Can you please analyze this article and express your opinion

Stop Saying This Is a Nation of Immigrants!

by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz

A nation of immigrants: This is a convenient myth developed as a response to the 1960s movements against colonialism, neocolonialism, and white supremacy. The ruling class and its brain trust offered multiculturalism, diversity, and affirmative action in response to demands for decolonization, justice, reparations, social equality, an end of imperialism, and the rewriting of history — not to be “inclusive” — but to be accurate. What emerged to replace the liberal melting pot idea and the nationalist triumphal interpretation of the “greatest country on earth and in history,” was the “nation of immigrants” story.

By the 1980s, the “waves of immigrants” story even included the indigenous peoples who were so brutally displaced and murdered by settlers and armies, accepting the flawed “Bering Straits” theory of indigenous immigration some 12,000 years ago. Even at that time, the date was known to be wrong, there was evidence of indigenous presence in the Americas as far back as 50,000 years ago, and probably much longer, and entrance by any means across the Pacific and the Atlantic — perhaps, as Vine Deloria Jr. put it, footsteps by indigenous Americans to other continents will one day be acknowledged. But, the new official history texts claimed, the indigenous peoples were the “first immigrants.” They were followed, it was said, by immigrants from England and Africans, then by Irish, and then by Chinese, Eastern and Southern Europeans, Russians, Japanese, and Mexicans. There were some objections from African Americans to referring to enslaved Africans hauled across the ocean in chains as “immigrants,” but that has not deterred the “nation of immigrants” chorus.

Misrepresenting the process of European colonization of North America, making everyone an immigrant, serves to preserve the “official story” of a mostly benign and the benevolent USA, and to mask the fact that the pre-US independence settlers, were, well, settlers, colonial setters, just as they were in Africa and India, or the Spanish in Central and South America. The United States was founded as a settler state, and an imperialistic one from its inception (“manifest destiny,” of course). The settlers were English, Welsh, Scots, Scots-Irish, and German, not including the huge number of Africans who were not settlers. Another group of Europeans who arrived in the colonies also were not settlers or immigrants: the poor, indentured, convicted, criminalized, kidnapped from the working class (vagabonds and unemployed artificers), as Peter Linebaugh puts it, many of who opted to join indigenous communities.

Only beginning in the 1840s, with the influx of millions of Irish Catholics pushed out of Ireland by British policies, did what might be called “immigration” begin. The Irish were discriminated against cheap labor, not settlers. They were followed by the influx of other workers from Scandinavia, Eastern, and Southern Europe, always more Irish, plus Chinese and Japanese, although Asian immigration was soon barred.   Immigration laws were not even enacted until 1875 when the US Supreme Court declared the regulation of immigration a federal responsibility. The Immigration Service was established in 1891.

Buried beneath the tons of propaganda — from the landing of the English “pilgrims” (fanatic Protestant Christian evangelicals) to James Fennimore Cooper’s phenomenally popular “Last of the Mohicans” claiming “natural rights” to not only the indigenous peoples territories but also to the territories claimed by other European powers — is the fact that the founding of the United States was a division of the Anglo empire, with the US becoming a parallel empire to Great Britain. From day one, as was specified in the Northwest Ordinance that preceded the US Constitution, the new republic for empire (as Jefferson called the US) envisioned the future shape of what is now the lower 48 states of the US. They drew up rough maps, specifying the first territory to conquer as the “Northwest Territory,” ergo the title of the ordinance. That territory was the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region, which was filled with indigenous farming communities.

Once the conquest of the “Northwest Territory” was accomplished through a combination of genocidal military campaigns and bringing in European settlers from the east, and the indigenous peoples moved south and north for protection into other indigenous territories, the republic for empire annexed Spanish Florida where runaway enslaved Africans and remnants of the indigenous communities that had escaped the Ohio carnage fought back during three major wars (Seminole wars) over two decades. In 1828, President Andrew Jackson (who had been a general leading the Seminole wars) pushed through the Indian Removal Act to force all the agricultural indigenous nations of the Southeast, from Georgia to the Mississippi River, to transfer to Oklahoma territory that had been gained through the “Louisiana Purchase” from France. Anglo settlers with enslaved Africans seized the indigenous agricultural lands for plantation agriculture in the Southern region. Many moved on into the Mexican province of Texas — then came the US military invasion of Mexico in 1846, seizing Mexico City and forcing Mexico to give up its northern half through the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Texas were then opened to “legal” Anglo settlement, also legalizing those who had already settled illegally, and in Texas by force. The indigenous and the poor Mexican communities in the seized territory, such as the Apache, Navajo, and Comanche, resisted colonization, as they had resisted the Spanish empire, often by force of arms, for the next 40 years. The small class of Hispanic elites welcomed and collaborated with US occupation.

Are “immigrants” the appropriate designation for the indigenous peoples of North America? No.

Are “immigrants” the appropriate designation for enslaved Africans? No.

Are “immigrants” the appropriate designation for the original European settlers? No.

Are “immigrants” the appropriate designation for Mexicans who migrate for work to the United States? No.

They are migrant workers crossing a border created by US military force. Many crossing that borders now are also from Central America, from the small countries that were ravaged by US military intervention in the 1980s and who also have the right to make demands on the United States.

So, let’s stop saying “this is a nation of immigrants.”

ome states argue for block grants from the federal government to the states in lieu of federal money for expansion. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this argument?

In a few paragraphs, please describe your view of the United Nations, its role on the global arena, and your assessment about how it has been handling global crisis situations. Do you think the United Nations is still effective in meetings its purpose?

Assume Continental and United are the only airlines servicing several routes in the Midwest. Both are contemplating on whether or not to raise their prices on these routes. Also assume that both airliners announce their decision at the same time and that there will be no communication between them prior to making the announcement. If both increase their fares, then Continental will make $15 million profit and United will make $10 million profit. If both keep their fares unchanged, then Continental will lose $10 million and United will make $3 million profit. If one raises its fares and the other does not, then the one that increased its fares will lose $5 million and the other will have a profit of $12 million.
a) Set up the payoff matrix for the decision strategy (to increase fares vs. to keep fares unchanged).
b) What is the dominant strategy for Continental?
c) What is the dominant strategy for United?
d) Is there a dominant equilibrium? If yes, what is it; if not why?.

What is the history of the United Way

Please see attached file and the link below and respond to following questions:

1. Is climate change really a problem?

2. How much investment should firms really put into reducing emissions.

3. From a strategic standpoint, what are the practical implications of these changes/predicted changes?

Sea transport has a relatively green image because ships emit less carbon dioxide per tonne and per kilometre than rail, truck or air transport. Yet, given its scale and rapid growth, it’s a major source of carbon emissions. Maritime transport emits around 1,000 million tonnes of CO? a year and is responsible for about 2.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The international law Despite being a major contributor to climate change, the powerful shipping industry has successfully lobbied to be excluded from obligations to reduce emissions under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, the 2015 Paris Agreement. There are also no sector-wide emission reduction targets in maritime shipping under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In other key policy spaces, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there are no obligations imposed on either states or shipping corporations to reduce maritime emissions. Countries could potentially set emissions targets domestically, but they rarely set sectoral targets, especially for sectors that are heavily exposed to international trade. In this context, the shipping industry has been particularly footloose in its response to climate change. It is therefore a cause for celebration that decades of negotiation have now yielded this agreement. The deal requires all IMO countries to reduce shipping emissions by 50% compared with 2008 levels. Ships will be required to be more energy-efficient and to use cleaner energy such as solar and wind electricity generation. Currently, the shipping industry is overwhelmingly reliant on dirty, carbon-rich fuels such as heavy diesel. Some stormy seas ahead The climate deal has been described as “historic”, but not all countries are on board. Some, particularly island nations that are vulnerable to sea level rise, wanted a “far, far more ambitious” target. Others, including the United States, Brazil, Panama and Saudi Arabia, are strongly against it. Reconciling these differences will be a difficult task for the IMO. It has always been technically difficult to accurately calculate the precise amount of fuel used during shipping operations. It’s even harder to allocate maritime emissions to specific countries. Contributing to the potential confusion is the use of “flags of convenience”. This is where a ship’s owners register the vessel in a country other than their own, and fly the flag of the country where registered. This is usually done to disguise the relationship between the vessel and its actual owner, due to the attractive, lower regulatory burdens that some open registries offer. Shipping corporations could also use flags of convenience to avoid mandatory emission reduction targets. The way forward As a result of the climate deal, states will eventually need to introduce domestic laws setting emission reduction targets for their shipping industry. These targets could also be applied to ships that call at their ports. The good news is that there is potential synergy between such regulation and existing laws, such as the European Union regulation that requires ship owners and operators to monitor, report and verify CO? emissions from certain vessels that dock at European ports. Read more: Five ways the shipping industry can reduce its carbon emissions The new climate deal has the potential to change the way shipping companies operate. It presents an opportunity for the shipping industry to become part of the solution rather than the problem when it comes to climate change. It’s also a strong signal to other international industries, such as the aviation sector, that have largely escaped emissions reduction targets. If we can reduce emissions in such a large and complex sector as marine transport, it bodes well for the capacity of international frameworks to tackle other difficult problems.

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float (p. 371) and then click on "Create Thread" to post your answers to the following questions: Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way?

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way?

China’s Managed Float

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy

Read the Case: China’s Managed Float Why do you think the Chinese government originally pegged the value of the yuan against the U.S. dollar? What were the benefits of doing this to China? What were the costs? What do you think the Chinese government should do? Let the float, maintain the peg, or change the peg in some way? i dont want picture of answer

China’s Managed Float

In 1994, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of $1 = 8.28 yuan. For the next 11 years, the value of the yuan moved in lockstep with the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. By early 2005, however, pressure was building for China to alter its exchange rate policy and let the yuan float freely against the dollar. Underlying this pressure were claims that after years of rapid economic growth and foreign capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate undervalued the yuan by as much as 40 percent. In turn, the cheap yuan was helping to fuel a boom in Chinese exports to the West, particularly the United States, where the trade deficit with China expanded to a record $160 billion in 2004. Job losses among American manufacturing companies created political pressures in the United States for the government to push the Chinese to let the yuan float freely against the dollar. American manufacturers complained that they could not compete against “artificially cheap” Chinese imports. In early 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham tried to get the Senate to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imports from China unless the Chinese agreed to revalue its currency against the U.S. dollar. Although the move was defeated, Schumer and Graham vowed to revisit the issue. For its part, the Bush administration pressured China from 2003 onwards, urging the government to adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy. Keeping the yuan pegged to the dollar was also becoming increasingly problematic for the Chinese. The trade surplus with the United States, coupled with strong inflows of foreign investment, led to a surge of dollars into China. To maintain the exchange rate, the Chinese central bank regularly purchased dollars from commercial banks, issuing them yuan at the official exchange rate. As a result, by mid 2005 China’s foreign exchange reserves had risen to more than $700 billion. They were forecast to hit $1 trillion by the end of 2006. The Chinese were reportedly buying some $15 billion each month in an attempt to maintain the dollar/yuan exchange rate. When the Chinese central bank issues yuan to mop up excess dollars, the authorities are in effect expanding the domestic money supply. The Chinese banking system is now awash with money and there is growing concern that excessive lending could create a financial bubble and a surge in price inflation, which might destabilize the economy. On July 25, 2005, the Chinese finally bowed to the pressure. The government announced that it would abandon the peg against the dollar in favor of a “link” to a basket of currencies, which included the euro, yen, and U.S. dollar. Simultaneously, the government announced that it would revalue the yuan against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent, and allow that value to move by 0.3 percent a day. The yuan was allowed to move by 1.5 percent a day against other currencies. Many American observers and politicians thought that the Chinese move was too limited. They called for the Chinese to relax further their control over the dollar/yuan exchange rate. The Chinese resisted. By 2006, pressure was increasing on the Chinese to take action. With the U.S. trade deficit with China hitting a new record of $202 billion in 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham once more crafted a Senate bill that would place a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports unless the Chinese allowed the yuan to depreciate further against the dollar. The Chinese responded by inviting the senators to China, and convincing them, for now at least, that the country will move progressively towards a more flexible exchange rate policy