Please read the case provided below and answer the following question:

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

4 Questions – Answer

1. Distinguish between the concepts of Needs, Wants and Demands, out of the three concepts which one you can relate it to Porsche customers . Briefly explain the concept of core competency , in your opinion what are the core competencies of Porsche.

2. Define and explain the concept of brand personality, describe the brand personality of Porsche brand in general, please justify your answers

3. Using relevant theory Analyze the buyer decision process of the Porsche Cayenne customer.

4. Identify, explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

4 Questions – Answer all Total Marks: 25

1.   Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

2. Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

3. You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

4. Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

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4 Questions – Answer all Total Marks: 25

1.   Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

2. Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

3. You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

4. Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

After reviewing the case for Nature Bros. Ltd., answer the following questions. After reviewing this material, make a list of additional information which should be supplied to support the sales projections. Comment on objectives: Are they reasonable, optimistic, or conservative? What marketing mix would best support this growth rate? Evaluate the information supplied regarding a new product development and physical assets in light of the pro forma income statements Morris developed. Is the capital sought appropriate for the circumstances? If more information is needed, state what it is and how it could be obtained. What sources should Morris approach for this amount of capital? Based on the current balance sheet, how much equity should he give up for the investment?

NATURE BROS. LTD. BACKGROUND Thanksgiving Day 1993 is the day that Dale Morris remembers as the “public debut” of his creation, a new seasoned salt mix. Although he was a salesman by temperament and career, his hobby was cooking. Having experimented with both traditional home cooking and more exotic gourmet cooking, Morris had developed an appreciation for many herbs and spices. He had also done a lot of reading about the health hazards of the typical American diet. When his mother learned that she had high blood pressure, Morris decided it was time for some action. He created a low-salt seasoning mix, based on a nutritive yeast extract, that could be used to replace salt in most cases. This Thanksgiving dinner, prepared for 25 family members and friends, would be his final testing ground. He used his mix in all the recipes except the pumpkin pie—everything from the turkey and dressing to the vegetables and even the rolls. As the meal progressed, the verdict was unanimously in favor of his secret ingredient, although he had a hard time convincing them that it was his invention and was only 10 percent salt. Everyone wanted a sample to try at home. Over the next two years, Morris perfected his product. Experiments in new uses led to “tasting parties” for friends and neighbors, and the holiday season found the Morris kitchen transformed into a miniature assembly line producing gift-wrapped bottles of the mix. Morris became something of a celebrity in his small town, but it wasn’t until the Ladies’ Mission Society at his church approached him with the idea of allowing them to sell his mix as a fund-raiser that he realized the possibilities of his creation. His kitchen-scale operation could support the sales effort of the church women for a short time, but if he wanted to take advantage of a truly marketable product, he would have to make other arrangements. Morris agreed to “test-market” his product through the church group while he looked for ways to expand and commercialize his operation. The charity sale was a huge success (the best the women had ever experienced), and, based on this success, Morris moved to create his own company. Naming his product “Nature Bros. Old Fashioned Seasoning,” he incorporated the company in 1995 as Nature Bros. Ltd. Morris used most of his savings to develop and register the trademarks, for packaging, and for product displays. He researched the cost of manufacturing and bottling his product in large quantities and concluded that he just didn’t have the cash to get started. His first attempts to raise money, in the form of a personal bank loan, were unsuccessful, and he was forced to abandon the project. For several years, he concentrated on his career, becoming a regional vice president of the insurance company he worked for. He continued to make “Nature Bros. Seasoning” in small batches, mainly for his mother and business associates. These users eventually enabled Morris to get financial support for his company. To raise $65,000 to lease manufacturing equipment and building space, he sold stock to his mother and to two other regional vice presidents of the insurance company. For their contributions, each became the owner of 15 percent of Nature Bros. Ltd. The process of getting the product to the retail market began in August 2002, and the first grocery store sales started in March 2003. The initial marketing plan was fairly simple—to get the product in the hands of the consumer. Morris personally visited the managers of individual supermarkets, both chains and independents, and convinced many to allow a tasting demonstration booth to be set up in their stores. These demonstrations proved as popular as the first Thanksgiving dinner trial nearly 10 years earlier. Dale Morris’s product was a hit, and in a short time, he was able to contract with food brokerage firms to place his product in stores in a 10-state region.

PRESENT SITUATION As indicated in the balance sheet (see Exhibit 1), more capital is needed to support the current markets and expand both markets and products. Two new products are being developed: a salt-free version of the original product and an MSG-based flavor enhancer that will compete with Accent. Morris worked with a business consultant in drawing up a business plan to describe his company, its future growth, and its capital needs. OVERALL PROJECTIONS The first section discusses the objectives and sales projections for 2004 and 2005 (Exhibits 2 and 3). The resulting pro forma income statements for 2004 to 2005 are in Exhibits 4 and 5. 2004

OBJECTIVES The company’s objectives for 2004 are to stabilize its existing markets and to achieve a 5 percent market share in the category of seasoned salt, a 10 percent market share in salt substitutes, and a 5 percent market share in MSG products. Although the original product contains less than 10 percent salt, the company has developed a salt-free product to compete with other such products. The dollar volume for the seasoned salt category in the seven markets the company is in will amount to $7,931,889 in 2004. In 2003, sales of the company in the Oklahoma market were 5.5 percent of the total sales for that market for the eight-month period that the company was operational. Since these sales were accomplished with absolutely no advertising, the company can be even more successful in the future in all seven current markets with a fully developed and funded advertising campaign. The marketing approach will include advertisements in the print media, with ads on “food day” offering cents-off coupons. This program will take place in all seven markets, while stores will continue to use floor displays for demonstrations. Nearly 100 percent warehouse penetration should be achieved in 2004 in these markets. The goal for the category of salt substitutes for 2004 is 10 percent of the market share. This larger market share can be achieved since there are only a few competitors, Mrs. Dash, AMBI Inc. with Cordia Salt Alternative, and RCN with No Salt. The company’s product is superior in all respects and has a retail price advantage of 10 to 20 cents per can. In addition, the company’s product is much more versatile than competitors’ products. Aggressive marketing and advertising will emphasize the tremendous versatility of usage as well as the great taste and health benefits of the product. The informal consumer surveys at demonstrations indicated that consumers prefer Nature Bros. to competitors’ products by a wide margin. A new product, which is already developed, will be added during this time. Called “Enhance,” it too is a dry-mixed, non cooked, low-overhead, high-profit food product. Its category of MSG products has a dollar volume of $1,957,090 in these markets. This category includes only one main competitor, Accent, made by Pet Inc. Accent has not been heavily advertised, and it is a one-line product with little initial name recognition. The company’s new product will have a 10- to 20-cent per can retail price advantage to help achieve a 5 percent share of this category. In summary, 2004 will be spent solidifying the company’s present market positions. 2005

OBJECTIVES The company intends to open eight new markets in 2005 that include Los Angeles, Phoenix, Portland, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Seattle, and Spokane. These new markets make up 17.1 percent of grocery store sales, according to the Progressive Grocer’s Marketing Guidebook, the industry standard. In the category of seasoned salt, these markets have a dollar volume of $15,218,886 a year. Salt substitutes sell at a volume of $10,064,028, and the MSG category $3,285,528. With proper advertising, the company’s shares forecast in our current markets will also be realized. A 5 percent penetration of the seasoned salt category is a very conservative projection considering the strong health consciousness of the West Coast. The products will be introduced in shippers, used in store demonstrations, and supported with media advertising to achieve at least a 5 percent market share. This would result in sales of $760,943 in that category. A 10 percent penetration is targeted in the salt-free category. Using aggressive marketing, price advantage at retail, and better packaging, the company will be well positioned against the lower-quality products of our competitors. With the dollar volume of this category at $10,064,028, a conservative estimate of our share would be $1,006,420. In the category of MSG, a 5 percent share will be achieved. The main competitor in this category does very little advertising. Again, attractive packaging, aggressive marketing, high quality, and a retail price advantage of 30–40 cents per unit will enable the company to realize a 5 percent market penetration. This share of the West Coast markets will generate sales of $164,276. Total sales of all three products in these eight new markets will be around $1,931,639. The company plans to continue to solidify the markets previously established through the use of coupons, co-op advertising, quality promotions, and word-of-mouth advertising. Market share in these original markets should increase by another 2.5 percent in 2005. The dollar volume of the seasoned salt category in 2005 should be around $9,522,472, and our market share at 7.5 percent would amount to $714,185. The dollar volume for the salt substitute category would be $6,220,748, giving sales at 12.5 percent of $775,593. In the MSG category, a 7.5 percent market share of the $2,055,864 volume would give sales of $154,189. The company’s total sales for the existing markets in 2005 will be in excess of $1,643,967. The totals for 2005 sales of Nature Bros. Old Fashioned Seasoning will be $1,475,128. Nature Bros. Salt-Free volume should be $1,784,013. The sales of Enhance, our MSG product, should be $318,465. This will give us a total sales volume of $3,557,606 for all three products in 2005.

FINANCIAL NEEDS AND PROJECTIONS In this plan, Morris indicated a need for $100,000 equity infusion to expand sales, increase markets, and add new products. The money would be used to secure warehouse stocking space, do cooperative print advertising, give point-of-purchase display allowances, and pay operating expenses.

NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT The company plans to continue an ongoing research and development program to introduce new and winning products. Four products are already developed that will be highly marketable and easily produced. Personnel are dedicated to building a large and profitable company and attracting quality brokers. The next new product targets a different market segment but can be brought online for about $25,000 by using our existing machinery, types of containers, and display pieces. A highly respected broker felt that the product would be a big success. The broker previously represented the only major producer of a similar product, Pet Inc., which had sales of $4.36 million in 1985. The company can achieve at least a 5 percent market share with this product in the first year. The company’s product will be at least equal in quality and offer a 17 percent price advantage to the consumer, while still making an excellent profit. Another new product would require slightly different equipment. This product would be initially produced by a private-label manufacturer. The product would be established before any major machinery was purchased. Many large companies use private-label manufacturers, or co-packers, as they are called in the trade. Consumer tests at demonstrations and food shows have indicated that each of these products will be strong. PLANT AND EQUIPMENT The company’s plant is located in a nearly new metal building in Rose, Oklahoma. The lease on the building limits payments to no more than $300 per month for the next seven years. The new computer-controlled filling equipment will be paid off in two months, and the seaming equipment is leased from the company’s container manufacturer for only $1 per year. The company has the capability of producing about 300,000 units a month with an additional $15,000 investment for an automatic conveyer system and a bigger product mixer. This production level would require two additional plant personnel, working one shift with no overtime. The company could double this production if needed with the addition of another shift. One of the main advantages of the company’s business is the very small overhead required to produce the products. The company can generate enough product to reach sales of approximately $4 million a year while maintaining a production payroll of only $37,000 a year. To meet the previously outlined production goals, the company will need to purchase another filling machine in 2005. This machine will be capable of filling two cans at once with an overall speed of 75 cans per minute, which would increase capacity to 720,000 units a month. A higher-speed seaming machine will also need to be purchased. The filling machine would cost approximately $22,000; a rebuilt seamer would cost $25,000, while a new one would cost $50,000. With the addition of these two machines, the company would have a capacity of 1,020,000 units per month on one shift. By 2006, the company will have to decide whether to continue the lease or buy the property where located and expand the facilities. The property has plenty of land for expansion for the next five years. The company has the flexibility to produce other types of products with the same equipment and can react quickly to changes in customer preferences and modify its production line to meet such demands as needed.

Bianca Pascoe has provided the following statement as background and advice in terms of the recommendations you can provide to her organisation.

The number of goods sold by “The Local” is in excess of one million per year with deliveries being about

40% of that figure. The amount of goods sold has decreased marginally in recent years. “The Local” is wholly owned but Bianca and her staff have a standard of living to

maintain so there is some pressure to raise overall sales whilst keeping costs, particularly

delivery costs, in check.   

Bianca continues: It is your job to use the sample data from last year’s overall sales to do

some statistical analyses and interpretations, investigating what the current overall sales of

the business are and providing insights that will guide future business decisions. She

specifically asks: Can you put together a statistical report about the overall sales and

deliveries of “The Local”?

1. Provide a table in which you summarise complete descriptive statistics on ‘Overall sales’

and ‘deliveries’ of the goods represented by your sample data set (including but NOT limited to measures

of central location, measures of variability, etc.). What insights do these statistics provide? Additionally,

please state the coefficient of variation for ‘sales’ and ‘deliveries’ for the entire dataset. Comment on the

results you observe.  

2. Prepare frequency distributions (remember to use Sturge’s rule and create the appropriate

similarly sized classes) and accompanying histograms and ogives for these quantitative sets. Think about and provide additional analyses/diagrams that may be of interest. What insights do these

statistics provide?  

3. Analyse ‘Overall sales’ and ‘deliveries’ for any relationship, providing a scatter plot.  

Comment on the existence of a relationship, how you came to that conclusion, if a

relationship exists further comment on its strength and, in any case, what this means in terms of managing the retail outlet.  

4. Develop cross tabulation or contingency tables to provide information on:  

a. Overall sales and fat/sugar content, please only analyse those goods that have items that

exhibit Regular and Low Fat/Sugar values.  

b. Item Type and deliveries. Remember quantitative values must be presented as classes

in cross tabulation or contingency tables. Be Careful to explain any patterns or anomalies

you find in your tables.  

5. Prepare a pie chart to graphically represent the proportion of overall sales by each item

type (create classes of overall sales for this purpose). Interpret the graph comment on any

issues you perceive.  

Pain “Pain,” an excerpt from the book Reaching Up for Manhood, draws on the writer’s training and experience as a psychologist. He uses the narrative to explain the power of memory in our lives, especially memory of painful experiences. His particular focus is on boys and on the ways, they are taught to repress the wounds caused by painful experiences. Nonetheless, it should be easy for readers to apply his insights to the experiences of girls.

1. Boys are taught to suffer their wounds in silence. To pretend that it doesn’t hurt, outside or inside. So many of them carry the scars of childhood into adulthood, never having come to grips with the pain, the anger, the fear. And that pain can change boys and bring doubts into their lives, though more often than not they have no idea where those doubts come from. Pain can make you afraid to love or cause you to doubt the safety of the ground you walk on. I know from my own experience that some pain changes us forever.

2. It all started because there was no grass. Actually, there was grass, you just couldn’t walk on it.

3. In the late fifties and early sixties, the projects were places people moved to get away from tenement buildings like mine. We couldn’t move into the projects because my mother was a single parent. Today most projects are crammed full of single parents, but when I was a child your application for the projects was automatically rejected if that was your situation. The projects were places for people on the way up. They had elevators, they were well maintained, and they had grass surrounding them. Grass like we had never seen before. The kind of grass that was like walking on carpet. Grass that yelled out to little girls and boys to run and tumble and do cartwheels and roll around on it. There was just one problem, it was off limits to people. All the projects had signs that said “Keep Off the Grass.” And there were men keeping their eyes open for children who dared even think of crossing the single-link chain that enclosed it. The projects didn’t literally have the only grass we could find in the Bronx. Crotona Park, Pelham Bay Park, and Van Cortland Park were available to us. But the grass in those parks was a sparse covering for dirt, rocks, and twigs. You would never think about rolling around in that grass, because if you did you’d likely be rolling in dog excrement or over a hard rock.

4. There was one other place where we found grass in our neighborhood. Real grass. Lawn-like grass. It was in the side yard of a small church that was on the corner of Union Avenue and Home Street. The church was small and only open on Sundays. The yard and its precious grass were enclosed by a four-foot-high fence. We were not allowed in the yard by the pastor of the church.

5. Occasionally we would sneak in to retrieve a small pink Spaulding ball that had gone off course during a game of stickball or punch ball, but if we were seen climbing the fence there would be a scene, with screams, yells, and threats to tell our parents. So although we often looked at that soft grass with longing, the churchyard was off limits.

6. It would have stayed off limits if it had not been for football. Football came into my life one fall when I was nine years old, and I played it every fall for the rest of my childhood and adolescence. But football in the inner city looked very different than football played other places. The sewer manhole covers were the end zones. Anywhere in the street was legal playing territory, but not the sidewalk. There could be no tackling on pavement, so the game was called two-hand touch. If you touched an opponent with both hands, play had to stop. The quarterback called colorful plays: “Okay now. David, you go right in front of the blue Chevy. I’m gonna fake it to you. Geoff, see the black Ford on the right? No, don’t look, stupid—they’re gonna know our play. You go there, stop, then cross over toward William’s stoop. I’ll look for you short. Richard, go to the first sewer and turn around and stop. I’ll pump it to you, go long, Geoff, you hike on three. Ready! Break!”

7. All we needed was grass. All our eyes were drawn to the churchyard. A decision had to be made. Rory was the first to bring it up. “We should sneak into the churchyard and play tackle.”

8. We all walked over to Home Street and, out of sight of front windows, climbed over the fence and walked onto the grass. A thick carpet of grass that felt like falling on a mattress. We were in heaven.

9. Football in the churchyard was everything we had imagined. We could finally block and tackle and not worry about falling on the hard concrete or asphalt streets. We didn’t have to worry about cars coming down the block the way we did when we played two-hand touch. And because we were able to tackle, we could have running plays. We loved it. We played for hours on end.

10. There was one problem with our football field, which was about thirty yards long and fifteen yards wide: at the far end there was a built-in barbecue pit, right in the middle of the end zone. If we were running with the football, or going out for a pass, we had to avoid the barbecue pit with its metal rods along the top, set into its concrete sides. We knew that no matter what you were doing when in that area of the yard, you had to keep one eye on the barbecue pit. To run into its concrete sides—or, even worse, the metal bars—would be very painful and dangerous.

11. I was fast and crafty. I loved to play split end on the offense. I could fake out the other kids and get free to catch the ball. I had one problem, though—I hadn’t mastered catching a football thrown over my head. To do this you have to lean your head back and watch as the football descends into your hands. Keep your eye on the ball, that’s the trick to catching one over the shoulder. We all wanted to go deep for “the bomb”—a ball thrown as far as possible, where a receiver’s job is to run full speed and catch it without-stretched hands. It took me forever to learn to concentrate on the football, with my head back as far as it would go, while running full speed. But finally, I mastered it. I was now a truly dangerous receiver. If you played too far away from me I could catch the ball short, and if you came too close I could run right by the slower boys and catch the bomb.

12. The move I did on Ned was picture perfect. I ran ten yards, turned around, and faced Walter. He pumped the ball to me. I felt Ned take a step forward, going for the fake as I turned and ran right by him. Walter launched the bomb. As the football left his hand I stopped looking over my shoulder at him and started my sprint to the end zone. After running ten yards I tilted my head back and looked up at the bright blue fall sky. Nothing. I looked forward again and ran harder, then looked up again. There it was, the brown leather football falling in a perfect arc toward the earth, toward where I would be in three seconds, toward the winning touchdown.

13. And then pain. The bar of the barbecue pit caught me in midstride in the middle of my shin. I went down in a flurry of ashes, legs and arms flying every which way. The pain was all-enveloping. I grabbed my leg above and below where it had hit; I couldn’t bear to touch the place where it had slammed into the bar. The pain was too much. I lay flat on the ground, trying to cry out. I could only make a humming sound deep in the back of my throat. My friends gathered around and I tried to act like a big boy, the way I had been taught. I tried not to cry. Then the pain consumed me and I couldn’t see any of my friends anymore. I howled and then cried and then howled some more. The boys saw the blood seeping through my dungarees and my brother John said, “Let me see. Be still. Let me see.” He rolled my pants leg up to my knee to look at the damage. All the other boys who had been playing or watching were in a circle around me. They all grimaced and turned away. I knew it was bad then, and I howled louder.

14. Catching the metal bar in full stride with my shin had crushed a quarter-sized hole in my leg. The skin was missing and even to this day I can feel the indentation in my shinbone where the bar gouged out a small piece of bone. I was off my feet for a few days and it took about two weeks for my shin to heal completely. Still, I was at the age where sports and friends meant everything to me. I couldn’t wait to play football in the churchyard again, but I was a much more cautious receiver than before.

15. Several years later, when I finished the ninth grade at a junior high school in the South Bronx and was preparing to go to high school, I knew that my life had reached a critical juncture. My high school prospects were grim. I didn’t pass the test to get into the Bronx High School of Science (I was more interested in girls than prep work), so my choices were either Morris High School or Clinton High School. Both of these were poor academically and suffered from a high incidence of violence. I asked my mother if I could stay with my grandparents in the house they had just built in Wyandanch, a quiet, mostly African-American town on Long Island. She agreed, and they agreed, so I went there for my three years of high school.

16. That first year I went out for the junior varsity football team at Wyandanch High and played football as a receiver. I was a good receiver. The years of faking out kids on the narrow streets of the Bronx made me so deceptive that I couldn’t be covered in the wide-open area of a real football field. But I had one problem—I couldn’t catch the bomb. My coach would scream at me after the ball had slipped through my fingers or bounced off my hands. “Geoff! What’s the matter with you? Concentrate, dang it! Concentrate!” I couldn’t. No matter how I tried to focus on the ball coming down out of the sky, at the last minute I would have to look down. To make sure the ground wasn’t playing tricks on me. No hidden booby traps. What happened in the churchyard would flash into my mind and even though I knew I was in a wide-open field, I’d have to glance down at the ground. I never made it as a receiver in high school. I finished my career as quarterback. Better to be looking at your opponent, knowing he wanted to tackle you, sometimes even getting hit without seeing it coming, but at least being aware of that possibility. Never again falling into the trap of thinking you were safe, running free, only you and the sky and a brown leather ball dropping from it.

17. Boys are conditioned not to let on that it hurts, never to say, “I’m still scared.” I’ve written here only about physical trauma, but every day in my work I deal with boys undergoing almost unthinkable mental trauma from violence or drug abuse in the home or carrying emotional scars from physical abuse or unloving parents. I have come to see that in teaching boys to deny their own pain we inadvertently teach them to deny the pain of others. I believe this is one of the reasons so many men become physically abusive to those they supposedly love. Pain suffered early in life often becomes the wellspring from which rage and anger flow, emotions that can come flooding over the banks of restraint and reason, often drowning those unlucky enough to get caught in their way. We have done our boys an injustice by not helping them to acknowledge their pain. We must remember to tell them “I know it hurts. Come let me hold you. I’ll hold you until it stops. And if you find out that the hurt comes back, I’ll hold you again. I’ll hold you until you’re healed.”

18. Boys are taught by coaches to play with pain. They are told by parents that they shouldn’t cry. They watch their heroes on the big screen getting punched and kicked and shot, and while these heroes might groan and yell, they never cry. And even some of us who should know better don’t go out of our way to make sure our boys know about our pain and tears, and how we have healed ourselves. By sharing this we can give boys models for their own healing and recovery.

19. Even after I was grown I believed that ignoring pain was part of learning to be a man, that I could get over hurt by simply willing it away. I had forgotten that when I was young I couldn’t run in an open field without looking down, that with no one to talk to me about healing, I spent too many years unable to trust the ground beneath my feet.

MEANINGS AND VALUES

1. What is the main expository point (thesis) of the essay, and where does the writer state it? (See “Guide to Terms”: Unity.)

2. What desires or aspirations did grass represent for the writer as a young man?

3. a. What, according to the writer, are the consequences of painful experiences (physical or emotional) suffered in youth?

b. Why might the writer have chosen to focus on the consequences of pain for boys? How might the essay’s conclusions be applied to or adapted for understanding the experiences of girls?

The cases involving the explosion of Ford Pinto's due to a defective fuel system design led to the debate of many issues, most centering around the use by Ford of a cost-benefit analysis and the ethics surrounding its decision not to upgrade the fuel system based on this analysis.Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself on the grounds that it used the accepted risk/benefit analysis to determine if the monetary costs of making the change were greater than the societal benefit. Based on the numbers Ford used, the cost would have been $137 million versus the $49.5 million price tag put on the deaths, injuries, and car damages, and thus Ford felt justified not implementing the design change. This risk/benefit analysis was created out of the development of product liability, culminating at Judge Learned Hand's BPL formula, where if the expected harm exceeded the cost to take the precaution, then the company must take the precaution, whereas if the cost was liable, then it did not have to. However, the BPL formula focuses on a specific accident, while the risk/benefit analysis requires an examination of the costs, risks, and benefits through use of the product as a whole. Based on this analysis, Ford legally chose not to make the design changes which would have made the Pinto safer. However, just because it was legal doesn't necessarily mean that it was ethical. It is difficult to understand how a price can be put on saving a human life.

There are several reasons why such a strictly economic theory should not be used. First, it seems unethical to determine that people should be allowed to die or be seriously injured because it would cost too much to prevent it. Second, the analysis does not take into all the consequences, such as the negative publicity that Ford received and the judgments and settlements resulting from the lawsuits. Also, some things just can't be measured in terms of dollars, and that includes human life. However, there are arguments in favor of the risk/benefit analysis. First, it is well developed through existing case law. Second, it encourages companies to take precautions against creating risks that result in large accident costs. Next, it can be argued that all things must have some common measure. Finally, it provides a bright line which companies can follow.

I. IntroductioIn May of 1968, the Ford Motor Company, based upon a recommendation by then vice-president Lee Iacocca, decided to introduce a subcompact car and produce it domestically. In an effort to gain a large market share, the automobile was designed and developed on an accelerated schedule. During the first few years sales of the Pinto were excellent, but there was trouble on the horizon.

A. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company¹In May 1972, Lily Gray was traveling with thirteen year old Richard Grimshaw in a 1972 Pinto when their car was struck by another car traveling approximately thirty miles per hour. The impact ignited a fire in the Pinto which killed Lily Gray and left Richard Grimshaw with devastating injuries. A judgment was rendered against Ford and the jury awarded the Gray family $560,000 and Matthew Grimshaw $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The surprise came when the jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages as well. This was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million.²

B. The Criminal Case³Six month following the controversial Grirnshaw verdict, Ford was involved in yet another controversial case involving the Pinto. The automobile's fuel system design contributed (whether or not it was the sole cause is arguable) to the death of three women on August 10, 1918 when their car was hit by another vehicle traveling at a relatively low speed by a man driving with open beer bottles, marijuana, caffeine pills and capsules of "speed."⁴ The fact that Ford had chosen earlier not to upgrade the fuel system design became an issue of public debate as a result of this case. The debate was heightened because the prosecutor of Elkart County, Indiana chose to prosecute Ford for reckless homicide and criminal recklessness.Some felt the issues raised in the Ford Pinto cases were an example of the "deep pocket" company disregarding consumer safety in pursuit of the almighty dollar. Others feel they are an example of runaway media coverage blowing a story out of proportion.⁵ Regardless of opinion, the Ford Pinto case is a tangled web of many complex legal and ethical issues.

To determine if the proper result was achieved in this case, one has to evaluate and weigh these many issues. The central issue in deciding whether Ford should be liable for electing not to redesign a defective product in order to maximize its bottom line, one must analyze the so-called "cost/benefit" analysis Ford used to defend this decision. Within the scope of this paper, this cost/benefit issue (and associated sub-issues) will be the focus of discussion. Other issues, such as the ethics involved in Ford's decision, the choice of prosecuting Ford criminally, whistle-blowing, the assignment of punitive damages and the Court of Appeals decision reducing the damages are all important issues of this case that will not be the focus herein.

II. Facts

A. Incident FactsOn August 10, 1978, three teenage girls stopped to refuel the 1973 Ford Pinto sedan they were driving. After filling up, the driver loosely reapplied the gas cap which subsequently fell off as they headed down U. S. Highway 33. Trying to retrieve the cap, the girls stopped in the right lane of the highway shoulder since there was no space on the highway for cars to safely pull off the roadway. Shortly thereafter, a van weighing over 400 pounds and modified with a rigid plank for a front bumper was traveling at fifty five miles an hour and stuck the stopped Pinto. The two passengers died at the scene when the car burst into flames. The driver was ejected and died shortly thereafter in the hospital. Inspecting the van shortly after the accident, the police found open beer bottles, marijuana and caffeine pills inside.⁶The subsequent proceedings were rather surprising. Based on the facts of the case, it seemed that any one of a number of parties could be liable in a civil action or prosecuted criminally. The obvious target seemed to be the driver of the van. It seems he could have been prosecuted for criminal homicide or the families of the victims could have pursued a civil action, in light of the fact the driver possessed several controlled substances at the time of the accident.A second potential party open to a civil suit was the Indiana Highway department. It was their design which left no safe stopping place along Highway 33 where cars could pull over for emergencies. In fact, the road was so dangerous that the Elkart County Citizens' Safety Committee had previously written a letter to the department asking that the road design be modified to provide safe stopping place for emergencies.⁷ It is also conceivable, the driver of the Pinto could have been found negligent for stopping a car in the middle of the highway.

The first surprise of the resulting litigation carne when Indiana state prosecutor filed suit against Ford Motor Company for criminal recklessness and reckless homicide.⁸ The famous and highly publicized legal battle was underway. Some have argued the prosecution acted unethically from day one, gathering and hiding evidence from the defendant and concealing information about the condition of the van driver.⁹ Whether true or not, the following litigation caused damage that would take Ford years to recover from.

B. Questionable DesignThe controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto concerned the placement of the automobile's fuel tank. It was located behind the rear axle, instead of above it. This was initially done in an effort to create more trunk space. The problem with this design, which later became evident, was that it made the Pinto more vulnerable to a rear-end collision. This vulnerability was enhanced by other features of the car. The gas tank and the rear axle were separated by only nine inches. There were also bolts that were positioned in a manner that threatened the gas tank. Finally, the fuel filler pipe design resulted in a higher probability that it would to disconnect from the tank in the event of an accident than usual, causing gas spillage that could lead to dangerous fires. Because of these numerous design flaws, the Pinto became the center of public debate.

These design problems were first brought to the public's attention in an August 1977 article in Mother Jones magazine. This article condemned the Ford Motor Company and the author was later given a Pulitzer Prize.¹⁰ This article originated the public debate over the risk/benefit analysis used by the Ford Motor Company in their determination as to whether or, not the design of the Pinto fuel tank be altered to reduce the risk of fire as the result of a collision.The crux of the public debate about The Ford Motor Company was the decision not to make improvements to the gas tank of the Pinto after completion of the risk/benefit analysis. Internal Ford documents revealed Ford had developed the technology to make improvements to the design of the Pinto that would dramatically decrease the chance of a Pinto "igniting" after a rear-end collision.¹¹This technology would have greatly reduced the chances of burn injuries and deaths after a collision. Ford estimated the cost to make this production adjustment to the Pinto would have been $11 per vehicle.¹²   Most people found it reprehensible that Ford determined that the $11 cost per automobile was too high and opted not to make the production change to the Pinto model.

C. Risk/Benefit AnalysisIn determining whether or not to make the production change, the Ford Motor Company defended itself by contending that it used a risk/benefit analysis. Ford stated that its reason for using a risk/benefit analysis was that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required them to do so.¹³   The risk/benefit approach excuses a defendant if the monetary costs of making a production change are greater than the "societal benefit" of that change. This analysis follows the same line of reasoning as the negligence standard developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States vs. Carroll Towing in 1947 (to be discussed later). The philosophy behind risk/benefit analysis promotes the goal of allocative efficiency. The problem that arose in the Ford Pinto and many other similar cases highlights the human and emotional circumstances behind the numbers which are not factored in the risk/benefit analysis.The Ford Motor Company contended that by strictly following the typical approach to risk,/benefit analysis, they were justified in not making the production change to the Pinto model. Assuming the numbers employed in their analysis were correct, Ford seemed to be justified. The estimated cost for the production change was $11 per vehicle. This $11 per unit cost applied to 11 million cars and 1.5 million trucks results in an overall cost of $137 million.

The controversial numbers were those Ford used for the "benefit" half of the equation. It was estimated that making the change would result in a total of 180 less burn deaths, 180 less serious burn injuries, and 2,100 less burned vehicles. These estimates were multiplied by the unit cost figured by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. These figures were $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 per vehicle equating to the total "societal benefit" is $49.5 million. Since the benefit of $49.5 million was much less than the cost of $137 million, Ford felt justified in its decision not to alter the product design. The risk,/benefit results indicate that it is acceptable for 180 people to die and 180 people to burn if it costs $11 per vehicle to prevent such casualty rates. On a case by case basis, the argument seems unjustifiable, but looking at the bigger picture complicates the issue and strengthens the risk/benefit analysis logic.

III. History and Development of Product Liability

A. IntroductionWhen defendants were found liable for only intentional harms, these harms fell under the category of absolute liability. Over time, courts added liability to some accidental harms. In order for a court to determine there was no liability in a conflict, it had to be ascertained whether or not the accident was "truly unavoidable."¹⁴    Technological advances created societal harms that were never before contemplated by courts. The truly unavoidable standard became a grayer area that was undefined and unreliable. Eventually, as industry rapidly advanced further, it became impossible and unreasonable to describe any accident as unavoidable.¹⁵   Still, courts seemed unwilling to shift to the theory of absolute liability, as it seemed to strict. However, with the courts finding fewer and fewer harms "unavoidable", another level had to be found between unavoidable accidents and strict liability.¹⁶

B. The Ordinary Care StandardIn the mid 1800s, courts began the evolution of moving away from what they once considered an important decision--whether a harm was a result of an action "on trespass" or a harm as a result of an action "on the case."¹⁷ The first landmark decision moving away from this distinction and thinking was Brown v. Kendall¹⁸ in 1850. In the decision, Chief Justice Shaw acknowledged moving away from this traditional distinction and to consideration of whether a harm was "willful, intentional, or careless."¹⁹ Not only did this decision move away from the strict "all or nothing" standard, it established the fluctuating standard of "ordinary care." Judge Shaw explained the use of this new standard:

"In using this term, ordinary care, it may be proper to state that what constitutes ordinary care will vary with the circumstances of cases. In general, it means that kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as required by the exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probable danger."²⁰

In essence Judge Shaw had created a "moving" standard of negligence that varied from situation to situation depending on the extent of care used, rather than the inflexible extremes discussed above. This new standard was not just a flat decision of whether an actor used due care in a situation, but whether the actor should have recognized the danger before taking the risk. Courts also required a defendant's actions be related to the harm incurred. In Crain v. Petrie,²¹ the court stated that "damages must appear to be the legal and natural consequences arising from the tort.²² Courts also considered whether the defendant should have taken some kind of preventive measure in advance that could have foreseeable prevented the harm.²³

These many factors the court considered boiled down into one main question: Was the accident truly avoidable or the fault of the defendant?²⁴   The Brown court stated,

"If, then, in doing this act, using due care and all proper precautions necessary to the exigency of the case, to avoid the hurt to others, in raising his stick..., he accidentally hit the plaintiff in his eye and wounded him, this was the result of the pure accident, or was involuntary, and unavoidable, and therefore the action would not lie.²⁵

This thinking was followed in similar cases and decisions of the time.²⁶   As stated above, this thinking moved the court from cut-and-dried ideas of negligence to ones that fluctuated and had to be examined on a case by case basis. If an accident seemed to be unavoidable and part of every day life there would be no action for recovery.

As technology progressed, courts began to find less and less accidents "unavoidable." In Huntress v. Boston & Main R.R.,²⁷ the court found the defendant negligent even though it took all necessary precautions. When a pedestrian was killed walking across the railroad tracks and the locomotive engineer had used all possible precautions in conducting the train, the defendant was still found to be negligent. The court stated that the railroad company should have foreseen the plaintiff's poor appreciation of the risk and that whether more precautions were necessary was a question for the jury.²⁸ As the power of design and invention advanced, so did the courts' perception of the power to prevent accidents.²⁹   It seemed the courts had almost moved to the extreme of absolute liability.

With this evolution, the courts were faced with a new problem. Should defendants be found liable in almost every situation because of new technological 'advancements? This created a new theory of negligence, one of balancing risks and benefits. In the early 1900s the courts evolved from just determining if an accident were unavoidable (as most at this point were considered to be) to what the costs were to avoid this accident in some fashion. The first attempt to consider this question and create a new standard was in a 1919 case, Adams v. Bullock.³⁰

In Adams, a young boy was playing with a rod when it struck the defendant's trolley wires that had been strung under a railroad bridge where the boy was walking. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, claiming that the company had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid the accident. Judge Cardozo's opinion made use of the traditional analysis and verbiage of the avoidable/unavoidable analysis. However, he discussed the "duty to adopt all reasonable precautions.³¹Furthermore, Judge Cardozo stated that the defendant had acted with the area of normal provision.³²

C. The Introduction of the Balancing ApproachAlthough Judge Cardozo concluded that the accident was not foreseeable and therefore unavoidable, the Adams case laid the groundwork for a "balancing" approach to negligence. The balancing approach assumes that if an accident has a very low probability, and there is a cost associated with preventing it, a defendant is not liable if he does not take precautionary measures. By stating that absent a "gift of prophecy the defendant could not have predicted the point upon the route where such an accident would occur," Judge Cardozo indicated that giving every possibility the ultimate amount of protection would be too costly compared to the risk of injury.³³   He further stated that guards everywhere would have prevented the injury but this would prove to be much too costly, and "guards here and there are of little value.³⁴   This decision was the harbinger of the balancing standard and cost/benefit analysis; a weighing of the risk of harm and the overall costs of avoiding it.

At the turn of the century, courts began focusing on this "balancing" method to determine liability. Costs, risks, and probability began to make their way into decisions. Courts began to compare degrees of risks and costs of harms with the benefits of activities on society. The trend moved toward placing the burden on society in instances where the benefit outweighed the risk or the risk was less than the cost to avoid it.³⁵   In cases such as this, the ``risk initiator" was assigned no liability. This balancing act seemed to be a tolerable middle ground between the old negligence liability standard and the extreme standard of absolute liability.

With courts struggling to define the middle ground during this time of technological advancement, they faced the same questions legal systems faced in similar times such as the industrial revolution and the growth of railroads. As the advancements created new products and the profits that went with them, courts had to decide what levels of risk society could tolerate and who should bear the costs when harms actually occurred.³⁶

F. Ford's Risk/Benefit AnalysisThe main controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto case was The Ford Motor Company's choices made during development to compromise safety for efficiency and profit maximization. More specifically, it was Ford's decision to use the cost/benefit analysis detailed in section 11 to make production decisions that translated into lost lives. During the initial production and testing phase, Ford set "limits for 2000" for the Pinto. That meant the car was not to exceed $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. This set tough limitations on the production team. After the basic design was complete, crash testing was begun. The results of crash testing revealed that when struck from the rear at speeds of 31 miles per hour or above, the Pinto's gas tank ruptured. The tank was positioned according to the industry standard at the time (between the rear bumper and the rear axle), but studs protruding from the rear axle would puncture the gas tank. Upon impact, the fuel filler neck would break, resulting in spilled gasoline. The Pinto basically turned into a death trap. Ford crash tested a total of eleven automobiles and eight resulted in potentially catastrophic situations. The only three that survived had their gas tanks modified prior to testing.⁵⁵

Ford was not in violation of the law in any way and had to make the decision whether to incur a cost to fix the obvious problem internally. There were several options for fuel system redesign. The option most seriously considered would have cost the Ford Motor Company and additional $11 per vehicle.⁵⁶   Under the strict $2000 budget restriction, even this nominal cost seemed large. In addition, Ford had earlier based an advertising campaign on safety which failed miserably. Therefore, there was a corporate belief, attributed to Lee Iacocca himself, of "safety doesn't sell."⁵⁷

Ultimately, the Ford Motor Company rejected the product design change. This was based on the cost-benefit analysis performed by Ford (see Exhibit One). Using the NHTSA provided figure of $200,000 for the "cost to society" for each estimated fatality, and $11 for the production cost per vehicle, the analysis seemed straightforward. The projected costs to the company for design production change were $137 million compared to the project benefits of making the design change which were approximately $49.5 million. Using the standard cost/benefit analysis, the answer was obvious--no production changes were to be made.

IV. The Negligence Efficiency Argument

A. Ford's DecisionThe Ford Motor Company's use of the risk/benefit analysis was the central issue of the suits filed against the company. Many pieces of evidence, including a number of internal Ford documents indicate the risk/benefit analysis was the main reason for Ford's decision not to make design changes to increase vehicle safety. However, before discussion of the risk/benefit analysis it should be noted there were secondary concerns which supported Ford's decision not to upgrade the fuel system design: (1) As stated above, Ford had based an earlier advertising campaign around safety, which failed. The company realized this was not a primary factor in car sales; (2) the bad publicity involved with a recall would be too much negative publicity to overcome. If this unquantifiable factor were included in the cost/benefit analysis the difference may have been overwhelming. Even though it was not a factor included in the analysis, Ford wanted to avoid it at any cost; (3) At the time of the product design and crash tests, the law did not require them to redesign the fuel system; and, (4) It was customary in the automotive industry to place the gas tank and between the rear axle and bumper.

Although case law has shown that business custom is not an excuse to escape liability, custom combined with the risk/benefit analysis would lead to the same result.⁵⁸   With these factors influencing the decision in the background, the primary factor was Ford's risk/benefit analysis of making the changes. The question is: Should a risk/benefit analysis be used in all circumstances, and was it the proper framework to use in this situation? If so, it seems that the correct decision was made. Examining this question after-the-fact, it certainly seems like a poor decision.

B. The NumbersThe Ford Motor Company's risk/benefit analysis indicated costs would be 2.5 times larger than the resulting benefits. It is apparent why Ford chose no to go ahead with the fuel tank adjustment. However, basing this decision on just the numbers with no consideration of any other factors falls short of a comprehensive analysis of the action. chose not to go ahead with the fuel tank adjustment. To do a complete job of analyzing Ford's decision, the variables inside the equation must be examined. On the cost side of the equation, the most questioned variable during the case was the cost per vehicle used by Ford. The manufacturer claimed making adequate changes to the fuel system would have cost $11 per vehicle. Some evidence indicated that these potential costs may have been much lower, maybe as low as $5 per vehicle.⁵⁹   Even with this lower cost and all other factors remaining the same, the costs still would have exceeded the benefits, although the difference would have been much less substantial (see Exhibit 2). In fact, will all other variables remaining the same, the cost per vehicle would have had to be as low as $3.96 to make the benefits "break even" with the costs (see Exhibit 3). However, if the costs were around $5 per vehicle, the Ford Motor Company would not have had as strong a risk/benefit argument as with the $11 figure provided.

The "benefit side" of the equation contains the most controversial number of the analysis--the value of a human life. Ford estimated no alterations to the gas tank design would result in 180 deaths, 180 burn victims and 2100 burned vehicles. In retrospect, these estimates are slightly low. It is hard to determine the exact number of victims because every victim did not file a claim, but these numbers were reasonable estimations at the time. Ford used $200,000 as the "cost" or "lost benefit" for each fatal burn injury, 567,000 for each burn injury and $700 for each burned vehicle. The number quantifying the price of a value life ($200,000) is what makes this problem so difficult. It is hard to decide what a life is worth, but most people feel the value of theirs is greater than $200,000. While this $200,000 figure was the most controversial of the equation, it was not determined by Ford. In 1972, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) provided the auto industry with the number $200,725 as the value to be utilized in risk/ benefit analysis such as was done by Ford (see Exhibit 4).⁶⁰Following the standard for negligence established by Judge Learned Hand in Carroll Towing, or the risk/utility standard established for manufacturer's liability, the decision was well founded. The costs to Ford to make this change, which would have been borne by the consumer, was 2.5 times higher (using the original numbers) than the benefit to society. Some negative publicity may have been expected, but certainly Ford did not anticipate being found criminally negligent. In fact, it would seem Ford had a strong argument against any liability whatsoever. The decision in the liability suit with the award of punitive damages was a surprise to the Ford Motor Company, much less the criminal prosecution. How could such a decision be rendered after Ford Motor Company had followed the standard set by the courts themselves? The answer lies in the fact that the "benefit" side of the equation included the benefit of saving lives, and putting a value on this variable is not as defensible as putting a value on the benefit of saving an inanimate object, such as a vehicle.

V. The Negligence-Efficiency Debate

A. IntroductionThe Ford Motor case has spurned the arguments for and against the use of risk/benefit analysis because of its foundation of economic efficiency. The Ford Motor Company case has spurred this argument. In 1972, Judge Richard Posner's article on the negligence-efficiency theory seemed to be the "starting point" for this argument and was both highly praised and highly criticized. The essence of this article is summarized in the following excerpt: "We lack a theory to explain the social function of the negligence concept ... This article attempts to formulate and test such a theory.... The essential clue, I believe, is provided by Judge Learned Hand's famous formulation of the negligence standard.... In a negligence case, Hand said, the judge (or jury) should attempt to measure three things: the magnitude of the loss if an accident occurs; the probability of the accident's occurring; and the burden of taking precautions that would avert it. If the product of the first two terms exceeds the burden of precautions, the failure to take those precautions is negligence. Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence.... If the cost of safety measures.... exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, to forego accident prevention.... Furthermore, overall economic value or welfare would be diminished ... by incurring a higher accident-prevention cost to avoid a lower accident cost.''⁶¹

Thus, the economic efficiency of negligence argument was born. While many economists have agreed and praised this article, it has been equally criticized by those not taking the "economic point of view." I will first discuss some of the many arguments against this economic efficiency point of view in light of the Ford Pinto case. Following is a further elaboration of Posner's view and defense of his position.

B. Arguments Against Negligence-Efficiency

         1. EthicsTaking an ethical approach to the Ford Pinto case makes accepting the risk/benefit analysis performed by the Ford Motor Company difficult. In making what seems to be the correct decision based on numbers, Ford is essence adopted a policy of allowing a certain number of people to die or be injured even though they could have prevented it. When taken on a case-by-case basis the decision seems to be a blatant disregard for human life. From a human rights perspective, Ford disregarded the injured individual's rights and therefore, in making the decision not to make adjustments to the fuel system, acted unethicallv.⁶²

2. Act UtilitarianismA second problem with strictly applying the risk/benefit framework is that it does not seem to take into account all of the consequences of Ford's decision. This position is considered the "act utilitarian' point of view. The act utilitarian approach evaluates each action separately and the consequences that arise from it.⁶³   This analysis would include any "harms" or "benefits" incurred by any people involved in the case. In utilizing this approach, it seems there are many factors that the Ford Motor Company did not account for in its risk/benefit analysis. When taking the situation from this perspective, it seems like the harms of not changing the fuel system outweighed the benefits. Not included in the previous risk/benefit analysis was the millions of dollars in settlements in unreported cases that never saw the courtroom. It is almost a sure bet that the settlement numbers were more on a per-case basis than the average numbers used for lost life per accident. Also, the bad publicity and reputational damage suffered by Ford over the next few years for being the cause of these lawsuits is hard to quantify, but the harm was considerable.⁶⁴   >From the utilitarian point of view, the harms and the benefits are far closer together than Ford determined in its analysis. In addition, if this was figured after-the-fact the harms far outweighed the benefits. This would be due to the cost of having to recall the 1971­1976 Pintos after the fact and the extreme bad publicity (much worse than could have been expected) that the Ford Motor Company suffered through for years after all litigation was settled.

3. Health and Safety Regulation ExceptionCritics argue there are several other related, yet distinct reasons why the Ford Motor company, as well other companies finding themselves in similar positions, should be condemned for relying on a risk/benefit analysis to make decisions based on consumer safety. In the areas of safety and health regulation, there are instances where it may not be wise to undertake a certain decision even though the benefits do not outweigh the costs.⁶⁵ This idea is imbedded somewhere between the utilitarian point of view and ethical point of view, discussed above. That is, the issue of whether the benefits outweigh the costs should not govern our moral judgment. There are some cases where a company must "do the right thing." While this may seem an argument based on emotion, there seem to be certain instances where these kind of considerations must be made. For instance, when governmental officials decide what level of pollution is allowable they take into effect certain vulnerable people--such as asthmatics or the elderly--and set the standard higher although the average citizen would not be affected by a lower one. This decision escapes the risk/benefit analysis. The higher standard is set so that the rights of the minority are not sacrificed for the needs of the majority. This kind of decision, much like automobile safety, are in the realm of specially valued things. For these, many will argue, risk/benefit analysis should not apply.⁶⁶

4. Expressing Terms in Dollar ValuesIn order to perform a risk/benefit analysis, all costs and benefits must be expressed in some common measure. This measure is typically in dollars, as the Ford Motor Company used in its analysis. This can prove difficult for things that are not commonly bought and sold on the open market. This is mainly the case for environmental policy, such as permissible levels of air pollutants, as in the example above.⁶⁷ The Ford Pinto case provides an extreme example. It questions how to value human life.

Economists have attempted to quantify, non-quantifiable items using varying methods with varying success.⁶⁸   Since individuals have unique tastes and values they are willing to pay different amounts for products and resources. This valuation system often receives high criticism. People's willingness to pay for something can also vary widely depending upon other circumstances. Based on these reasons, attempts to quantify something such as a human life can be very difficult and is the most debated aspect of the Ford Pinto case.
There are numerous things which individuals consider "priceless." For instance, most people would claim that they would not sell their right to vote or their freedom of speech for any amount of money.⁶⁹ Therefore, to tell someone that there is a certain price for their life is a preposterous notion. Therefore when taken on a case-by-case basis it is impossible for an individual to grasp the concept. There are numerous things which individuals consider "priceless." For instance, most people would claim that they would not sell their right to vote or their freedom of speech for any amount of money. Moreover, would a parent be able to put a value on the life of a child? Obviously, the notion that, on an individual basis, a person would take a certain amount of money for their life is ludicrous. To tell someone that $200,725 is a sufficient trade-off for their life, as argued in the Ford Pinto case, illustrates this point.
Economists, however, do not agree with the "priceless" concept. To them, to trade one unit of anything, even a life, for an infinite quantity of all other goods is an equally preposterous notion. It can be argued that everything can be priced or have a value laid upon it. To take this theory down to an individual level reduces the strength of this notion.
In Ford's case, the $200,725 value of a human life was provided to the company by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The criticism for the value can not be laid upon Ford. The criticism is in using a number, or in other words using the risk/benefit analysis, in this situation at all. To compound the problem, Ford seemed to blindly follow the dictated numbers without giving any extra consideration to the fact that it in fact was a human life they were quantifying.
5. No Wealth MaximizationRelated to the lack of "markets" or "prices" for a life is the idea of wealth maximization. The foundation of the risk/benefit analysis is the theory of economic efficiency and an underlying principle for efficiency is wealth maximization. If legal decisions are based on efficiency, then nothing will be wasted and the wealth of the country will be at its maximum.⁷⁰   However, in order to conduct an efficiency analysis, everything must have a price--returning to the reoccurring problem. Since the reliance on prices is necessary and not merely contingent, the system of wealth maximization cannot tell us anything about right conduct where no prices exist. Prices are, in part, the result of demand and demand is the result of prior entitlements. Consequently, wealth maximization cannot generate an initial set of entitlements." ⁷¹
Along the same lines, efficiency theory assumes that wealth maximization is the goal of law, which is not the case. The goal of law is the indefinable term. "justice."⁷²   Judges and juries do not attempt to make decisions based on wealth maximization, they base their decisions on justice. This difference can be seen in the special rules for rescue, handicapped citizens, and whether the insane are found liable for their torts.⁷³
6. ExternalitiesAnother potential problem with the risk,/benefit approach is the fact that it does not take externalities into effect. This is a topic with which the law of torts often has trouble. However, it cannot be ignored just because it is hard to compute.⁷⁴ Victims are permitted to recover for pain and suffering and the cost/benefit analysis seems to ignore this point. It is yet another one of the variables that is almost impossible to estimate, much less pinpoint. In addition, this is another area where the lack of a market is influential. Minimization of social costs differs from the minimization of private costs precisely because there is an absence of complete markets, and this absence is exactly what makes measurements so difficult.⁷⁵
7. Activity FrequencyIf a company or a court were to accurately analyze the costs and benefits of an activity, it must calculate the number of times the potential victim engages in the activity.⁷⁶   Taking out the number of times the activity is engaged in reduces the damages. This calculation is often unobtainable, especially in Ford's case in terms of automobile use. Professor Polinsky, in his book, An Introduction to Law and Economics explains, "In practice it is usually not feasible to include the level of participation in the activity has an aspect of the standard of care. For example, it would be virtually impossible for a court to determine bow many miles a particular person drives each. year since that person might drive a different car that is shared with other family members or he might drive different cars owned by the household. If the injurer's level of participation in the activity is omitted from the standard of care, than a negligence rule generally will lead him to participate in the activity to an excess degree. The reason for this is straightforward, if the care he exercises meets the standard of care, be will not be liable for any damages. In practice, the negligence rule is likely to be inefficient for this reason.⁷⁷

8. Negligence is Predictable: Victims Often LoseFinally, the cost/benefit analysis and economic efficiency reasoning is argued to be a skewed framework because it does not take into account the fact that injured parties are at a disadvantage. While the law attempts to place the plaintiff and defendant on equal ground, it is impossible to accomplish. The plaintiff must prove the negligence, a difficult task. The negligence-efficiency theory does not account for plaintiffs who cannot afford to bring a lawsuit to trial or those who cannot establish negligence although it exists. With the adoption of the negligence-efficiency theory, it is predictable that victims are going to lose more than. They are going to win.⁷⁸

        9. ConclusionObviously there are a number of arguments against the use of cost/benefit analysis and the negligence-efficiency theory. Most of these arguments are separate but related and .revolve around the fact that there are no markets or prices for human life. It will be forever debated whether it is possible to set a price or value on a life to use in these calculations and whether this leads to an economically efficient outcome In the case of Grimshaw, the jury was obviously appalled with Ford's attempt to apply the NHTSA's calculation to risk/benefit standard. Was this a sign of this standard's inefficiency or was it just a sign of an ineffective jury?
C. For Negligence-EfficiencyFor as many arguments as there are against risk/benefit analysis, there are as many claiming it is economically efficient and therefore the correct standard. In defense of the Ford Motor Company, this standard developed over many years of caselaw, as detailed earlier in this paper. This negligence standard and the use of risk/benefit analysis for product liability had been accepted by courts for years before the Pinto controversy. There was no reason for Ford to believe that this was not the standard that should be used in making its decision. Ford's automatic decision once it "ran the numbers" confirms the fact that they did not question the idea of using this analysis. In addition, there are many arguments in support of this sort of analysis other than just the fact that this was the standard at the time.
        1. Risk/benefit Analysis is "Instinctively Done"In 1972, Judge Richard Posner wrote an article entitled, "A Theory of Negligence," claiming all tort law furthers economic efficiency. He claims that while judges do not write opinions in terms of welfare economics, there has always been an effort to decide cases on this basis. "People can apply the principles of economics intuitively--and thus `do' economics without knowing they are doing it.''⁷⁹ Therefore, Posner claims that the Carroll Towing decision was not a novel concept, it just expressed in algebraic terms what court had long been applying.⁸⁰
        2. Maximization of Social ResourcesFor defendants, such as the Ford Motor Company, who create risks of harm that may be suffered by others, the risk-benefit standard for negligence provides incentives to take precautions to avoid or minimize risks that can be avoided more cheaply than the cost of the precautions. By holding a defendant liable for injuries that could have been avoided at less cost than the accident, a risk-benefit test acts as a deterrent to curb risks that are worth avoiding, while allowing a defendant to take actions or avoid precautions that are not worth deterring. Deterring conduct that results in greater accident costs than the benefits of the conduct minimizes the total costs of accidents and accident precaution. Therefore, it seems this tort "policy" serves the goal of maximizing societal resources.⁸¹
To understand the efficiency theory of the risk-benefits analysis, one other point must be explained. In a products liability design defects case, use of the discussed liability standard requires identification of an alternative design that would have prevented the accident. One must be able to compare the additional costs created by the alternative design, in relation to the existing design, with the costs of the injuries that the alternative design could prevent.⁸²   In the Pinto case, Ford obviously undertook this analysis, examining the additional $11 cost per unit of changing the fuel system design.
        3. Economic Feasibility of Valuing Non-Economic ItemsThe decision to use a risk/benefit analysis does not necessarily result in the strict utilitarianism as suggested by some critics.⁸³   Most all detractors of cost/benefit analysis center their argument around the idea that placing a value on "non-economic" items, such as a human life, does not lead to economic efficiency. Proponents of the system claim their risk/benefit analysis is nothing more than what it claims to be--an effort to find some common measure for things that are not easily comparable, yet must be compared. While this may seem crass--comparing lives to dollars--some comparison must be made and all the factors in the equation must be brought down to a common denominator for the comparison to take place. Other instances arise where lives are traded against lives, just not brought down to the dollar amount that took place in the Ford Pinto case. In the choice between hospital beds and preventive treatment, lives are traded against lives.⁸⁴   It is when the analysis is taken down to an individual level that it becomes problematic.Economists dispel the related argument just as easily. The idea that if one can quantify "non-economic" items, there are certain "specially valued" things that cannot be priced. It is true that different individuals value certain things differently, but simply because an individual deems something has "special value" does not mean that they are unaffected by economic factors. One may specially value a personal relationship, but how often he calls this person is influenced by long-distance rates. One may specially value music or watching sporting events, but still can be affected by the price of records and tickets to the Kennedy Center or the price for watching events on cable or a ticket to the ball game. ⁸⁵
        4. Efficiency Does Not Equal ImmoralCritics look at risk/benefit analysis in cases such as the Ford Pinto case as a depravity of morality. The idea is that everyone has the "right" to a safe and healthy workplace, or the "right" to expect product they purchase to be safe.⁸⁶   Those who subscribe to this philosophy feel there are some "moral" decisions that must be made no matter what the fiscal impacts may be or what the risk,/benefit relationship dictates. Proponents of the risk/benefit analysis counter this "ethical" argument with the idea that these are not either/or decisions being made, but rather gradations of risk.⁸⁷   That is, Ford is not sacrificing all safety features of the Pinto, it is a question of to what degree Ford feels safety features are necessary. It could be argued that the safety question was answered for them prior to the risk/benefit analysis when Ford's earlier advertising campaign based on safety failed. Decisions involving gradation of risks are made every day, just not under such strict scrutiny. Obviously, highways would be safer if the speed were restricted to 25 miles per hour on all roads. However, this must be balanced with the "price" of slower traffic. in choosing 55 or 65 as the speed limit, we are sacrificing lives to make travel quicker and less costly. Therefore, the Ford Motor Company is not morally void for choosing between levels of safety. Auto manufacturers do this every dav.
        5. No Standard for Using an "Ethical Balancing"All of the arguments against the use of risk/benefit analysis seem to center around the "ethical argument." Instead of a monetary system, sire should adopt an ethical system that balances conflicts between certain unspecified duties and rights according to "deliberate reflection.⁸⁸   While placing dollar amounts on these items is admittedly arbitrary, the "ethical" method would open a much larger debate. Who would be in charge of this ethical reflecting and on whose behalf would these decisions be made? There would be no clear limits for the actions of regulatory agencies. What public values would rise above these vague guidelines? Finding or arriving at a consensus for this ethical standard is virtually impossible.

USING ABOVE CASE PLEASE

Please use this strategy when you analyze a case:

Identify and write the main issues found discussed in the case (who, what, how, where and when (the critical facts in a case).

List all indicators (including stated "problems") that something is not as expected or as desired.

Briefly analyze the issue with theories found in your textbook or other academic materials. Decide which ideas, models, and theories seem useful. Apply these conceptual tools to the situation. As new information is revealed, cycle back to sub steps a and b.

Identify the areas that need improvement (use theories from your textbook)

Specify and prioritize the criteria used to choose action alternatives.

Discover or invent feasible action alternatives.

Examine the probable consequences of action alternatives.

Select a course of action.

Design and implementation plan/schedule.

Create a plan for assessing the action to be implemented.

Conclusion ( should end with a strong conclusion or summary)

Writing Requirements

3–5 pages in length (excluding cover page, abstract, and reference list)

APA format,

1. Using any data sets, run two multiple regression equations. state the dependent and independent variable ( you need to start with at least three and end with at least two) and how you believe they will be related. Run the regression equation until you get to the final model. Then test for the assumptions and interpret the necessary statistics. (use excel Megastat).

Please select from any of the data sets.

Real Estate Data

Baseball2012 Data

Banking Chicago Data

International Data

Variable descriptions

Real Estate Sales data

Variables

X1 = selling price in $000

X2= Number of bedrooms

X3= Size of the home in square feet

X4= Pool (1=yes, 0= no)

X5= Distance from the center of the city in miles

X6= Township

X7= Garage attached (1=yes, 0= no)

X8= Number of bathrooms

105 homes sold

Baseball Data

Variables

X1 = Team

X2= Language (American =1, National =0)

X3= Built (year stadium was built)

X4= Size (stadium capacity)

X5= Salary (total 2012 team salary, $ million)

X6= Wins

X7= Attendance (total for team in millions)

X8= BA (team batting average)

X9= ERA (Team earned run average)

X10= HR (Team home runs)

X11 = Errors (team errors)

X12= SB (team stolen bases)

X13= year

X14= Average player salary ($)

Buena School District Bus Data

Variables

X1 = Bus number

X2= Maintenance cost ($)

X3= (Age)

X4= Miles

X5= Bus type (diesel or gasoline)

X6= Bus Manufacturer (Bluebird, Keiser, Thompson)

X7= Passengers

2. Using any dataset, run an ANOVA test, and interpret the statistically significant Tukey output.

I will be glad if this two questions are answered. My previous question was not answered. Please remember to use MegastatThank you.

Between 2000 and 2012, Gap, Inc. (Gap) ceded its world leadership position in specialty fashion retailing to Inditex of Spain and H&M of Sweden. These two companies, each less than a quarter of Gap’s size in 2000, were now setting the pace in the global mass fashion market, and Gap appeared to be falling ever further behind. In the intervening twelve years, three CEOs had struggled to turn around the fading brand. While several temporary profit boosts appeared to herald a recovery, a sustained rally remained elusive. Mickey Drexler, Gap’s CEO since 1983, who had been responsible for Gap’s rise to global prominence, was fired in 2002 after two years of double digit, same-store sales declines and a 75% drop in the stock price. 1 His successor, Paul Pressler, appeared to have engineered a remarkable recovery, but was fired in 2007 after disappointing sales and another slump in profits. His replacement, Glenn Murphy, fresh from a successful turnaround at a Canadian drug-store chain, promised tighter price controls, lower administrative costs, and a leaner, more aggressive Gap. He cut costs and drove up earnings per share, but sales continued to decline. After four years of troubles, Murphy brought in former J. Crew President, Tracy Gardner, to consult with the Gap brand and he began a bold program to close one fifth of Gap’s North American store base. In 2012, sales had lifted 8%, same-store sales were strongly positive for all of Gap’s domestic sub-brands, and the company’s share price had lifted nearly 50% from the prior year. After 12 years of poor performance, had Glenn Murphy finally discovered the answers to Gap’s problems?  Mickey Drexler: 2000-2002 After Gap, Inc. “misjudged fashion trends in 2000,” its sales growth rate slowed to 18%, below the historical average, and operating profits fell 20% to $1.4 billion.3 CEO Mickey Drexler, was confident that this stumble was a short term problem, but 2001 results suggested otherwise. Sales lifted only 1%, operating profits plunged anther 70% to $426 million and the company made a net loss. 2002 saw sales rise 4% and operating profits recover to $1.0 billion, but comparable stores sales continued to fall. Gap’s stock price decreased from a high of $53.75 in February 2000 to $14 in May 2002.4 Several top designers and senior executives left the company “disillusioned with how bureaucratic the organization had become.” Analysts noted that, while Gap had made “button-down shirts, chinos and basic cotton T-shirts the boomer uniform,” it was struggling to resonate as well with some members of Generation Y (those born in the late 1970s to early 1990s) who were “looking for individuality, not conformity.”6Chairman Don Fisher had had enough. The night before the Gap board meeting on May 22, 2002, Steve Jobs, a board member, called Mickey Drexler to warn him that the board was planning to fire him the next morning. Drexler entered the board meeting aggressively and a board member later described it as “a very emotional scene.”Despite his shock and disappointment, Drexler quickly recovered. In 2003, he became the CEO of J. Crew, a quality basic clothing chain which was incurring heavy losses. Within two years, he had returned it to profitability and, within five, he had more than doubled sales. Paul Pressler: 2002-2007 Paul S. Pressler replaced Drexler as the CEO of Gap, Inc. Pressler had spent 15 years with The Walt Disney Company and ended his tenure there as the chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts. The press noted the difference in the two men’s leadership styles: whereas Drexler “flew by the seat of his khakis,” relying on his honed intuition to direct apparel development, Pressler was researchoriented and left decisions about apparel to Gap, Inc.’s designers. 8 Pressler stated, “I had to demonstrate to everyone that the general manager is here to lead the people—not pick the buttons.”9 Pressler moved quickly to close 200 underperforming stores, slow the rate of new openings, and reduce excess inventory, 10 resulting in a “spectacular turnaround” in 2003. 11 Between 2002 and 2003, operating profits rose 87% to $1.8 billion, marginally beating the all-time record set in 1999. Gap Brand Pressler hired Canadian Pina Ferlisi as executive vice president of product design in March 2003 to define the division’s style aesthetic. Before joining Gap, Inc., Ferlisi worked at Perry Ellis, Tommy Hilfiger, and Theory; she also helped launch the successful Marc by Marc Jacobs line. Her Gap design team was located in New York City and included Vice President of Women’s Design Louise Trotter, who formerly worked at Calvin Klein, and Vice President of Accessories Design Emma Hill, who previously held a similar post at Marc Jacobs. Both Trotter and Hill hailed from the U.K. Scores of consumer and employee insights indicated that female Gap customers felt that the brand’s offerings were too androgynous and boxy. Hence, Ferlisi made the women’s lines more feminine and focused on fabric and fit. Banana Republic For years, Banana Republic had a reputation of being “a purveyor of chic basics—casual office wear in black or beige”27—i.e., an upscale Gap. However, under the direction of President Marka Hansen, the division focused on making its product assortment more fashionable and trendy, minimizing the overlap between Gap and Banana, and catering to 25- to 30-year-old professionals . Hansen explained, “What’s the hook or differentiation? . . . It’s an affordable, covetable luxury . . . . We’re bringing fashion to a wider audience. Old Navy Under President Jenny Ming, Old Navy continued its focus on families, rolling out underwear, maternity, and infant lines to raise margins.32 The division expanded to Canada in Pressler’s first year as CEO and it targeted Hispanics with its first Spanish television spot at the end of 2003. The company’s localization strategy was tested in select Old Navy stores in 2004, and the company planned to extend the program to all Old Navy outlets in 2005. Forth & Towne Gap, Inc. established five test stores for Forth & Towne in Chicago and New York by fall 2005. Under Gary Muto’s leadership, the firm positioned Forth & Towne to appeal to women aged 35– 50. Gap Online Toby Lenk, a 1987 Harvard MBA, headed the company’s online division, Gap, Inc. Direct. In 2004, Gap, Inc. was the largest U.S. online apparel retailer with sales of over $500 million. It was “redesign[ing] and rebuild[ing] all of [its] websites from the ground up” to enhance visitors’ online shopping and to improve online and in-store integration.47 Lenk noted that 35% of the company’s Web site visitors were pre-shoppers preparing for store visits, and 13% of those who entered a Gap, Inc. store had visited the store’s online site beforehand. The firm’s new e-commerce platform would allow the sites to take back orders and preorders. Lenk explained, “This means we will never have to walk a sale on a basic item, and at the same time it will allow us to run our basic inventory much tighter.”48 The company planned to have most of the Web site enhancements completed by the 2005 holiday season. Marketing Along with reworking Gap’s main brands, Pressler also overhauled Gap’s public image and publically positioned its divisions as lifestyle brands. The CEO remarked, “We need to bring more theatrics, storytelling and consistency [to retail]. If you can’t tell me what a Gap dinner party, Banana Republic car or Old Navy vacation looks like, then we haven’t built our stories.”49 Pressler had also been focused on differentiating the brands and “upgrading the marketing functions at all of Gap’s brands, including the hires of new head marketers at all three units.”50 Recent Gap-brand TV advertising featured actors and singers. The company paid 40-year-old actress Sarah Jessica Parker, former Sex and the City star, $38 million to appear in television and print ads for three seasons during 2004–2005. It replaced Parker with 17-year-old British soul singer Joss Stone as its Gap spokes-model in the summer of 2005.51 In an effort to tout its “vastly expanded variety of fits” in jeans, the company planned to use more nontraditional types of advertising—i.e., “guerrilla marketing and grassroots tactics,” according to Jeff Jones, executive vice president of marketing at Gap. After lackluster results in 2005 and six consecutive quarters of declining same-store sales, Pressler pointed to 2006 as a key year to prove Gap’s recovery and justify his rebranding efforts.60 Pressler noted, “We are acting with a tremendous sense of urgency to win back customers.”61 Pressler also increased the annual cash dividend 78% for 2006 and the board authorized a further $500 million for a share repurchase program, $250 of which would be repurchased in Q1 and Q2 of 2006. Fisher: Interim CEO, 2007 Although Fisher was interim CEO for less than a year, he made a number of moves that undid much of Pressler’s previous work. Less than a week after firing Pressler, he cut many of Pressler’s hires from Disney. Cynthia Harriss, the president of Gap U.S., was replaced by Marka Hansen, the previous president of Banana Republic and an employee since 1987. Fisher also closed all Forth & Towne stores by the end of June, taking a pretax charge of $40 million.67 Although Forth & Towne has been open since 2005, financials were never disclosed for the brand. Fisher also began to reduce Gap’s workforce to bring down expenses, cutting a “relatively small percentage” of the 150,000 workers. Glenn Murphy: 2007-2012 On July 26, 2007, Gap appointed Glen Murphy, as the new CEO. Since 2001, he had been the CEO of Shoppers Drug Mart, a Canadian drugstore chain. Murphy’s first major move as CEO was to cut expenses and control inventory discounting. Quarter three profit for 2007 lifted 26% due to lower marketing spending and better product margins. In 2008, Spain’s Inditex overtook Gap, Inc. as the world’s largest specialty apparel retailer, reaching $3.3 billion in sales for the first quarter of 2008 compared to Gap’s $3.25 billion.86 With over 200 designers and rapid supply chains that could produce and stock hot items within weeks. Problems returned in 2011. Sales remained steady at $14.5 billion, but operating profits fell 27% to $1.4 billion. Murphy hired former J. Crew President, Tracy Gardner, to consult with the Gap brand. Gap announced plans to shut more than one fifth of its North American stores over the next two years and aimed to shrink the U.S. store base to 700 by the end of 2013.91 Murphy noted that China was Gap’s biggest market for further growth. However, by the end of 2012, Murphy’s strategy appeared to be working. Sales lifted 8% to $15.6 billion, a six-year high, and operating profit recovered to $1.9 billion. Store closings lifted sales per store in the North American Gap to $3.7 million (from a low of $3.3 million in 2009) and comparable store sales were strongly positive for all of Gap’s North American divisions. Gap had also made significant steps toward streamlining its production and engaging more closely with trending fashions. By 2012, Gap had cut its lead time from more than nine months in the early 2000s to less than four months for key items.96 Across all lines, production time had been cut by nearly one third. 97 In January Gap acquired Intermix Inc. for $130 million, which promised expansion into the luxury market as well as greater access to of-the-moment fashion pieces. Although Intermix didn’t manufacture its own clothing, it has established relationships with a variety of high street designers. What else could Murphy do to restore Gap’s leading position in fashion retailing? Would Murphy’s international and online focus be enough to sustain this turnaround?

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What is the case about?

What are the important events that occurred in the case?

What can we learn from reading the case?

What advice do you have for the leaders in the case and/or company in the case?