In 2019, Special Corporation, a calendar year C corporation, has a $75,000 charitable contribution carryover from a gift made in 2014. Special Corporation is contemplating a gift of land to a qualified charity in either 2019 or 2020. Special Corporation purchased the land as an investment five years ago for $100,000 (current year value is $250,000). Before considering any charitable deduction, Special Corporation projects taxable income of $1 million for 2019 and $1.2 million for 2020. Should Special Corporation make the gift of land to charity in 2019 or 2020? Provide detailed calculations and support for your answer.

Summarize two topics you found to be most noteworthy in this reading. Must be in own word(200words).

Buffet Essays I. Preferred Stock

When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline." Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 91/4% preferred stock of USAir. I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might be. ([Again, if] history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.) To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements in its labor contracts-and that's something most airlines have found it extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception. Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock. For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by 75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful. Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right: Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends"- to run five percentage points over the prime rate-would be accrued on any arrearages. This meant that when our 91/4% dividend was omitted for two years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 131/4% and 14%. Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996, when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9 million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge thank-you for extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment. Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly by an industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has basic cost problems that must be solved. In any event, the prices of USAir's publicly-traded securities tell us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par value of $358 million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over the years collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including $30 million received in 1997). Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid, I tried once more to unload our holdings-this time for about $335 million. You're lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're so rich, why aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you may conclude he had a point. We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc., $600 million of The Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc., and $300 million of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1. Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less. In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil. In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity- type product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor. However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made it. Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred, convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of a value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that value of a nonconvertible preferred of Salomon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption. The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may be worth more because of their conversion options. Berkshire made five private purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period and the time seems right to discuss their status. In each case we had the option of sticking with these preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from their fixedincome characteristics. The option we had to convert was a kicker. Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Peres" . . . was a modified form of common stock whose fixedincome characteristics contributed only a minor portion of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Peres automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, [our other convertible preferred stocks] were set to become common stocks only if we wished them to-a crucial difference. When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately" exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income securities they replaced. We beat this expectation-but only because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects." Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused me some well-deserved heartburn. Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake-of a kind, however, never recognized on financial statements. We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given that this would have been a huge private placement carrying important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to have Berkshire opt for common. But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which point the company-quite properly-called the issue, moving to do that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend 1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70 million. In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the company at a modest discount. Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper industry-actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing-so our choice in August was whether to sell in the market or to the company..., Our Champion capital gain was moderate-about 19% after tax from a six-year investment-but the preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see [Part V.H.].) Our First Empire preferred [was to] be called on March 31, 1996, the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding banker, and we love being associated with him. Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire. Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60-Salomon interim chairman, that is-because of an earlier purchase of a fixed-income security. Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking." Even the most charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my point. To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive. Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99, and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that we will yet find value in our right to convert.

Chinese furniture industry analysis from 2010 to 2020 export and import write less than 3000 words

So far, things have gone well with Dr. Bueller. Before you wrap up your meetings and he begins investing, you decide to spend a little time sharing information with him about using derivatives to manage risk and enhance returns in his stock portfolio. You decide the best way to illustrate this is via a call option that he can use on a stock that might have some upside potential. If the stock does not reach the potential, the option minimizes the risk. The stock is AXQ Enterprises—a high-tech firm that did well during the Internet boom but declined when the boom turned into a bust. If the company’s new portal software is adopted by a large number of consumers over the next few months, you believe the stock can go much higher. The 6-month options are priced at US$1, the strike price is US$22, and the current price for AXQ stock is US$20. Put together a report of 4–6 pages (body of report) with a table or graph included that illustrates what advice you would give Dr. Bueller on the options if the price of the stock was US$18, US$21, US$24, or US$28 at the end of 6 months. Assignment Guidelines Create a report of 4–6 pages (body of report) for Dr. Bueller that includes the following: Your table or graph that contains the stock option data and the profit/loss depending on the hypothetical stock prices of US$18, US$21, US$24, or US$28 at the end of the 6-month period. Your recommendations on whether or not to exercise the option based on the 4 hypothetical stock prices. Explain the reasoning behind your recommendations. Answer the following questions: What happens if the stock price hits US$23? What happens if the stock price hits US$23.01? What purpose could adding a technology company into a stock portfolio serve? Please be sure that your report adheres to the general format above. Your submitted assignment must include the following: A report of 4–6 pages (body of report) that includes a title page, your stock option information table or graph, your stock option recommendations, and your answers to the questions listed in the Assignment Guidelines. Be sure to include a complete explanation of the rationale supporting your recommendations.

McAdoo & Co. is an engineering firm with offices in several cities in the Carolinas. McAdoo’s fiscal year-end is December 31, and it prepares financial statements just once a year, at year-end. For bookkeeping purposes, McAdoo has adopted a policy to record payments and collections in advance into asset and liability accounts, respectively. The company’s unadjusted trial balance at December 31, 2020 is shown below. All accounts have normal-side balances.

Additional information available at year-end is as follows:

1.         In the first week of January 2021, McAdoo received bills for December 2020 utilities totaling $28,985. The company paid all of these bills in late January 2021.

2.         On June 1, 2020, McAdoo purchased a 24-month insurance policy for $306,720 and paid the full cost of the policy in advance. The policy provides coverage through May 31, 2022. Note – Contrary to the company’s normal practice, McAdoo’s bookkeeper recorded the prepayment into the Insurance Expense account. Give the adjusting entry needed when a company uses the expense approach to record a payment in advance.

3.         McAdoo operates 5 days a week, Mondays through Fridays. Employees are paid each Monday, for hours worked through the previous Friday. On Monday, December 28, 2020, the last payday in 2020, McAdoo paid its employees for hours worked during the week of December 21-25. (Note that Christmas Day is a paid holiday for all employees.) The employees then worked their regular schedule through the end of the year. McAdoo’s payroll averages $14,215 per day.

4.         McAdoo sometimes leases unused space in its buildings to other businesses. On November 1, 2020, a new tenant signed a 1-year lease and paid the first 8 months’ rent of $63,880 in advance. The lease began on that date and runs through October 31, 2021.

5.         McAdoo started the year 2020 with a Supplies account balance of $51,320. During the year, McAdoo made several purchases of supplies totaling $78,465. A physical count at year-end 2020 revealed the company had a total of $59,715 of supplies on hand.

6.         The Notes Payable balance relates to a bank loan taken in 2019 that is payable in full on September 30, 2023. The loan agreement specifies that McAdoo pay interest annually on September 30 at the rate of 5.20% per year. McAdoo’s bookkeeper made the proper entry for the first interest payment, on September 30, 2020. (Hint – Think about the entry McAdoo made on the first interest payment date.)

7.         McAdoo performed $291,670 of legal services for several clients in December 2020 that it has not yet billed, recorded or collected.

8.         McAdoo estimates that 8.55% of the 2020 year-end accounts receivable balance will not be collected.

9.         McAdoo purchased its buildings in 2011 and its equipment in 2015. McAdoo depreciates its fixed assets according to the straight-line method. For the buildings, it uses estimates of 36 years for the useful life and $240,000 for the salvage value. For the equipment, it uses estimates of 12 years for the useful life and $37,000 for the salvage value.

10.       The company’s income tax rate for the year is 25%. (Hint – The income tax rate is applied to the company’s income after all revenues and expenses have been considered except for the income tax charge.)

– Instructions –

Complete the following tasks relating to McAdoo & Co.’s accounting process at year-end 2020:

(b)        Prepare the adjusting journal entries needed at December 31, 2020.

Read the Hospital Scenario for this course and complete the following assignment:

Write a 500-750 word paper that addresses the following: APA style ( title: Leadership styles)

Evaluate the management styles and identify the positive and negatives of each manager’s characteristics.

Identify what transactional and transformational leadership theories are present.

Provide an example of how one leader mentioned in the case study could adapt the servant leadership model into practice, and how this change could have an impact on a quality improvement department within health care.

The Scenario:

Kalia recently accepted the chief executive officer (CEO) position at a steadily declining transitional care organization. After meeting with the board of trustees, she was eager to demonstrate how her vision would change the direction of the failing company. Her hope was to discover allies within the company that could help make it easier to put her plan for the company into action. However, she soon found that her formal authority as CEO had been severely undermined by the pervious CEO, whose practice had been to distribute power within the organization, but had poorly managed those to whom he gave power. During Kalia’s first week, she arranged her schedule so that she could meet with administrative staff as soon as possible. During the meeting, Kalia requested budget information for each manager. None of the administrative staff were able to obtain the information for Kalia. They told her that company financial information was considered classified and could only be accessed through Manny, the chief financial officer (CFO) – the managers were not able to monitor their own budgets. One individual volunteered that sometimes the CFO’s administrative assistant would allow people to review reports, if the CFO was out and “she liked you.” After the meeting, Kalia went to Dominic, the chief information officer (CIO), to see if a centralized shared network could be created so employees could access important and sensitive data necessary for staff to make business decisions. Dominic informed her that the system was complicated, and that he was the only one familiar with how it was set up. He also told her that he would be going on paternity leave, and no one else could be trusted with the system. Therefore, a project like that could not begin until he returned. Dominic suggested that, in the meantime, Kalia begin the request with Manny, the CFO, as he would need to approve the budget for the project because it would be costly. Kalia walked to Manny’s office. As soon as she walked in, Manny said, “I heard you don’t think that the way I handle finances is acceptable. I have 26 years of experience, plus dual master’s degrees in accounting and finance. I am surprised that a young woman starting out would consider herself an expert. Kalia was surprised by Manny’s comments, and she was equally surprised to turn and see two of her administrative staff sitting on the couch in Manny’s office. Uncertain of how to respond, Kalia turned and walked back to her office. In her office, Kalia sat down at her desk and put her face in her hands. She was now questioning everything she thought she knew about the company, being the CEO, and why she was hired.

1. Listed below you will see the concept of a “business situation”. You may define/discuss “business situation” as you wish. The possibilities are endless – just be clear in your discussion. For example, it can be in your everyday management of a business or specifically related to a strategic action like an acquisition. This question has three major parts. Please answer ALL parts of the question. If you wish to tailor any or all of your response to a specific company or industry, please feel free to do so. You may certainly incorporate material from all your MBA classes to answer this question.

1. In your opinion, (1) what are the most important accounting and finance concepts/issues/measures (you can be both specific and/or broad) relevant for addressing and understanding a business situation – offer 3, and (2) how are these concepts/issues/measures used to address and understand a business situation?

2. In your opinion, (1) what are the most important management concepts/issues/measures (you can be both specific and/or broad) relevant for addressing and understanding a business situation – offer 3, and (2) how are these concepts/issues/measures used to address and understand a business situation?

3. In your opinion, (1) what are the most important marketing concepts/issues/measures (you can be both specific and/or broad) relevant for addressing and understanding a business situation – offer 3, and (2) how are these concepts/issues/measures used to address and understand a business situation?  

In the following scenario, each of the four categories of Principles Underlying an Audit Conducted in Accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards are violated. In the box below (1) identify the four categories (the “P – R – P – R”) [2 points each], (2) provide a brief description of each category [2 points each], and (3) indicate at least one way that the actions of the auditor in the scenario violates each of the four categories of principles

Joni Thompson, the CEO of a small privately held company, contacted Darrel Folkert, CPA, about conducting an audit of the company’s records. Joni told Darrel that she needed an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) in time to submit two years of audited financial statements to a bank as part of a loan application. Darrel immediately accepted the engagement and agreed to provide an audit report within three weeks. Joni agreed to pay Darrel a fixed fee if the loan was granted.

Darrel hired two Portland State University accounting students to conduct the audit and spent a couple of hours telling them exactly what to do. Darrel told the students not to spend time reviewing internal controls because it is not a publicly traded company, but to concentrate on proving the mathematical accuracy of the ledger accounts and summarizing the data in the accounting records that support Joni’s financial statements. Given the lack of procedures performed by the two accounting students, they did not identify that Joni did not have an allowance for uncollectible accounts, even though more than 50% of the balance in the Accounts Receivable account is two or more years old. The students followed Darrel’s instructions and after two weeks gave Darrel a Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and a Statement of Cash Flows. Darrel received the three statements and immediately prepared an unqualified (clean) audit report. The report did not refer to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and the two accounting students did not check the accounting principles applied in prior periods. There was also no mention as to the responsibility of management or the degree of responsibility that Darrel was taking in the audit report.

Value Products Ltd manufactures a single product. You are the management accountant
responsible for preparing the quarterly budgets of the next quarter from July to September 2020.
Your colleague, the financial accountant, has provided you the following extracted data from
the balance sheet as at 30 June 2020:
Assets Liabilities
Accounts Receivable $250,000 Bank Overdraft $90,000
Plant and Machinery $800,000 (Cost) Dividend Payable $10,000
Long-term Loan 15% $400,000
The following transactions are expected during the next three months:
Sales Purchases Expenses
January $1,500,000 $1,000,000 $200,000
February 2,000,000 1,500,000 250,000
March 3,000,000 2,800,000 300,000
All sales are on credit and the collections have the following pattern:
During the month of sale: 80% (early payment discount of 4% is given)
In the subsequent month: 20% (no discount)
Payments for purchase are made in the month of purchase enjoying a 10% early payment
discount.
Expenses shown above include depreciation of machinery which is calculated at a rate of 12%
per annum on cost. Expenses are paid for in the month in which they are incurred.
The dividend payable will be paid in July.
Loan interest for the three months will be paid in September.
Required:
(a) Prepare a Cash Budget for each of the three months from July to September 2020.

(b) Prepare a Budgeted Income Statement for the period from July to September 2020.