negative signs with any of your answers.