the average molecular speed of four gases at 27 °C. Xe, Ar, Ne, He. What, if any, relationship do you observe between average molecular speed and molar mass? Estimate the average molecular speed of xenon at 27 °C.

The Sheldon Corporation began a consulting business specializing in on-site computer training on January 1, 2018. The following transactions took place during its first three months of operations.

Summary of Transactions

Jan. 1 Sold 5,000 shares of capital stock for a total of $500,000 cash.

Jan. 2 Paid the premium of $12,000 on a 24-month insurance policy on all assets.

Jan. 3 Purchased land and a building for a total of $350,000 cash. The land is valued at $50,000, while the building is valued at $300,000 and is expected to have a useful life of 30 years.

Jan. 10 Purchased a computer network system for $36,000 cash. The expected useful life is 6 years.

Jan. 15 Paid $2,400 cash for a phone system that should have a 3-year useful life.

Jan. 16 Paid cash to acquire equipment and furniture for business purposes at a cost of $12,000. The expected useful life is 4 years.

Jan. 19 Purchased office supplies for $1,250 cash. (Use the asset account “Office Supplies” for such purchases.)

Jan. 24 Paid cash of $10,000 for binders, manuals, and workbooks for use in Sheldon's client programs. Sheldon's policy is to initially record these materials as an asset (Program Supplies) and to then expense the materials used for a particular training program when the program is completed.

Jan. 30 Paid wages of $1,800 and salaries of $3,600 for work performed during January.

Feb. 14 Completed the first client program for a fee of $9,500. The customer paid $2,500 of the fee that day, with the remainder billed on account. Program supplies used on the project had originally cost Sheldon $1,500.

Feb. 15 Paid wages of $2,400 in cash.

Feb. 19 Paid utilities for the month of January of $1,050 in cash.

Feb. 23 Purchased on account 30 specialized manuals as program supplies for use in computer training for a total of $1,800.

Feb. 28 Borrowed $45,000 from the bank on a 2-year note. The interest rate on the note is 6% per year (or 0.5% per month).

Mar. 1 Paid wages of $3,600 and salaries of $6,000.

Mar. 1 Completed on-site computer training for two customers: JKL Products, Inc., and Watson Company. Billed JKL $11,000 on account. The fee for Watson was $9,200, half of which Watson paid in cash with the remainder on account. Program supplies used for the two customers totaled $4,600.

Mar. 4 Purchased additional program supplies on account for a total of $3,600.

Mar. 13 Collected $16,600 on account from credit customers.

Mar. 15 Completed first all-day computer workshop for walk-in customers. Sales totaled $4,250, all in cash. Program supplies used for the workshop originally cost Sheldon $1,850.

Mar. 16 Billed Coastal Corporation $7,500 for on-site training completed on March 16. Program supplies for the training originally cost Sheldon $2,500. Mar. 16 Paid wages of $3,700.

Mar. 17 Purchased office supplies of $750 on account.

Mar. 21 Paid $3,200 to suppliers for materials previously purchased on account.

Mar. 23 Paid utilities for the month of February of $1,800 in cash.

Mar. 26 Received a $2,000 cash advance from Watson Company for additional computer training to begin April 1, 2018.

Mar. 29 Collected $6,250 on account from credit customers.

Mar. 31 Purchased $3,600 of program supplies for cash.

Additional Data Determined at March 31, 2018:

Unpaid and unrecorded wages and salaries totaled $2,700 and $8,500, respectively.

Service revenue unrecorded and unbilled at March 31 amounted to $9,300. Program supplies associated with these services originally cost Sheldon $2,800.

Office supplies on hand at March 31 totaled $450.

Sheldon uses straight-line depreciation on all depreciable assets and assumes the assets will have no value at the end of their estimated useful lives. A full month's depreciation is taken for the month of purchase, regardless of which day of the month the purchase is made. For example, depreciation expense for the three months ended March 31, 2018, on the phone system is $200 (i.e., $2,400/3 years x 3/12 of a year). Land is not considered depreciable. You may use a single account (Depreciation Expense) to record all of the depreciation expense for the depreciable assets. Also, you may use a single account (Accumulated Depreciation) to record the effect of depreciation on total assets.

Sheldon must record accrued interest for one month on the $45,000 bank loan.

Sheldon estimates utilities used during March amounted to $1,800, although the bill has not yet been received.

Remember insurance that has expired.

Required (round all amounts to the nearest dollar):

1. Record the transactions and events for the three months ending March 31, 2018, in general journal format. Record all prepaid expenses as assets at this time and all unearned revenues as liabilities. Do not record any adjusting journal entries based on the "additional data" at this time.

2. Post the journal entries prepared in (1.) to the general ledger T-accounts.

3. Prepare an unadjusted trial balance.

4. Record the necessary adjusting journal entries based on the "additional data" at March 31 in the general journal and then post these journal entries to the T- accounts.

5. Prepare an adjusted trial balance.

6. Prepare an income statement for the first three months of Sheldon's operations. Remember to include the proper heading.

7. Prepare Sheldon's March 31, 2018, balance sheet. Remember to include the proper heading. Also, the balance sheet does NOT need to be a classified balance sheet.

Carter Cleaning Centers

Jennifer Carter graduated from State University in June 2005, and, after considering several job offers, decided to do what she always planned to do go into business with her father, Jack Carter. Jack Carter opened his first Laundromat in 1995 and his second in 1998. The main attraction of these coin laundry businesses for him was that they were capital- rather than labor-intensive. Thus, once the investment in machinery was made, the stores could be run with just one unskilled attendant and none of the labor problems one normally expects from being in the retail service business. The attractiveness of operating with virtually no skilled labor notwithstanding, Jack had decided by 1999 to expand the services in each of his stores to include the dry cleaning and pressing of clothes. He embarked, in other words, on a strategy of related diversification by adding new services that were related to and consistent with his existing coin laundry activities. He added these for several reasons. He wanted to better utilize the unused space in the rather large stores he currently had under the lease. Furthermore, he was, as he put it, tired of sending out the dry cleaning and pressing work that came in from our coin laundry clients to a dry cleaner 5 miles away, who then took most of what should have been our profits. To reflect the new, expanded line of services, he renamed each of his two stores Carter Cleaning Centers, and was sufficiently satisfied with their performance to open four more of the same type of stores over the next 5 years. Each store had its own on-site manager and, on average, about seven employees and annual revenues of about $500,000. It was this six-store chain that Jennifer joined after graduating. Her understanding with her father was that she would serve as a troubleshooter/consultant to the elder Carter with the aim of both learning the business and bringing to it modern management concepts and techniques for solving the business problems and facilitating its growth.

Questions:

1. In line with your course, define the significance of the case?

2. The case narrated that the owner was capital oriented rather than labor-intensive. As an HRM student, what do you think about the philosophy of the owner? Which suggestions you will recommend to utilize labour oriented philosophy in the organization?

3. What suggestions you will provide to Jennifer to link HRM policies and practices with the differentiation strategy of the organization? Justify your answer.

A May 2005 federal indictment included the following charges against certain Indianapolis ready-mix cement dealers:

For forming and carrying out the charged combination and conspiracy, Defendant and co-conspirators did those

things that they combined and conspired to do, including, among other things:

a. engaging in discussions regarding the prices at which each

would sell ready mixed concrete;

b. agreeing during those discussions to specific price increases

for ready mixed concrete and to the timing of those price increases;

c. issuing price announcements and/or price quotations in

accordance with the agreements reached;

d. selling ready mixed concrete pursuant to those agreements

at collusive and noncompetitive prices; and

e. accepting payment for ready mixed concrete sold at the

agreed-upon collusive and noncompetitive prices.

Assume for the sake of this question that these allegations are true. Discuss, with reference to the antitrust decisions covered in the course, factors determining whether or not these cement dealers have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Montarello and Martins (2005) found that fifth grade students completed more mathematics problems correctly when simple problems were mixed in with their regular math assignments. To further explore this phenomenon, suppose that a researcher selects a standardized mathematics achievement test that produces a normal distribution of scores with a mean of µ= 100 and a standard deviation of σ = 24. The researcher modifies the test by inserting a set of very easy problems among the standardized questions and gives the modified test to a sample of n = 36 students. If the average test score for the sample is M = 120, is this result sufficient to conclude that inserting the easy questions improves student performance? Use a one-tailed test with α = .05.

The null hypothesis in words is Group of answer choices:

Inserting the easy questions decreases student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions does not affect student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions does not improve student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions improves student performance on the achievement test

The alternative hypothesis in symbols is

Group of answer choices

H1: µ ≤ 100

H1: µ > 100

H1: M ≤ 100

H1: M > 100

H1: µ = 100

H1: µ ≠ 100

The critical z value is

If it is a decimal number that is less than one, please include the 0 before the decimal point. If it is a decimal number with two or more than two places, leave only two decimal places after the decimal point. Please do not round. Finally, it is is a negative number, please do not forget to put the minus sign in front of it.

The z-score statistic is:

If it is a decimal number that is less than one, please include the 0 before the decimal point. If it is a decimal number with two or more than two places, leave only two decimal places after the decimal point. Please do not round. Finally, it is is a negative number, please do not forget to put the minus sign in front of it.

Your decision is

Group of answer choices

Reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is greater than the critical z value

Reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is not greater than the critical z value

Fail to reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is greater than the critical z value

Fail to reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is not greater than the critical z value

1a)

Montarello and Martins (2005) found that fifth grade students completed more mathematics problems correctly when simple problems were mixed in with their regular math assignments. To further explore this phenomenon, suppose that a researcher selects a standardized mathematics achievement test that produces a normal distribution of scores with a mean of µ= 100 and a standard deviation of σ = 24. The researcher modifies the test by inserting a set of very easy problems among the standardized questions and gives the modified test to a sample of n = 36 students. If the average test score for the sample is M = 120, is this result sufficient to conclude that inserting the easy questions improves student performance? Use a one-tailed test with α = .05.

The null hypothesis in words is

Group of answer choices

Inserting the easy questions decreases student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions does not affect student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions does not improve student performance on the achievement test

Inserting the easy questions improves student performance on the achievement test

b)The alternative hypothesis in symbols is

c)The critical z value is

d)The z-score statistic is:

e)

Your decision is

Group of answer choices

Reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is greater than the critical z value

Reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is not greater than the critical z value

Fail to reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is greater than the critical z value

Fail to reject the null hypothesis because the z-score statistic is not greater than the critical z value

1b)

Suppose that over the past 30 years during any given week of the major-league season, an average of µ = 12 players are hit by wild pitches. Assume that the distribution is normal with a standard deviation of σ =3. For a sample of n = 4 weeks, in which the daily temperature was extremely hot, the weekly average of hit-by- pitch players was M = 16.

Are players more likely to get hit by pitches during hot weeks? Use a one-tailed test with α = .01.

The alternative hypotheses in words is:

Group of answer choices

The number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather remains the same

The number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather significantly changes

There is a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather.

There is not a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather.

a)The null hypothesis in symbols is:

b)The critical z value is

c)The z-score statistic is:

d)

Your decision is

Group of answer choices

Reject the null hypothesis and conclude that that there is a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather

Reject the null hypothesis and conclude that that there is not a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather

Fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that that there is a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather

Fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that that there is not a significant increase in the number of hit-by-pitch players during hot weather

e)

Compute Cohen’s d to estimate the size of the effect.

Cohen's d is:

f)Report the results in APA

1c)

A researcher conducts a hypothesis test to evaluate the effect of a treatment that is expected to increase scores. The hypothesis test produces a z-score statistic of z= 1.23 , if the researcher is using a one-tailed test, what is the correct statistical decision?

Group of answer choices

Reject the null hypothesis with α = .05, but not with α = .01

Reject the null hypothesis with either α = .05 or α = .01

Fail to reject the null hypothesis with either α = .05 or α = .01

cannot answer without additional information

Montarello and Martins (2005) found that fifth grade students completed more mathematics problems correctly when simple problems were mixed in with their regular math assignments. To further explore this phenomenon, suppose that a researcher selects a standardized mathematics achievement test that produces a normal distribution of scores with a mean of µ= 100 and a standard deviation of σ = 18. The researcher modifies the test by inserting a set of very easy problems among the standardized questions and gives the modified test to a sample of n = 36 students. If the average test score for the sample is M = 104, is this result sufficient to conclude that inserting the easy questions improves student performance? Use a one-tailed test with α = .01.

A)The alternative hypotheses in words is

B)The null hypothesis in symbols is

C)The critical z values is

D)The z-score statistic is:

E) Your decision is

CASE:

In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation

907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005)

JACOBS, Justice:

[The Walt Disney Company hired Ovitz as its executive president and as a board member for five years after lengthy compensation negotiations. The negotiations regarding Ovitz’s compensation were conducted predominantly by Eisner and two of the members of the compensation committee (a four-member panel). The terms of Ovitz’s compensation were then presented to the full board. In a meeting lasting around one hour, where a variety of topics were discussed, the board approved Ovitz’s compensation after reviewing only a term sheet rather than the full contract. Ovitz’s time at Disney was tumultuous and short-lived.]…In December 1996, only fourteen months after he commenced employment, Ovitz was terminated without cause, resulting in a severance payout to Ovitz valued at approximately $ 130 million. [Disney shareholders then filed derivative actions on behalf of Disney against Ovitz and the directors of Disney at the time of the events complained of (the “Disney defendants”), claiming that the $130 million severance payout was the product of fiduciary duty and contractual breaches by Ovitz and of breaches of fiduciary duty by the Disney defendants and a waste of assets. The Chancellor found in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed.]

We next turn to the claims of error that relate to the Disney defendants. Those claims are subdivisible into two groups: (A) claims arising out of the approval of the OEA [Ovitz employment agreement] and of Ovitz’s election as President; and (B) claims arising out of the NFT [nonfault termination] severance payment to Ovitz upon his termination. We address separately those two categories and the issues that they generate.…

…[The due care] argument is best understood against the backdrop of the presumptions that cloak director action being reviewed under the business judgment standard. Our law presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.…

The appellants’ first claim is that the Chancellor erroneously (i) failed to make a “threshold determination” of gross negligence, and (ii) “conflated” the appellants’ burden to rebut the business judgment presumptions, with an analysis of whether the directors’ conduct fell within the 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) provision that precludes exculpation of directors from monetary liability “for acts or omissions not in good faith.” The argument runs as follows: Emerald Partners v. Berlin required the Chancellor first to determine whether the business judgment rule presumptions were rebutted based upon a showing that the board violated its duty of care, i.e., acted with gross negligence. If gross negligence were established, the burden would shift to the directors to establish that the OEA was entirely fair. Only if the directors failed to meet that burden could the trial court then address the directors’ Section 102(b)(7) exculpation defense, including the statutory exception for acts not in good faith.

This argument lacks merit. To make the argument the appellants must ignore the distinction between (i) a determination of bad faith for the threshold purpose of rebutting the business judgment rule presumptions, and (ii) a bad faith determination for purposes of evaluating the availability of charter-authorized exculpation from monetary damage liability after liability has been established. Our law clearly permits a judicial assessment of director good faith for that former purpose. Nothing in Emerald Partners requires the Court of Chancery to consider only evidence of lack of due care (i.e. gross negligence) in determining whether the business judgment rule presumptions have been rebutted.…

The appellants argue that the Disney directors breached their duty of care by failing to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available with respect to Ovitz’s employment agreement.…[but the] only properly reviewable action of the entire board was its decision to elect Ovitz as Disney’s President. In that context the sole issue, as the Chancellor properly held, is “whether [the remaining members of the old board] properly exercised their business judgment and acted in accordance with their fiduciary duties when they elected Ovitz to the Company’s presidency.” The Chancellor determined that in electing Ovitz, the directors were informed of all information reasonably available and, thus, were not grossly negligent. We agree.

…[The court turns to good faith.] The Court of Chancery held that the business judgment rule presumptions protected the decisions of the compensation committee and the remaining Disney directors, not only because they had acted with due care but also because they had not acted in bad faith. That latter ruling, the appellants claim, was reversible error because the Chancellor formulated and then applied an incorrect definition of bad faith.

…Their argument runs as follows: under the Chancellor’s 2003 definition of bad faith, the directors must have “consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.” Under the 2003 formulation, appellants say, “directors violate their duty of good faith if they are making material decisions without adequate information and without adequate deliberation[,]” but under the 2005 post-trial definition, bad faith requires proof of a subjective bad motive or intent. This definitional change, it is claimed, was procedurally prejudicial because appellants relied on the 2003 definition in presenting their evidence of bad faith at the trial.…

Second, the appellants claim that the Chancellor’s post-trial definition of bad faith is erroneous substantively. They argue that the 2003 formulation was (and is) the correct definition, because it is “logically tied to board decision-making under the duty of care.” The post-trial formulation, on the other hand, “wrongly incorporated substantive elements regarding the rationality of the decisions under review rather than being constrained, as in a due care analysis, to strictly procedural criteria.” We conclude that both arguments must fail.

The appellants’ first argument—that there is a real, significant difference between the Chancellor’s pre-trial and post-trial definitions of bad faith—is plainly wrong. We perceive no substantive difference between the Court of Chancery’s 2003 definition of bad faith—a “conscious and intentional disregard [of] responsibilities, adopting a we don’t care about the risks’ attitude…”—and its 2005 post-trial definition—an “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.” Both formulations express the same concept, although in slightly different language.

The most telling evidence that there is no substantive difference between the two formulations is that the appellants are forced to contrive a difference. Appellants assert that under the 2003 formulation, “directors violate their duty of good faith if they are making material decisions without adequate information and without adequate deliberation.” For that ipse dixit they cite no legal authority. That comes as no surprise because their verbal effort to collapse the duty to act in good faith into the duty to act with due care, is not unlike putting a rabbit into the proverbial hat and then blaming the trial judge for making the insertion.

…The precise question is whether the Chancellor’s articulated standard for bad faith corporate fiduciary conduct—intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities—is legally correct. In approaching that question, we note that the Chancellor characterized that definition as “an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.” That observation is accurate and helpful, because as a matter of simple logic, at least three different categories of fiduciary behavior are candidates for the “bad faith” pejorative label.

The first category involves so-called “subjective bad faith,” that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm. That such conduct constitutes classic, quintessential bad faith is a proposition so well accepted in the liturgy of fiduciary law that it borders on axiomatic.…The second category of conduct, which is at the opposite end of the spectrum, involves lack of due care—that is, fiduciary action taken solely by reason of gross negligence and without any malevolent intent. In this case, appellants assert claims of gross negligence to establish breaches not only of director due care but also of the directors’ duty to act in good faith. Although the Chancellor found, and we agree, that the appellants failed to establish gross negligence, to afford guidance we address the issue of whether gross negligence (including a failure to inform one’s self of available material facts), without more, can also constitute bad faith. The answer is clearly no.

…”issues of good faith are (to a certain degree) inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty.…” But, in the pragmatic, conduct-regulating legal realm which calls for more precise conceptual line drawing, the answer is that grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith. The conduct that is the subject of due care may overlap with the conduct that comes within the rubric of good faith in a psychological sense, but from a legal standpoint those duties are and must remain quite distinct.…

The Delaware General Assembly has addressed the distinction between bad faith and a failure to exercise due care (i.e., gross negligence) in two separate contexts. The first is Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL, which authorizes Delaware corporations, by a provision in the certificate of incorporation, to exculpate their directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the duty of care. That exculpatory provision affords significant protection to directors of Delaware corporations. The statute carves out several exceptions, however, including most relevantly, “for acts or omissions not in good faith.…” Thus, a corporation can exculpate its directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that is not in good faith. To adopt a definition of bad faith that would cause a violation of the duty of care automatically to become an act or omission “not in good faith,” would eviscerate the protections accorded to directors by the General Assembly’s adoption of Section 102(b)(7).

A second legislative recognition of the distinction between fiduciary conduct that is grossly negligent and conduct that is not in good faith, is Delaware’s indemnification statute, found at 8 Del. C. § 145. To oversimplify, subsections (a) and (b) of that statute permit a corporation to indemnify (inter alia) any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation against expenses…where (among other things): (i) that person is, was, or is threatened to be made a party to that action, suit or proceeding, and (ii) that person “acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.…” Thus, under Delaware statutory law a director or officer of a corporation can be indemnified for liability (and litigation expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not for a violation of the duty to act in good faith.

QUESTION:   
i. How did the court view the plaintiff’s argument that the Chancellor had developed two different types of bad faith? Why?
ii. What two statutory provisions has the Delaware General Assembly passed that address the distinction between bad faith and a failure to exercise due care (i.e., gross negligence)? Why are they important?

a) Harris News receives payments on 3-month newspaper subscriptions of $9,000 on December 1. On December 1, Harris debits Cash $9,000 and credits Revenue $9,000. Adjusting entries are prepared monthly. At December 31, Harris will _______ Revenue for__________. **Show all steps/work in determining revenue amount.

b) Total Fitness Inc. sells $6,000 worth of 1-year club memberships on August 1, Year 1.Total Fitness's fiscal year ends December 31. The balance in the Unearned Revenue account at December 31, Year 1 is_______? **Show all steps/work in determining Unearned Revenue amount.

1.Revenue and profit are the same thing.

a.True

b.False

2.In the short run for a particular market, there are 300 firms. Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 when it produces 200 units of output. $30 is above every firm's average variable cost. One point on the market supply curve is

3.Profit maximizing quantity is the level of quantity where

4.Most of the firms in today's world are perfectly competitive.

a.True

b.False

5.For firms operating in a perfectly competitive market, price must always be greater than marginal revenue.

a.True

b.False