Patricia Johnson is the sole owner of Crane Vista Park, a public camping ground near the Crater Lake National Recreation Area. Patricia has compiled the following financial information as of December 31, 2020. Revenues during 2020—camping fees $186,228 Fair value of equipment $186,228 Revenues during 2020—general store 86,463 Notes payable 79,812 Accounts payable 14,632 Expenses during 2020 199,530 Cash on hand 30,595 Accounts receivable 23,278 Original cost of equipment 140,336 (a) Determine Patricia Johnson’s net income from Crane Vista Park for 2020. Net income $enter Net income in dollars (b) Prepare a balance sheet for Crane Vista Park as of December 31, 2020. (List Assets in order of liquidity.) CRANE VISTA PARK Balance Sheet choose the accounting period Assets enter a balance sheet item $enter a dollar amount enter a balance sheet item enter a dollar amount enter a balance sheet item enter a dollar amount select a closing section name for this part of the balance sheet $enter a total amount for this part of the balance sheet Liabilities and Owner’s Equity select an opening name for section one enter a balance sheet item $enter a dollar amount enter a balance sheet item enter a dollar amount select a closing name for section one enter a total amount for this section of the balance sheet select an opening name for section two enter a balance sheet item enter a dollar amount select a closing name for this part of the balance sheet $enter a total amount for this part of the balance sheet
In: Accounting
At the end of 2020, the records of Block Corporation reflected the following.
| Common stock, $5 par, authorized 500,000 shares | ||
| Outstanding January 1, 2020, 400,000 shares | $2,000,000 | |
| Sold and issued April 1, 2020, 2,000 shares | 10,000 | |
| Issued 5% stock dividend, September 30, 2020; 20,100 shares | 100,500 | |
| Preferred stock, 6%, $10 par, nonconvertible, noncumulative, authorized 50,000 shares | ||
| Outstanding during year, 20,000 shares | 200,000 | |
| Paid-in capital in excess of par, common stock | 180,000 | |
| Paid-in capital in excess of par, preferred stock | 100,000 | |
| Retained earnings (after the effects of current preferred dividends declared during 2020) | 640,000 | |
| Bonds payable, 6.5%, nonconvertible, issued at par January 1, 2020 | 1,000,000 | |
| Net income | 164,000 | |
| Income tax rate, 25% |
a. What EPS presentation is required—basic, diluted, or both?
| Answer: Basic EPS/Diluted EPSBasic and Diluted EPS |
b. Compute the required EPS amount(s).
| Net Income Available to Common Stockholders |
Weighted Avg. Common Shares Outstanding |
Per Share |
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Answer: Basic EPS/Diluted EPSBasic and Diluted EPS | Answer | Answer | Answer |
c. Compute the required EPS amount(s), assuming that the preferred stock is cumulative.
| Net Income Available to Common Stockholders |
Weighted Avg. Common Shares Outstanding |
Per Share |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
Answer: Basic EPS/Diluted EPSBasic and Diluted EPS |
Answer | Answer | Answer |
In: Accounting
Taxable income and pretax financial income would be identical for Bridgeport Co. except for its treatments of gross profit on installment sales and estimated costs of warranties. The following income computations have been prepared.
|
Taxable income |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
||||||
| Excess of revenues over expenses (excluding two temporary differences) |
$149,000 |
$192,000 |
$96,700 |
||||||
| Installment gross profit collected |
7,600 |
7,600 |
7,600 |
||||||
| Expenditures for warranties |
(5,500 |
) |
(5,500 |
) |
(5,500 |
) |
|||
| Taxable income |
$151,100 |
$194,100 |
$98,800 |
||||||
|
Pretax financial income |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
||||||
| Excess of revenues over expenses (excluding two temporary differences) |
$149,000 |
$192,000 |
$96,700 |
||||||
| Installment gross profit recognized |
22,800 |
-0- |
-0- |
||||||
| Estimated cost of warranties |
(16,500 |
) |
-0- |
-0- |
|||||
| Income before taxes |
$155,300 |
$192,000 |
$96,700 |
The tax rates in effect are 2019, 40%; 2020 and 2021, 45%. All tax
rates were enacted into law on January 1, 2019. No deferred income
taxes existed at the beginning of 2019. Taxable income is expected
in all future years.
Prepare the journal entry to record income tax expense, deferred
income taxes, and income taxes payable for 2019, 2020, and 2021.
(Credit account titles are automatically indented when
amount is entered. Do not indent manually. If no entry is required,
select "No Entry" for the account titles and enter 0 for the
amounts.)
|
Date |
Account Titles and Explanation |
Debit |
Credit |
|
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
In: Accounting
Pharoah Home Improvement Company installs replacement siding,
windows, and louvered glass doors for single-family homes and
condominium complexes. The company is in the process of preparing
its annual financial statements for the fiscal year ended May 31,
2020. Jim Alcide, controller for Pharoah, has gathered the
following data concerning inventory.
At May 31, 2020, the balance in Pharoah’s Raw Materials Inventory
account was $428,400, and Allowance to Reduce Inventory to Market
had a credit balance of $26,750. Alcide summarized the relevant
inventory cost and market data at May 31, 2020, in the schedule
below.
Alcide assigned Patricia Devereaux, an intern from a local college,
the task of calculating the amount that should appear on Pharoah’s
May 31, 2020, financial statements for inventory at
lower-of-cost-or-market as applied to each item in inventory.
Devereaux expressed concern over departing from the historical cost
principle. Assume Garcia uses LIFO inventory costing.
|
Cost |
Replacement |
Sales Price |
Net Realizable |
Normal Profit |
||||||||||
| Aluminum siding | $73,500 | $65,625 | $67,200 | $58,800 | $5,355 | |||||||||
| Cedar shake siding | 90,300 | 83,370 | 98,700 | 89,040 | 7,770 | |||||||||
| Louvered glass doors | 117,600 | 130,200 | 195,720 | 176,715 | 19,425 | |||||||||
| Thermal windows | 147,000 | 132,300 | 162,540 | 147,000 | 16,170 | |||||||||
| Total | $428,400 | $411,495 | $524,160 | $471,555 | $48,720 | |||||||||
(a1) Determine the proper balance in Allowance to
Reduce Inventory to Market at May 31, 2020.
| Balance in the Allowance to Reduce Inventory to Market |
$ |
(a2) For the fiscal year ended May 31, 2020,
determine the amount of the gain or loss that would be recorded due
to the change in Allowance to Reduce Inventory to Market.
| The amount of the gain (loss) |
$ |
In: Accounting
Cyclops Company has its own research department. However, the company purchases patents from time to time. The following is a summary of transactions involving patents now owned by the company.
Assume that the legal life of each patent is also its useful life.
Required:
Total amortization expense for the year ended December 31, 2020
these are all the information given.
In: Accounting
PLEASE READ ALL OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE BEGINNING THIS ASSIGNMENT. For this assignment, you need to analyze the information below from BOTH the management AND the employee perspective. This information pertains to a labor union in a simulated/made up/not real firm in Glen Ellyn. The first part of your information relates to Management – the second part relates to the Labor Union employees. I have provided you with information from the last union negotiations at the plant in 2016. It is now time to begin preparing for negotiations for 2020 and beyond. The third part of this assignment is your analyzing what you have gained from this assignment.
Your assignment needs to include the following information:
Format this assignment using the section headings noted as you see below with “Management” and the “CPFac Workers Labor Union”. Be very clear about the information required above.
Management –
Put yourself in the role of President and Owner of Cooper Plastics Corp. located in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. Cooper manufactures plastic cups, plates, silverware, bowls, etc.
There is a union, CPFacWorkers, representing the 95 factory workers at Cooper Plastics.
It is time for the management team at Cooper to once again negotiate with the CPFacWorkers.
Your negotiations document needs to include the following for BOTH Management and the Union - you must include these categories for both offers:
Data from Current Contract, which expires in September 2020:
/hour
Sales: Profits:
CPFacWorkers Labor Union –
Now, put yourself in the role of the negotiating team representing the CPFacWorkers labor union at Cooper Plastics in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. Cooper manufactures plastic cups, plates, silverware, bowls, etc. There are a total of 95 factory workers in the bargaining unit of your union.
It is time to negotiate with the Cooper Plastics management team.
Your negotiations document needs to include the following - you must include these categories in both offers:
Data from Current Contract, which expired in September 2020:
Current Salaries based on 2080 hours per year, base pay $10/hour
Sales: Profits:
Other Considerations:
When complete, click on the assignment name link to submit the assignment for grading.
In: Operations Management
In: Accounting
Q1. The Cartel That Makes Sure Airplane Tickets Never Get Cheaper
SKY HIGH
It’s been a windfall year for the industry, but you won’t be getting any better accommodations or more affordable fares. What gives?
Updated Apr. 14, 2017 10:33AM ET / Published Jun. 22, 2015 5:21AM ET
Jim Young/Reuters
Screw the passengers.
That appears all too often to be the governing philosophy of the airline business.
Take the case of a United Airlines flight from Chicago to London last weekend. A technical problem forced the plane to abort its trans-Atlantic route and divert to Goose Bay in Canada. The 176 passengers were marooned there for more than 20 hours, sleeping in unheated military barracks at near-freezing temperatures.
“There was nobody from United Airlines to be seen anywhere,” one passenger told NBC News. “No United representative ever reached out to anybody, no phone calls, no human beings, no nothing. Nobody had any idea what was going on.”
It so happened that this came at the end of a week in which the world’s airline chiefs, junketing in Miami, celebrated their most lucrative year ever. They are projecting profits totaling $29.3 billion in 2015—almost double what they made in 2014.
And you must have noticed if you’re flying anywhere in the U.S. this summer that seat prices are not falling. Indeed, if the owners of those seats are suddenly feeling fat and happy, they are in no mood to pass on their swell feelings to you. It’s hard to imagine any other service industry being run like the airline business—but then there is no other business like the airline business.
So now we have a novel opportunity to see how airlines behave when, suddenly and much to their surprise, they find themselves with a business model that is working. If making a profit is a new experience for them, what effect will that have on their behavior?
First, let us consider why the numbers have been transformed.
There has been a steep change in the efficiency of jets. Beginning with the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, the combination of lighter but stronger composite materials in structures and a quantum leap in engine efficiency, using far less fuel, has slashed operating costs per airplane by as much as 30 percent.
In the last year, this windfall has been boosted by the large decline in oil prices.
However, these dual benefits are not being evenly spread either among airlines or continents. Airlines stuck with fleets of older airplanes are not getting these benefits. Fleet age has become far more decisive in deciding an airline’s profitability, particularly true in the U.S.
The three major U.S. legacy carriers—American, United, and Delta—failed to get in early to order the new generation of airplanes—the 787, the Airbus A350, revamped versions of the Boeing 777, the Airbus A320, and the Boeing 737—and allowed European, Middle Eastern, and Asian competitors to become first adopters and, thereby, reap the benefits of lower fuel costs.
The average age of the jets in the American fleet is 12.3 years; for United 13 years; and for Delta 17.2 years. It won’t be until at least 2020 that they can finally dump the oldest of their airplanes. (American has actually been delaying the delivery of some new jets that it ordered.)
Age doesn’t mean that an airplane is unsafe. Properly maintained 20-year-old jets are not in danger of falling apart. The frequency of flights determines retirement age more than years and the smaller single-aisle jets used on domestic routes age the fastest because they are making up to seven flights a day.
Age may not be dangerous but it sure registers with passengers when it contrasts with the comforts they encounter in the new generation of jets with their better cabin climate and quieter engines. So it’s not surprising that when airlines show up with all-new fleets as well as gracious cabin crews people start wondering, Why can’t it always be like this?
It’s also not surprising that the major American carriers are now trying to stop those airlines from coming to an airport near you.
When it comes to price and the domestic U.S. routes, not only are prices not coming down but there is persuasive evidence of price-fixing. The veteran investigative reporter James B. Stewart described this market as a classic oligopoly in a penetrating piece in The New York Times .
However, this is far from being a new phenomenon. These tactics began long before the final round of consolidation mergers when US Airways was swallowed by American Airlines in 2013. They have merely been continually refined to the point now when the airlines, suddenly enjoying profits, have responded not by lowering fares but by tightening control over the number of seats available and cutting back on flight frequency and destinations.
The reality is that the airlines don’t need to expose themselves to charges of collusion on fares and the operation of a hidden cartel that mutually governs capacity. That’s so 20th century.
These days their key tool is “yield management”—being able to precisely calculate how many seats should be available on any given route at any time of the day or night and adjusting the price hour-by-hour according to demand. This algorithm has become so refined and the market so controlled that each of the major airlines ends up looking at the same numbers on their computer screen. No human intervention is needed. In all but name it is a cartel—but one run entirely by unaccountable robots.
So?
We live in the world’s most vigorously capitalist marketplace. What’s wrong with airlines trying to make a decent profit, for once? And what is the point of them flying empty seats around the skies?
But I come back to my earlier point: How do these airline executives behave when, joy of joys, they find their balance sheets deeply in the black? Like a lot of other corporate minders they think a lot more about their shareholders than their customers. Short-termism rules. Wall Street responds to quarterly earnings, not patient long-term strategy.
A good example is Jet Blue. This airline was a rare example of a successful startup based on a maverick idea: super-chummy cabin staff and generously spaced seating. A new CEO (previously schooled by the stingy bean-counters at British Airways) is undermining that spirit by jamming more seats into the cabin and raising baggage charges, all at the behest of shareholders.
The problem is that the people running airlines in the U.S. have one part of their brain missing, the part that provides the service ethic. As well as fare-gouging they’re space gouging in the cabins. Even with the newest jets like the Dreamliner they are packing more seats into coach than the airplane designers (or nature) intended.
Q1. Read the above article and answer the questions that follow.
a. Why did the investigative reporter James B. Stewart describe US airlines as a classic Oligopoly?
b. What is the meaning of yield management as described in the above article?
c. Why did the writer accuse people running airlines of missing service ethics
In: Economics
1. The Cartel That Makes Sure Airplane Tickets Never Get Cheaper
SKY HIGH
It’s been a windfall year for the industry, but you won’t be getting any better accommodations or more affordable fares. What gives?
Updated Apr. 14, 2017 10:33AM ET / Published Jun. 22, 2015 5:21AM ET
Jim Young/Reuters
Screw the passengers.
That appears all too often to be the governing philosophy of the airline business.
Take the case of a United Airlines flight from Chicago to London last weekend. A technical problem forced the plane to abort its trans-Atlantic route and divert to Goose Bay in Canada. The 176 passengers were marooned there for more than 20 hours, sleeping in unheated military barracks at near-freezing temperatures.
“There was nobody from United Airlines to be seen anywhere,” one passenger told NBC News. “No United representative ever reached out to anybody, no phone calls, no human beings, no nothing. Nobody had any idea what was going on.”
It so happened that this came at the end of a week in which the world’s airline chiefs, junketing in Miami, celebrated their most lucrative year ever. They are projecting profits totaling $29.3 billion in 2015—almost double what they made in 2014.
And you must have noticed if you’re flying anywhere in the U.S. this summer that seat prices are not falling. Indeed, if the owners of those seats are suddenly feeling fat and happy, they are in no mood to pass on their swell feelings to you. It’s hard to imagine any other service industry being run like the airline business—but then there is no other business like the airline business.
So now we have a novel opportunity to see how airlines behave when, suddenly and much to their surprise, they find themselves with a business model that is working. If making a profit is a new experience for them, what effect will that have on their behavior?
First, let us consider why the numbers have been transformed.
There has been a steep change in the efficiency of jets. Beginning with the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, the combination of lighter but stronger composite materials in structures and a quantum leap in engine efficiency, using far less fuel, has slashed operating costs per airplane by as much as 30 percent.
In the last year, this windfall has been boosted by the large decline in oil prices.
However, these dual benefits are not being evenly spread either among airlines or continents. Airlines stuck with fleets of older airplanes are not getting these benefits. Fleet age has become far more decisive in deciding an airline’s profitability, particularly true in the U.S.
The three major U.S. legacy carriers—American, United, and Delta—failed to get in early to order the new generation of airplanes—the 787, the Airbus A350, revamped versions of the Boeing 777, the Airbus A320, and the Boeing 737—and allowed European, Middle Eastern, and Asian competitors to become first adopters and, thereby, reap the benefits of lower fuel costs.
The average age of the jets in the American fleet is 12.3 years; for United 13 years; and for Delta 17.2 years. It won’t be until at least 2020 that they can finally dump the oldest of their airplanes. (American has actually been delaying the delivery of some new jets that it ordered.)
Age doesn’t mean that an airplane is unsafe. Properly maintained 20-year-old jets are not in danger of falling apart. The frequency of flights determines retirement age more than years and the smaller single-aisle jets used on domestic routes age the fastest because they are making up to seven flights a day.
Age may not be dangerous but it sure registers with passengers when it contrasts with the comforts they encounter in the new generation of jets with their better cabin climate and quieter engines. So it’s not surprising that when airlines show up with all-new fleets as well as gracious cabin crews people start wondering, Why can’t it always be like this?
It’s also not surprising that the major American carriers are now trying to stop those airlines from coming to an airport near you.
When it comes to price and the domestic U.S. routes, not only are prices not coming down but there is persuasive evidence of price-fixing. The veteran investigative reporter James B. Stewart described this market as a classic oligopoly in a penetrating piece in The New York Times .
However, this is far from being a new phenomenon. These tactics began long before the final round of consolidation mergers when US Airways was swallowed by American Airlines in 2013. They have merely been continually refined to the point now when the airlines, suddenly enjoying profits, have responded not by lowering fares but by tightening control over the number of seats available and cutting back on flight frequency and destinations.
The reality is that the airlines don’t need to expose themselves to charges of collusion on fares and the operation of a hidden cartel that mutually governs capacity. That’s so 20th century.
These days their key tool is “yield management”—being able to precisely calculate how many seats should be available on any given route at any time of the day or night and adjusting the price hour-by-hour according to demand. This algorithm has become so refined and the market so controlled that each of the major airlines ends up looking at the same numbers on their computer screen. No human intervention is needed. In all but name it is a cartel—but one run entirely by unaccountable robots.
So?
We live in the world’s most vigorously capitalist marketplace. What’s wrong with airlines trying to make a decent profit, for once? And what is the point of them flying empty seats around the skies?
But I come back to my earlier point: How do these airline executives behave when, joy of joys, they find their balance sheets deeply in the black? Like a lot of other corporate minders they think a lot more about their shareholders than their customers. Short-termism rules. Wall Street responds to quarterly earnings, not patient long-term strategy.
A good example is Jet Blue. This airline was a rare example of a successful startup based on a maverick idea: super-chummy cabin staff and generously spaced seating. A new CEO (previously schooled by the stingy bean-counters at British Airways) is undermining that spirit by jamming more seats into the cabin and raising baggage charges, all at the behest of shareholders.
The problem is that the people running airlines in the U.S. have one part of their brain missing, the part that provides the service ethic. As well as fare-gouging they’re space gouging in the cabins. Even with the newest jets like the Dreamliner they are packing more seats into coach than the airplane designers (or nature) intended.
Q1. Read the above article and answer the questions that follow.
a. Why did the investigative reporter James B. Stewart describe US airlines as a classic Oligopoly?
b. What is the meaning of yield management as described in the above article?
c. Why did the writer accuse people running airlines of missing service ethics?
In: Economics
Q1. The Cartel That Makes Sure Airplane Tickets Never Get Cheaper
SKY HIGH
It’s been a windfall year for the industry, but you won’t be getting any better accommodations or more affordable fares. What gives?
Updated Apr. 14, 2017 10:33AM ET / Published Jun. 22, 2015 5:21AM ET
Jim Young/Reuters
Screw the passengers.
That appears all too often to be the governing philosophy of the airline business.
Take the case of a United Airlines flight from Chicago to London last weekend. A technical problem forced the plane to abort its trans-Atlantic route and divert to Goose Bay in Canada. The 176 passengers were marooned there for more than 20 hours, sleeping in unheated military barracks at near-freezing temperatures.
“There was nobody from United Airlines to be seen anywhere,” one passenger told NBC News. “No United representative ever reached out to anybody, no phone calls, no human beings, no nothing. Nobody had any idea what was going on.”
It so happened that this came at the end of a week in which the world’s airline chiefs, junketing in Miami, celebrated their most lucrative year ever. They are projecting profits totaling $29.3 billion in 2015—almost double what they made in 2014.
And you must have noticed if you’re flying anywhere in the U.S. this summer that seat prices are not falling. Indeed, if the owners of those seats are suddenly feeling fat and happy, they are in no mood to pass on their swell feelings to you. It’s hard to imagine any other service industry being run like the airline business—but then there is no other business like the airline business.
So now we have a novel opportunity to see how airlines behave when, suddenly and much to their surprise, they find themselves with a business model that is working. If making a profit is a new experience for them, what effect will that have on their behavior?
First, let us consider why the numbers have been transformed.
There has been a steep change in the efficiency of jets. Beginning with the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, the combination of lighter but stronger composite materials in structures and a quantum leap in engine efficiency, using far less fuel, has slashed operating costs per airplane by as much as 30 percent.
In the last year, this windfall has been boosted by the large decline in oil prices.
However, these dual benefits are not being evenly spread either among airlines or continents. Airlines stuck with fleets of older airplanes are not getting these benefits. Fleet age has become far more decisive in deciding an airline’s profitability, particularly true in the U.S.
The three major U.S. legacy carriers—American, United, and Delta—failed to get in early to order the new generation of airplanes—the 787, the Airbus A350, revamped versions of the Boeing 777, the Airbus A320, and the Boeing 737—and allowed European, Middle Eastern, and Asian competitors to become first adopters and, thereby, reap the benefits of lower fuel costs.
The average age of the jets in the American fleet is 12.3 years; for United 13 years; and for Delta 17.2 years. It won’t be until at least 2020 that they can finally dump the oldest of their airplanes. (American has actually been delaying the delivery of some new jets that it ordered.)
Age doesn’t mean that an airplane is unsafe. Properly maintained 20-year-old jets are not in danger of falling apart. The frequency of flights determines retirement age more than years and the smaller single-aisle jets used on domestic routes age the fastest because they are making up to seven flights a day.
Age may not be dangerous but it sure registers with passengers when it contrasts with the comforts they encounter in the new generation of jets with their better cabin climate and quieter engines. So it’s not surprising that when airlines show up with all-new fleets as well as gracious cabin crews people start wondering, Why can’t it always be like this?
It’s also not surprising that the major American carriers are now trying to stop those airlines from coming to an airport near you.
When it comes to price and the domestic U.S. routes, not only are prices not coming down but there is persuasive evidence of price-fixing. The veteran investigative reporter James B. Stewart described this market as a classic oligopoly in a penetrating piece in The New York Times .
However, this is far from being a new phenomenon. These tactics began long before the final round of consolidation mergers when US Airways was swallowed by American Airlines in 2013. They have merely been continually refined to the point now when the airlines, suddenly enjoying profits, have responded not by lowering fares but by tightening control over the number of seats available and cutting back on flight frequency and destinations.
The reality is that the airlines don’t need to expose themselves to charges of collusion on fares and the operation of a hidden cartel that mutually governs capacity. That’s so 20th century.
These days their key tool is “yield management”—being able to precisely calculate how many seats should be available on any given route at any time of the day or night and adjusting the price hour-by-hour according to demand. This algorithm has become so refined and the market so controlled that each of the major airlines ends up looking at the same numbers on their computer screen. No human intervention is needed. In all but name it is a cartel—but one run entirely by unaccountable robots.
So?
We live in the world’s most vigorously capitalist marketplace. What’s wrong with airlines trying to make a decent profit, for once? And what is the point of them flying empty seats around the skies?
But I come back to my earlier point: How do these airline executives behave when, joy of joys, they find their balance sheets deeply in the black? Like a lot of other corporate minders they think a lot more about their shareholders than their customers. Short-termism rules. Wall Street responds to quarterly earnings, not patient long-term strategy.
A good example is Jet Blue. This airline was a rare example of a successful startup based on a maverick idea: super-chummy cabin staff and generously spaced seating. A new CEO (previously schooled by the stingy bean-counters at British Airways) is undermining that spirit by jamming more seats into the cabin and raising baggage charges, all at the behest of shareholders.
The problem is that the people running airlines in the U.S. have one part of their brain missing, the part that provides the service ethic. As well as fare-gouging they’re space gouging in the cabins. Even with the newest jets like the Dreamliner they are packing more seats into coach than the airplane designers (or nature) intended.
Q1. Read the above article and answer the questions that follow.
a. Why did the investigative reporter James B. Stewart describe US airlines as a classic Oligopoly?
b. What is the meaning of yield management as described in the above article?
c. Why did the writer accuse people running airlines of missing service ethics?
In: Economics