A professor states that in the United States the proportion of college students who own iPhones is .66. She then splits the class into two groups: Group 1 with students whose last name begins with A-K and Group 2 with students whose last name begins with L-Z. She then asks each group to count how many in that group own iPhones and to calculate the group proportion of iPhone ownership. For Group 1 the proportion is p1 and for Group 2 the proportion is p2. To calculate the proportion you take the number of iPhone owners and divide by the total number of students in the group. You will get a number between 0 and 1.

• What would you expect p1 and p2 to be?
• Do you expect either of these proportions to be vastly different from the population proportion of .66?
• Would you be surprised if p1 was different than p2?
• Would you be surprised if they were the same or similar?
• What statistical concept describes the relationship between the first letter of someone's last name and whether or not they own an iPhone?

CASE: HAROLD DAVIS and ENID DAVIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 861 F.2d 558 November 14, 1988 Plaintiff-appellants Harold and Enid Davis claimed charitable deductions under IRC section 170 for funds they sent to their two sons for their support while they served as full-time unpaid missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay-Saints at the New York City Mission and at the New Zealand/Cook Islands Mission. These deductions were disallowed by the IRS. BACKGROUND A primary activity of the Church is its worldwide missionary program. Over 25,000 individuals have participated annually since 1977. Missionaries typically serve the Church for two years at a location assigned by the Church. Missionary work is uncompensated, but the Church will pay mission-related expenses if the missionary is unable to support himself or obtain the necessary funds from his family. Most missionaries are between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two; many receive payments from their parents to defray their living expenses. After an individual is "called" by the Church to serve as a missionary the Church advises parents of the amount that it believes will be necessary to provide for the missionary's support and requests their assistance. The life of a missionary is closely supervised. Mission rules prohibit missionaries from dating, attending movies or plays, or engaging in various sports or other activities. Missionaries are required to submit weekly reports detailing the time spent in Church service and explaining their expenses for the week. The Missionary Handbook contains the following admonition: "The money received for your support is sacred and should be spent wisely and only for necessary work. Keep expenses at a minimum. Keep records of all expenditures." The Church gives several reasons for its preference not to collect and distribute contributions for its missionaries. First, the Church feels that direct contributions to missionaries foster the Church doctrine of sacrifice and consecration. Second, the Church believes that direct transmittal promotes frugality by missionaries because of their awareness of the personal sacrifices that are being made on their behalf. Third, direct transmittal reduces the administrative and bookkeeping expenses that would otherwise be imposed on the Church. The appellants' sons, Benjamin and Cecil, both were "called" by the Church to serve as missionaries when they became nineteen years old. During 1980 and 1981 the appellants transferred $3480 and $4135 to Benjamin. Benjamin used this money primarily for living expenses. During 1981 appellants transferred $1518 to Cecil. Cecil also used this money primarily to pay his living expenses. The appellants filed two amended tax returns for 1980 and 1981, claiming as charitable contributions the full amounts they sent to their sons. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law We take judicial notice of the fact that the Church is a qualified religious organization to which deductible contributions can be made. Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 78, Cumulative List of Organizations 216 (1984). Under Section 170, deductions are allowed for contributions "to or for the use of" qualified organizations. The requisite elements are that (1) the transfer of property is made with no expectation of a quid pro quo, (2) it is made to a qualified recipient, and (3) it is made "to or for the use of" the qualified recipient. The appellants argue that the payments to their sons were "for the use of" the Church and therefore deductible as charitable contributions. The government argues that the expenditures were not charitable contributions because they were never within the physical control of the Church. B. Charitable Contributions In situations where a taxpayer has claimed a charitable deduction for funds that have been earmarked for a specific individual, courts have considered whether the charity exercises control over the use of the funds. The appellants claim that actual control by the charity is a factor to be considered, but should not be required in all cases. The government responds that the deduction should be disallowed because the contributions were received directly by the missionaries from the taxpayer parents and were neither to nor for the use of the Church. The better reasoned approach, we feel, is to require that the recipient charity have control over the donated funds. The control gauge stems from the basic requirement that the beneficiary of a charitable contribution must be indefinite. When a taxpayer intends a contribution for a specific purpose, or even a specific individual, but the charity retains control over the funds, this requirement is satisfied. But when a taxpayer makes a contribution directly to the intended beneficiary so that the charity never possesses the funds, let alone controls their use, there can be no guarantee that the beneficiary will be indefinite. See Barry's Estate v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1982) (property bequeathed to member of Jesuit Order, as opposed to Order itself, not deductible though legatee obligated by Canon law to transfer property acquired to the Order). Here the charity lacked actual control over the funds. Contributions were deposited directly into the personal checking accounts of the taxpayers' sons. While the Church admonished the missionaries to spend their money wisely, the use to which the funds were put was solely within the control of the missionaries. CONCLUSION We do not question the high ideals of the Church or the valuable services it performs in connection with its missionary program. We are constrained by the law, however; and it is up to the legislature to provide the remedy that is sought by the appellants. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.

Question: The brothers Davis bravely did missionary work for the LDS Church. Their parents supported them financially. Discuss how you, as the Davis family’s CPA, would have argued to the IRS auditor (or the court) that the amounts paid by the Davis parents were properly deductible as charitable contributions.

Based on Court Case United States v. Bestfoods 113F.3d 572 (1998)

United States v. Bestfoods

113 F.3d 572 (1998)

SOUTER, JUSTICE

The United States brought this action under §107(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) against, among others, respondent CPC International, Inc., the parent corporation of the defunct Ott Chemical Co. (Ott II), for the costs of cleaning up industrial waste generated by Ott II’s chemical plant. Section 107(a)(2) authorizes suits against, among others, “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility.” The trial focused on whether CPC, as a parent corporation, had “owned or operated” Ott II’s plant within the meaning of §107(a)(2). The District Court said that operator liability may attach to a parent corporation both indirectly, when the corporate veil can be pierced under state law, and directly, when the parent has exerted power or influence over its subsidiary by actively participating in, and exercising control over, the subsidiary’s business during a period of hazardous waste disposal. Applying that test, the court held CPC liable because CPC had selected Ott II’s board of directors and populated its executive ranks with CPC officials, and another CPC official had played a significant role in shaping Ott II’s environmental compliance policy.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although recognizing that a parent company might be held directly liable under §107(a)(2) if it actually operated its subsidiary’s facility in the stead of the subsidiary, or alongside of it as a joint venturer, that court refused to go further. Rejecting the District Court’s analysis, the Sixth Circuit explained that a parent corporation’s liability for operating a facility ostensibly operated by its subsidiary depends on whether the degree to which the parent controls the subsidiary and the extent and manner of its involvement with the facility amount to the abuse of the corporate form that will warrant piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the separate corporate entities of the parent and subsidiary. Applying Michigan veil-piercing law, the court decided that CPC was not liable for controlling Ott II’s actions, since the two corporations maintained separate personalities and CPC did not utilize the subsidiary form to perpetrate fraud or subvert justice.

Held:

1. When (but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, a parent corporation may be charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary’s actions in operating a polluting facility. It is a general principle of corporate law that a parent corporation (so-called because of control through ownership of another corporation’s stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. CERCLA does not purport to reject this bedrock principle, and the Government has indeed made no claim that a corporate parent is liable as an owner or an operator under §107(a)(2) simply because its subsidiary owns or operates a polluting facility. But there is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s behalf. CERCLA does not purport to rewrite this well-settled rule, either, and against this venerable common-law backdrop, the congressional silence is audible. Cf. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-267. CERCLA’s failure to speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands application of the rule that, to abrogate a common-law principle, a statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534.

2. A corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of its subsidiary’s facility may be held directly liable in its own right under §107(a)(2) as an operator of the facility.

(a) Derivative liability aside, CERCLA does not bar a parent corporation from direct liability for its own actions. Under the plain language of §107(a)(2), any person who operates a polluting facility is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution, and this is so even if that person is the parent corporation of the facility’s owner. Because the statute does not define the term “operate,” however, it is difficult to define actions sufficient to constitute direct parental “operation.” In the organizational sense obviously intended by CERCLA, to “operate” a facility ordinarily means to direct the workings of, manage, or conduct the affairs of the facility. To sharpen the definition for purposes of CERCLA’s concern with environmental contamination, an operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.

(b) The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the direct liability analysis of the District Court, which mistakenly focused on the relationship between parent and subsidiary, and premised liability on little more than CPC’s ownership of Ott II and its majority control over Ott II’s board of directors. Because direct liability for the parent’s operation of the facility must be kept distinct from derivative liability for the subsidiary’s operation of the facility, the analysis should instead have focused on the relationship between CPC and the facility itself, i.e., on whether CPC “operated” the facility, as evidenced by its direct participation in the facility’s activities. That error was compounded by the District Court’s erroneous assumption that actions of the joint officers and directors were necessarily attributable to CPC, rather than Ott II, contrary to time-honored common-law principles. The District Court’s focus on the relationship between parent and subsidiary (rather than parent and facility), combined with its automatic attribution of the actions of dual officers and directors to CPC, erroneously, even if unintentionally, treated CERCLA as though it displaced or fundamentally altered common-law standards of limited liability. The District Court’s analysis created what is in essence a relaxed, CERCLA-specific rule of derivative liability that would banish traditional standards and expectations from the law of CERCLA liability. Such a rule does not arise from congressional silence, and CERCLA’s silence is dispositive.

(c) Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit erred in limiting direct liability under CERCLA to a parent’s sole or joint venture operation, so as to eliminate any possible finding that CPC is liable as an operator on the facts of this case. The ordinary meaning of the word “operate” in the organizational sense is not limited to those two parental actions, but extends also to situations in which, e.g., joint officers or directors conduct the affairs of the facility on behalf of the parent, or agents of the parent with no position in the subsidiary manage or direct activities at the subsidiary’s facility. Norms of corporate behavior (undisturbed by any CERCLA provision) are crucial reference points, both for determining whether a dual officer or director has served the parent in conducting operations at the facility, and for distinguishing a parental officer’s oversight of a subsidiary from his control over the operation of the subsidiary’s facility. There is, in fact, some evidence that an agent of CPC alone engaged in activities at Ott II’s plant that were eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s facility: The District Court’s opinion speaks of such an agent who played a conspicuous part in dealing with the toxic risks emanating from the plant’s operation. The findings in this regard are enough to raise an issue of CPC’s operation of the facility, though this Court draws no ultimate conclusion, leaving the issue for the lower courts to reevaluate and resolve in the first instance.

113 F.3d 572, vacated and remanded.

What norms of corporate behavior does the court look to in determining whether an officer or a director is involved in the operation of a facility?

A summary of the topic you chose with rationale. (This may have personal significance to you or it may be a topic of particular interest that you have seen in the news.)

An explanation of the significance of the two research studies to health care delivery in the United States.

A description of the major functions provided by research and data monitoring of health care delivery in the United States.

Identification of potential environments within health care delivery appropriate to research and data monitoring.

Your assessment of the impact of the studies in your chosen articles in regards to health care delivery, incorporating and expanding on the information you provided in Part One. Were the studies intended to change or influence health care delivery? If so, how? If not, what are the implications of each study for health care delivery?

Your assessment of the role the allied health professional plays, or could play, in research and data monitoring of health care delivery in the United States

# 1 If the Yen trading at a spot price of 111 yen to USD and the 1-year forward rate is 115 Yen to 1 USD? What is premium of discount of the Yen, relative to the USD?
1.   3.48% Discount
2.   3.48% premium
3.   3.60% discount
4.   3.60% Premium

# 2 Suppose that inflation next year is 8% in japan and 4% in the United States. If the current spot rate is JPY107 = USD1, what is the expected spot rate at the end of the year?
1.   JPY102.72 = USD1
2.   JPY103.04 = USD1
3.   JPY111.12 = USD1
4.   JPY111.82 = USD1

# 3    Suppose the one-year interest rate in the United states is 7%. What would you expect the interest rate to be in the UK, if expected inflation is 4% in the United states and 8% in the UK?
1.   5.19%
2.   7.93%
3.   9.08%
4.   11.12%

The United States claims that Canada subsidizes the production of softwood lumber and that imports of lumber damage the interests of US producers.  The United States has imposed a high tariff on Canadian imports to counter the subsidy.  Canada is thinking of retaliating by refusing to export water to California.  The following table shows the payoff matrix for the simultaneous game that Canada and the US are playing

a.       What is the US’ optimal strategy? Why?

b.       What is Canada’s optimal strategy? Why?

c.       What is the outcome of the game? Explain.

d.       Is this game like a Prisoner’s Dilemma game or different in some crucial way? Explain.

e.       Which country would benefit more from a free trade agreement (where only the strategy of “no tariff” is allowed)?

A United States Treasury bond pays annual interest, has a par value of $1,000, matures in 24 years, has a coupon rate of 1.14% per annum, and has a yield to maturity (YTM) of 11.33% per annum.  The default risk premium on the bond issued by a United States company called Risky Business in the United States is 2.89% per annum. The bond issued by Risky Business pays annual coupon, has a par value of $1,000, matures in 24 years and has a coupon rate of 1.14% per annum. The current intrinsic value of that bond issued by Risky Business is $( ). (Note: answer must be accurate to nearest cent, or 2 decimal places but you may leave your answer with more than 2 decimal places.) [Hint: The default risk premium a bond is the difference between the YTM of a risky bond and the YTM of a default-free bond.]

24) In a ciriminal case, the plaintiff must prove the case by the preponderance of the evidence

True

False

25) The President of the United States

27) The President of the United States

28) Punitive damages are intended to:

29) The three branches of government in the United States are the:

30) Promissory estoppel can be a substitute for consideration.

True

False

QUESTION 6
George recently paid $ 50.00 to renew his driver's license. This payment is considered a tax.
   True
   False

QUESTION 7
Because the United States District Court knows a broader set of cases, decisions of the United States District Court may be considered to have a more authoritative weight than the United States Federal Claims Court.
   True
   False

QUESTION 8
Corporations are required to file a tax return only if their taxable income is greater than:

a-$ 0

b-$ 1,000.

c-$ 600.

d-$ 750.

e-None of those.
  
QUESTION 9
The future value can be calculated as Future Value = Present Value / (1 + r) n.
   True
   False

QUESTION 10
The conversion strategy takes advantage of the fact that tax rates vary according to different activities.
   True
   False