Forecasting the Income Statement, Balance Sheet, and Statement of Cash Flows
Assume the following are the financial statements of Nike, Inc.

We forecast Nike's income statement using the following forecast assumptions:

Instructions: Forecast Nike's fiscal year 2012 income statement.

Assume no change for: other income and interest expense.

Round forecasts to $ millions.

Do not use negative signs with your answers in the income statement.  

Instructions: Forecast Nike's fiscal year 2012 balance sheet.

Assume no change for: short-term investments, goodwill, notes payable, common stock, capital in excess of stated value and accumulated other comprehensive income.

Round forecasts to $ millions.

We forecast Nike's balance sheet using the following forecast assumptions:

Instructions: Forecast Nike's fiscal year 2012 stastement of cash flows.

Use negative signs with your answers below, when appropriate.

It is a strategic management.

Question: Discuss the business-level and corporate-level strategies of Apple, as discussed in the articles below. Why is Apple pursuing these strategies? Be sure to discuss competitive pressures from Sony as it pursues its strategy. Compel your response with data from the articles.

Article 1:

High-end AirPods and over-ear headphones coming next year

Foxconn to build AirPods; Inventec may lose some HomePod work

Apple Inc. is about to pump up the volume on its audio-device strategy, planning higher-end AirPods, a new HomePod and studio-quality over-ear headphones for as early as next year, according to people familiar with the matter.

The Cupertino, California-based company is working on new AirPods with noise-cancellation and water resistance, the people said. Apple is trying to increase the range that AirPods can work away from an iPhone or iPad, one of the people said. You won’t be swimming in them though: The water resistance is mainly to protect against rain and perspiration, the people said.

Slated for 2019, the earbuds will likely cost more than the existing $159 pair, and that could push Apple to segment the product line like it does with iPhones, one of the people said. Apple is also working on a wireless charging case that’s compatible with the upcoming AirPower charger.

The company has also internally discussed adding biometric sensors to future AirPods, like a heart-rate monitor, to expand its health-related hardware offerings beyond the Apple Watch, another person said. The current AirPods will be refreshed later this year with a new chip and support for hands-free Siri activation, Bloomberg News reported.

There are over-ear headphones coming from Apple, too. Those will compete with pricey models from Bose Corp. and Sennheiser. They will use Apple branding and be a higher-end alternative to the company’s Beats line. Apple originally intended to introduce the headphones by the end of 2018, but has faced development challenges, and is now targeting a launch as early as next year, the people said. They asked not to be identified talking about unreleased products. An Apple spokeswoman declined to comment.

Shares of noise-cancellation component maker Cirrus Logic Inc. rose as much as 10 percent after Susquehanna analyst Christopher Rolland wrote that the company would be working with Apple on the new AirPods.

The consumer-electronics giant uses unique accessories like the AirPods to round out its hardware and software ecosystem. Accessories have become an important revenue source in recent years, helping Apple’s Other Products unit generate sales of $12.9 billion in the 2017 fiscal year. That’s cushioned a slowdown in iPhone unit growth.

Apple's Other Sales Boom

Other Products category has become an increasingly important selling point for Apple devices

Note: Other Products include AirPods, Apple TV, Apple Watch, HomePod, Beats headphones, accessories.

The upcoming audio push builds on Apple’s earlier success in the field. The iPod and iTunes digital music store helped revive the industry and began a transformation that turned the company from a computer maker into a mobile-device giant.

In 2012, Apple declared itself one of the largest shippers of audio speakers because of the earbuds that come bundled with its devices and the built-in speakers in iPhones, Macs and iPads. Two years later, Apple bought headphone maker and streaming-music company Beats for $3 billion, its largest acquisition. An in-house audio-product team is run by Gary Geaves, formerly an engineer from B&W Group Ltd., a maker of speaker systems and headphones.

Apple is shaking up its supply chain in preparation for the latest audio products, expanding a partnership with iPhone manufacturer Foxconn Technology Group and decreasing its reliance on smaller hardware maker Inventec Corp., the people said. Apple plans to ramp up AirPods production by working with Foxconn, people familiar with the arrangement said. So far, it has mostly worked with Inventec, but builds about 30 percent of the units with Luxshare Precision Industry Co. When the earbuds first came out in 2016, they were delayed, and there was limited supply after the product finally went on sale. A Foxconn press official declined to comment.

Apple’s latest music-focused device, the HomePod, was also delayed, and has seen sluggish sales so far -- although reviewers praised the sound quality. It was originally built with Inventec, but Apple has since expanded production to Foxconn. Apple is working on a new version of the HomePod for as early as next year, and it could switch production away from Inventec for the latest model, according to people familiar with the relationship. Inventec executives met with Apple executives in California in recent weeks to discuss future HomePod orders, but a final decision on working with Inventec on the new model hasn’t been made, the people said. An Inventec spokeswoman said the company "will try its best to secure new orders."

For the over-ear headphones, Apple has discussed working with Tymphany, a Primax Electronics Ltd. subsidiary that makes consumer and professional audio systems, according to a person familiar with the situation. Production hasn’t started, and the deal isn’t finalized.

Article 2 - Sony:

Pioneer of Walkman targets premium market dominated by Bose and Beats

TOKYO -- When Ichiro Takagi took over Sony Corp.'s audio business seven years ago, he found the staff took pride in being the global No. 1 in headphones, in terms of units sold. But he was appalled at how many were $10 headphones sold for minimal profit at grocery stores. "What's the point of that? Where's our brand image?" Mr. Takagi recalls telling employees. Fast forward to this fall and the international electronics show in Berlin, where Mr. Takagi was showing off the latest version of his flagship product, a $350 pair of noise-canceling wireless headphones.

The premium-price headphone market has been largely dominated by Bose, the industry pioneer popular with frequent fliers, and Beats, the fashion-savvy brand acquired by Apple Inc. for $3 billion in 2014. All share the challenge of wooing listeners who already get free earbuds with their smartphones.

Sony said in May it has 11% of the headphone market in terms of revenue, the third-largest slice. It didn't name the top two companies.

The audio business -- where Sony has been a player since the 1950s -- is a prime example of how it got back to profitability in recent years, even in a traditional hardware business that once looked like a lost cause. For the year that ended in March, sales for the audio unit rose for the first time in 20 years after having fallen some 80% from the peak.

More important for Chief Executive Kenichiro Yoshida, the home-electronics division, including audio and televisions (another former money loser), posted operating profit of nearly $800 million for the year, helping Sony achieve record overall profit. Mr. Yoshida is hoping roughly to match that record in the current fiscal year: Quarterly earnings coming Tuesday will give a progress report. The rise of Spotify Technology SA and other music services has been good for headphone makers, increasing the time consumers spend listening on the go. Streaming companies such as Spotify and France-based Deezer offer high-resolution services that have expanded the market for higher-quality headphones costing hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Recent product releases by Sony include a $280 pair of earphones; an $8,500 portable music player targeted at audiophiles goes on sale in December, with a gold-plated volume controller and a battery system designed to reduce noise.

In the first generation of portable MP3 music players, "the quality of the music sources was poor," Sony audio executive Yoshinori Matsumoto said. "We couldn't push high-end listening devices because they would highlight the coarseness." Now, better technology has "made high-quality music more accessible both to customers and creators," he said.

Audio has paralleled Sony's highs and lows through its 72-year history. The Walkman in 1979 set off a revolution in portable electronic devices, with Sony in the lead. But in the 2000s, Sony let Apple and the iPod seize the dominant position. By 2011, the Tokyo company was nearly giving up on its old hardware products. "The attitude of management at that time was like, 'If you're so-so, that's fine,' " Mr. Takagi, the audio-unit chief, said. That changed under then Chief Executive Kazuo Hirai, who took over in 2012, and Mr. Yoshida, who was chief financial officer under Mr. Hirai and became CEO this year. They pushed the audio team to drop cheap products and focus on a few high-end models.Mr. Takagi says the new management scrapped an organizational chart that had separate groups of engineers focusing on subcategories like car audio. "I told them to look around the whole industry to come up with products that consumers are willing to pay extra for," he said.

Sony says the $350 headphones can detect the owner's facial shape, hairstyle and presence of glasses, as well as pressure changes in an airplane, all to optimize the noise-canceling feature. "Our latest model is distinctly the best in terms of noise-canceling technology," says Mr. Takagi, who is in the habit of visiting electronics stores to eavesdrop on what customers are saying to salespeople. "It's obvious if you ask your ears."

Another Sony rival, especially for younger customers, is Beats. Mr. Matsumoto says the competition has led Sony to stress fashion as well as sound quality. "In China, headphones have become part of the outfit for young people, and they have to have a style that people want to wear all the time, even when they are not listening," he said.

Mr. Takagi said there is more innovation to come, such as headsets that stream music from the internet on their own without having to be hooked up to a smartphone. "Audio will remain a profitable business so long as we keep listening to music," Mr. Takagi said. "If we remain as a strong and respected player in the industry, then the whole company will be too because audio is the origin of Sony."

What kind of challenges did American housewives face? Why do you agree/disagree with her arguments?

Women Are Household Slaves, 1949

HELP WANTED: DOMESTIC: FEMALE. All cooking, cleaning, laundering, sewing, meal planning, shopping, weekday chauffeuring, social secretarial service, and complete care of three children. Salary at employer’s option. Time off if possible.

No one in her right senses would apply for such a job. No one in his right senses, even a desperate widower, would place such an advertisement. Yet it correctly describes the average wife and mother’s situation, in which most women remain for love, but many because they have no way out.

A nauseating amount of bilge is constantly being spilled all over the public press about the easy, pampered existence of the American woman. Actually, the run of the mill, not gainfully employed female who is blessed with a husband and from two to four children leads a kind of life that theoretically became passé with the Emancipation Proclamation. Its confinement makes her baby’s play pen seem like the great open spaces. Its hours — at least fourteen a day, seven days a week — make the well known sunup to sundown toil of sharecroppers appear, in comparison, like a union standard. Beside the repetitious, heterogeneous mass of chores endlessly bedeviling the housewife, an executive’s memorandum of unfinished business is a virgin sheet.

Housewifery is a complex of housekeeping, household management, housework and childcare. Some of its elements, such as budgeting, dietetics, and above all, the proper upbringing of children, involve the higher brain centers; indeed, home economics has quite as respectable an academic status as engineering, and its own laboratories, dissertations and hierarchy of degrees. Other of its facets, and those the most persistent and time-consuming, can be capably handled by an eight-year-old child. The role of the housewife is, therefore, analogous to that of the president of a corporation who would not only determine policies and make over-all plans but also spend the major part of his time and energy in such activities as sweeping the plant and oiling machines.

Industry, of course, is too thrifty of the capacities of its personnel to waste them in such fashion. Likewise, organized labor and government afford workers certain standardized legal or customary protections. But in terms of enlightened labor practice, the housewife stands out blackly as the Forgotten Worker.

She is covered by no minimum wage law; indeed, she gets no wages at all. Like the bondservant of another day, or the slave, she receives maintenance; but anything beyond that, whether in the form of a regular “allowance” or sporadic largesse, is ruggedly individualistic….

No state or county health and sanitation inspectors invade the privacy of the home, as they do that of the factory; hence kitchens and domestic dwellings may be ill-ventilated, unsanitary and hazardous without penalty. That many more accidents occur in homes than in industry is no coincidence. Furthermore, when a disability is incurred, such as a bone broken in a fall off a ladder or legs scalded by the overturning of a kettle of boiling water, no beneficent legislation provides for the housewife’s compensation.

Rest periods are irregular, about ten to fifteen minutes each, a few times during the long day; night work is frequent and unpredictably occasioned by a wide variety of factors such as the mending basket, the gang gathering for a party, a sick child, or even more pressing, a sick husband. The right to a vacation, thoroughly accepted in business and industry, is non-existent in the domestic sphere. When families go to beach bungalows or shacks in the woods Mom continues on almost the same old treadmill; there are still little garments to be buttoned and unbuttoned, three meals a day to prepare, beds to be made and dishes to be washed. Even on jolly whole-family motor trips with the blessings of life in tourist camps or hotels, she still has the job considered full time by paid nurses and governesses.

Though progressive employers make some sort of provision for advancement, the housewife’s opportunities for advancement are nil; the nature and scope of her job, the routines of keeping a family fed, clothed and housed remain always the same. If the male upon whom her scale of living depends prospers, about all to which she can look forward is a larger house — and more work. Once, under such circumstances, there would have been less, thanks to servants. Currently, however, the jewel of a general houseworker is virtually extinct and even the specialists who smooth life for the wealthy are rarities.

Industry has a kind of tenderness toward its women workers that is totally lacking towards women workers in the home. Let a plant employee be known to be pregnant, and management and foremen, who want to experience no guilt feelings toward unborn innocents, hasten to prevent her doing any kind of work that might be a strain upon her. In the home, however, now as for centuries, a “normal” amount of housework is considered “healthy” — not to mention, since no man wants to do it, unavoidable. There may be a few proscriptions against undue stretching and heavy lifting, but otherwise, pregnant or not, the housewife carries on, turning mattresses, lugging the vacuum cleaner up and down stairs, carrying winter overcoats to the attic in summer and down from it in the fall, scrubbing kitchen and bathroom floors, washing woodwork if that is indicated by the season, and on her feet most of the time performing other such little chores beside which sitting at an assembly line or punching a typewriter are positively restful.

Despite all this, a good many arguments about the joys of housewifery have been advanced, largely by those who have never had to work at it. One much stressed point is that satisfaction every good woman feels in creating a home for her dear ones. Well, probably every good woman does feel it, perhaps because she has had it so drummed into her that if she does not, she is not a good woman; but that satisfaction has very little to do with housewifery and housework. It is derived from intangibles, such as the desirable wife-husband and mother-child relationships she manages to effect, the permeating general home atmosphere of joviality or hospitality or serenity or culture to which she is the key, or the warmth and security she gives to the home by way of her personality, not her broom, stove or dishpan. For a woman to get a rewarding sense of total creation by way of the multiple, monotonous chores that are her daily lot would be as irrational as for an assembly line worker to rejoice that he had created an automobile because he tightens a bolt. It is difficult to see how clearing up after meals three times a day and making out marketing lists (three lemons, two packages of soap powder, a can of soup), getting at the fuzz in the radiators with the hard rubber appliance of the vacuum cleaner, emptying wastebaskets and washing bathroom floors day after day, week after week, year after year, add up to a sum total of anything except minutiae that laid end to end reach nowhere.

According to another line of reasoning, the housewife has the advantage of being “her own boss” and unlike the gainfully employed worker can arrange her own schedules. This is pure balderdash…. If there is anything more inexorable than children’s needs, from an infant’s yowls of hunger and Junior’s shrieks that he has just fallen down the stairs to the subtler need of an adolescent for a good listener during one of his or her frequent emotional crises, it is only the pressure of Dad’s demand for supper as soon as he gets home…. What is more, not her own preferences as to hours, but those set by her husband’s office or plant, by the schools, by pediatricians and dentists, and the children’s homework establish when the housewife rises, when she goes forth, and when she cannot get to bed.

Something else makes a mockery of self-determined routines; interruptions from the outside world. Unprotected by butler or doorman, the housewife is at the mercy of peddlers, plain or fancy Fuller brush; odd-job seekers; gas and electric company men who come to read meters; the Salvation Army in quest of newspapers; school children hawking seeds or tickets or chances; and repair men suggesting that the roof is in a hazardous condition or household machinery needs overhauling. Unblessed with a secretary, she answers telephone calls from insurance and real estate agents who “didn’t want to bother your husband at his office.” … All such invasions have a common denominator: the assumption that the housewife’s time, like that of all slave labor, has no value.

In addition to what housewifery has in common with slavery, there are factors making it even less enviable as a way of life. The jolly gatherings of darkies with their banjos in the Good Old Days Befoh de Wah may be as mythical as the joys of housewifery, but at any rate we can be sure that slaves were not deprived of social intercourse throughout their hours of toil; field hands worked in gangs, house servants in teams. The housewife, however, carries through each complex operation of cooking, cleaning, tidying and laundering solo; almost uniquely among workers since the Industrial Revolution, she does not benefit by division of labor. Lunch time, ordinarily a pleasant break in the working day, for her brings no pleasant sociability with the girls in the cafeteria, the hired men in the shade of the haystack, or even the rest of the household staff in the servants’ dining room. From the time her husband departs for work until he returns, except for an occasional chat across the back fence or a trek to market with some other woman as childbound, housebound, and limited in horizons as herself, she lacks adult company; and even to the most passionately maternal, unbroken hours of childish prattle are no substitute for the conversation of one’s peers, whether that be on a high philosophical plane or on the lower level of neighborhood gossip. The Woman’s Club, happy hunting ground of matrons in their forties, is perhaps a reaction against this enforced solitude during earlier married life.

Something else enjoyed by slaves, but not by housewives, was work in some measure appropriate to their qualifications. The more intelligent were selected as house servants; the huskier as field hands. Such crude vocational placement has been highly refined in industry, with its battery of intelligence and aptitude tests, personnel directors and employment counselors. Nothing of the kind is even attempted for unpaid domestic workers. When a man marries and has children, it is assumed that he will do the best work along lines in which he has been trained or is at least interested. When a woman marries and has children, it is assumed that she will take to housewifery. But whether she takes to it or not, she does it.

Such regimentation, for professional or potentially professional women, is costly both for the individual and society. For the individual, it brings about conflicts and frustrations. The practice of housewifery gives the lie to the theory of almost every objective of higher education. The educated individual should

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

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Required Questions

Question 01: You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

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Question 02: Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

4 Questions – Answer all Total Marks: 25

1.   Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

2. Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

.

Required Questions

Question 01: You are asked to develop a Mission statement and four Marketing objectives for Porsche for the next ten years (2021- 2025) . Draft an ideal mission statement and outline your four marketing objectives (5 marks

.

Question 02: Identify , explain and justify the main consumer behaviour characteristics that influences the Porche buyers.

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

Required Questions –

Question 01: Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study (5 marks)

Question 02: Marketing had evolved through five stages, out of this five which concept or concepts is Porsche following , justify your answer. Do you agree with this why or why not (5 marks)

COMPANY Case: Porsche: Guarding the Old While Bringing in the New

Porsche (pronounced Porsh-uh) is a unique company. It has always been a niche brand that makes cars for a small and distinctive segment of automobile buyers. In 2009, Porsche sold only 27,717 cars in the five models it sells in the United States. Honda sold about 10 times that many Accords alone. But Porsche owners are as rare as their vehicles. For that reason, top managers at Porsche spend a great deal of time thinking about customers. They want to know who their customers are, what they think, and how they feel. They want to know why they buy a Porsche rather then a Jaguar, a Ferrari, or a big Mercedes coupe. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don’t know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche’s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

Since its early days, Porsche has appealed to a very narrow segment of financially successful people. These are achievers who see themselves as entrepreneurial, even if they work for a corporation. They set very high goals for themselves and then work doggedly to meet them. And they expect no less from the clothes they wear, the restaurants they go to, or the cars they drive. These individuals see themselves not as a part of the regular world but as exceptions to it. They buy Porsches because the car mirrors their self-image; it stands for the things owners like to see in themselves and their lives.

Most of us buy what Porsche executives call utility vehicles. That is, we buy cars primarily to go to work, transport children, and run errands. Because we use our cars to accomplish these daily tasks, we base buying decisions on features such as price, size, fuel economy, and other practical considerations. But Porsche is more than a utility car. Its owners see it as a car to be enjoyed, not just used. Most Porsche buyers are not moved by information but by feelings. A Porsche is like a piece of clothing—something the owner “wears” and is seen in. They develop a personal relationship with their cars, one that has more to do with the way the car sounds, vibrates, and feels, rather than the how many cup holders it has or how much cargo it can hold in the trunk. They admire their Porsche because it is a competent performance machine without being flashy or phony.

People buy Porsches because they enjoy driving. If all they needed was something to get them from point A to point B, they could find something much less expensive. And while many Porsche owners are car enthusiasts, some of them are not. One successful businesswoman and owner of a high-end Porsche said, “When I drive this car to the high school to pick up my daughter, I end up with five youngsters in the car. If I drive any other car, I can’t even find her; she doesn’t want to come home.”

For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand’s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. But as the years rolled on, Porsche management became concerned with a significant issue: Were there enough Porsche buyers to keep the company afloat? Granted, the company never had illusions of churning out the numbers of a Chevrolet or a Toyota. But to fund innovation, even a niche manufacturer has to grow a little. And Porsche began to worry that the quirky nature of the people who buy Porsches might just run out on them.

This led Porsche to extend its brand outside the box. In the early 1970s, Porsche introduced the 914, a square-ish, mid-engine, two-seater that was much cheaper than the 911. This meant that a different class of people could afford a Porsche. It was no surprise that the 914 became Porsche’s top selling model. By the late 1970s, Porsche replaced the 914 with a hatchback coupe that had something no other regular Porsche model had ever had: an engine in the front. At less than $20,000, more than $10,000 less than the 911, the 924 and later 944 models were once again Porsche’s pitch to affordability. At one point, Porsche increased its sales goal by nearly 50 percent to 60,000 cars a year.

Although these cars were in many respects sales successes, the Porsche faithful cried foul. They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as “real” Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn’t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche’s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche’s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.

But Porsche wasn’t going down without a fight. It quickly recognized the error of its ways and halted production of the entry-level models. It rebuilt its damaged image by revamping its higher-end model lines with more race-bred technology. In an effort to regain rapport with customers, Porsche once again targeted the high end of the market in both price and performance. It set modest sales goals and decided that moderate growth with higher margins would be more profitable in the long term. Thus, the company set out to make one less Porsche than the public demanded. According to one executive, “We’re not looking for volume; we’re searching for exclusivity.”

Porsche’s efforts had the desired effect. By the late 1990s, the brand was once again favored by the same type of achiever who had so deeply loved the car for decades. The cars were once again exclusive. And the company was once again profitable. But by the early 2000s, Porsche management was again asking itself a familiar question: To have a sustainable future, could Porsche rely on only the Porsche faithful? According to then CEO Wendelin Wiedeking, “For Porsche to remain independent, it can’t be dependent on the most fickle segment in the market. We don’t want to become just a marketing department of some giant. We have to make sure we’re profitable enough to pay for future development ourselves.”

So in 2002, Porsche did the unthinkable. It became one of the last car companies to jump into the insatiable sport utility vehicle (SUV) market. At roughly 5,000 pounds, the new Porsche Cayenne was heavier than anything that Porsche had ever made, with the exception of some prototype tanks it made during WWII. Once again, the new model featured an engine up front. And it was the first Porsche to ever be equipped with seatbelts for five. As news spread about the car’s development, howls could be heard from Porsche’s customer base.

But this time, Porsche did not seem too concerned that the loyalists would be put off. Could it be that the company had already forgotten what happened the last time it deviated from the mold? After driving one of the first Cayenne’s off the assembly line, one journalist stated, “A day at the wheel of the 444 horsepower Cayenne Turbo leaves two overwhelming impressions. First, the Cayenne doesn’t behave or feel like an SUV, and second, it drives like a Porsche.” This was no entry-level car. Porsche had created a two-and-a-half ton beast that could accelerate to 60 miles per hour in just over five seconds, corner like it was on rails, and hit 165 miles per hour, all while coddling five adults in sumptuous leather seats with almost no wind noise from the outside world. On top of that, it could keep up with a Land Rover when the pavement ended. Indeed, Porsche had created the Porsche of SUVs.

Last year, Porsche upped the ante one more time. It unveiled another large vehicle. But this time, it was a low-slung, five-door luxury sedan. The Porsche faithful and the automotive press again gasped in disbelief. But by the time the Panamera hit the pavement, Porsche had proven once again that Porsche customers could have their cake and eat it to. The Panamera is almost as big as the Cayenne but can move four adults down the road at speeds of up to 188 miles per hour and accelerate from a standstill to 60 miles per hour in four seconds flat.

Although some Porsche traditionalists would never be caught dead driving a front engine Porsche that has more than two doors, Porsche insists that two trends will sustain these new models. First, a category of Porsche buyers has moved into life stages that have them facing inescapable needs; they need to haul more people and stuff. This not only applies to certain regular Porsche buyers, but Porsche is again seeing buyers enter its dealerships that otherwise wouldn’t have. Only this time, the price points of the new vehicles are drawing only the well heeled, allowing Porsche to maintain its exclusivity. These buyers also seem to fit the achiever profile of regular Porsche buyers.

The second trend is the growth of emerging economies. Whereas the United States has long been the world’s biggest consumer of Porsches, the company expects China to become its biggest customer before too long. Twenty years ago, the United States accounted for about 50 percent of Porsche’s worldwide sales. Now, it accounts for only about 26 percent. In China, many people who can afford to buy a car as expensive as a Porsche also hire a chauffeur. The Cayenne and the Panamera are perfect for those who want to be driven around in style but who may also want to make a quick getaway if necessary.

The most recent economic downturn has brought down the sales of just about every maker of premium automobiles. When times are tough, buying a car like a Porsche is the ultimate deferrable purchase. But as this downturn turns back up, Porsche is better poised than it has ever been to meet the needs of its customer base. It is also in better shape than ever to maintain its brand image with the Porsche faithful and with others as well. Sure, understanding Porsche buyers is still a difficult task. But a former CEO of Porsche summed it up this way: “If you really want to understand our customers, you have to understand the phrase, ‘If I were going to be a car, I’d be a Porsche.’

Required Questions –

Question 01: Critically analyze the relevant Porters generic strategies and the growth strategies Porsche is pursuing , justify your answer by referring to the case study

Please study the article below and answer to the following questions: 1. As an operation manager for a service company (Amazon, FedEx, UPS, pizza shop, pharmaceutical services, resident manager, coffee shops and bank tellers) what safety plan do you need to implement to minimize the risk for the delivery workers during the pandemic corona virus and also for “Safety stock versus MRP” 2. Do you think the employees in these businesses should continue to work during the “shelter in place” and restrictions now in March-April 2020 due to corona virus impact?

Workers push for more safety measures

Grocery delivery startup Instacart's delivery workers were set to begin a work stoppage Monday to press safety demands, as a walkout was planned by employees at an Amazon warehouse said to be the site of coronavirus infections. - Agence France-Presse

Under normal circumstances, delivering pizza, filling prescriptions or making bubble tea might not seem heroic. But when workers across the country are being told to stay at home, service workers and pharmacists are putting themselves at risk just by doing their jobs. - The New York Times

"This sounds dramatic, but I think people are really scared for their lives," said Sarah Clarke, an organizer with the group behind the Instacart strike.

They Are Still Working During the Coronavirus Outbreak

On March 20, in an effort to control the growing number of coronavirus cases in New York — New York City in particular — Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo issued an executive order requiring all nonessential businesses to keep their workers at home. Restaurants, grocery stores, pharmacies, convenience stores and hardware stores are all deemed essential, and all are allowed to remain open.

Damon Winter walked one block in Manhattan — on 72nd Street between Broadway and Columbus Avenue — to conduct an informal photographic census of the businesses still open and the people who were working in the hours before Governor Cuomo’s order went into effect.

Under normal circumstances, delivering pizza, filling prescriptions or making bubble tea might not seem heroic. But when workers across the country are being told to stay at home, service workers and pharmacists are putting themselves at risk just by doing their jobs. Simple actions like commuting to work or opening a door could expose them to the coronavirus.

In the past few weeks, New York City, a massive city by any measure, has shrunk. The block is one’s village. These are the people who make it tick.

Emdadul Chowdhury has worked at Gray’s Papaya, a city institution selling hot dogs and tropical drinks, since 2008, preparing food or tending the register. Only four people are working there now (compared with seven before the executive order), and it has gone from being a 24-hour operation to being open just six hours a day.

“Compared to last week, less and less people are coming into the store,” Mr. Chowdhury said. His main fear is of contracting the coronavirus on his commute from the Bronx, on a mostly empty D train. He wears gloves and a mask and washes his hands.

Chow Mok owns Zen Medica, a nutritional supplement store. “Every time people come in, we’re trying to tell them to stay calm, to relax. Stress is going to compromise the immune system,” she said.

“Protecting ourselves is helping to manage and support our own body’s defense, which is the immune system,” Ms. Mok added. “I get nervous too but having more freak-out attacks is not going to help anybody.”

She has a shipment of organic hand sanitizers, medicinal mushrooms and immune-support nutrients coming in. With fewer people walking through the door, most of her business has transitioned to shipments.

Donna Schofield owns Stationery and Toy, which sells office and school supplies, party supplies, board games and, lately, a lot of toilet paper, hand sanitizer and Clorox wipes.

“It’s kind of hard to stay afloat,” Ms. Schofield said. “I might be able to manage it. I’m just going day by day right now.”

“We leave the front door open so that nobody has to touch the handle,” she added. “We’re just going with the flow. I survived Sandy. I can probably survive this, too.”

Andrew Greaves has delivered packages for FedEx for five years. His route extends on 72nd Street from Riverside Drive to Central Park West. “It’s like Christmas all over again,” he said. “The more people are staying home, the more they order.”

Although the volume of packages has gone up during the pandemic, some aspects of his job are easier. “The more deserted the streets are, the easier it is to deliver a package in Manhattan,” Mr. Greaves said. Another good thing is that almost everyone is at home to accept a package.

“The only thing that is weird and different is the part where someone would have to sign for a package,” he said. People are hesitant to touch the scanner. Instead, FedEx is allowing him to write “C-19” in place of a customer’s signature.

“I’m thankful to still be working, that’s for sure,” Mr. Greaves said.

Sherif Eltahawy is a pharmacist and the owner of two pharmacies on 72nd Street: Joseph Pharmacy and Wellness Pharmacy. In addition to shortening his stores’ hours, he has asked all his workers to use masks and gloves and allows no more than five customers into each store at once.

“A lot of people are more panicked than is necessary,” he said. “It is understandable, but a lot of people are afraid that there’s going to be a shortage of their medications.”

Acetaminophen, hand sanitizer and cough medications are in short supply. “We’re trying to order from different vendors, different suppliers, to do the best we can to stock,” he said, “but it’s very limited.”

Althea Gordon has worked for nine years as a teller at Citibank. “I’m holding on to what’s going on,” she said. “It’s hard. It’s stressful. I’m taking precautions.” At work, she says, she is using a lot of hand sanitizer. “We wash our hands often and we use Lysol inside and outside.”

Citibank has shortened her branch’s hours, but it is still open six days a week. “People are nice when they come in,” Ms. Gordon said. “They tell us that they appreciate us.”

“I love to help people and I love to work with people,” she added. “That’s why I get up every day.”

Not surprisingly, Babacar Fall, the manager of Gartner’s Hardware, has seen an uptick in sales of face masks, gloves, cleaning supplies, hand sanitizers and thermometer batteries.

“The business never goes down, honestly. I have very good customers,” he said. “We’re doing better, compared to neighbors and everybody.” He came to New York from Senegal in 1984.

As the resident manager of an apartment building on the block, Blerim Havolli maintains and cleans the building. He has been doing this job for eight years. With the coronavirus, “I have to clean more than any other time,” he said.

He worries about people who enter the building to deliver food or packages. “You don’t know if one of them is infected or not,” he said.

“I’m trying to be very careful because I’m the guy who has responsibility of the building at this time,” Mr. Havolli said. “If I get sick, the building isn’t going to fall down, but nobody can clean up.”

Mr. Havolli has lived in New York City since 1999. Now a U.S. citizen, he immigrated from Kosovo as a refugee.

Juan Gutierrez has worked for three years as a chef at Friedmans. Normally he works 40 hours a week, but that has been reduced to 15 or 20.

“The business has gone down, I imagine, by 85 percent,” he said. “It’s difficult because the store used to have a lot of employees, and many of them are without work and they have families and kids.”

Before the executive order, there would be four or five others with him in the kitchen, but for now, he cooks alone, mostly for delivery. One of his colleagues started a GoFundMe page for his co-workers who are without work.

Rachel Pellerin moved from Florida a month and a half ago to start a church for deaf people with her husband. She works at Coco Fresh Tea & Juice to help finance that dream.

“We stayed open and so far we have been getting a lot of delivery orders,” she said. “I’m grateful to still be able to get paid, but at the same time it can be a little nerve-racking because I know the danger of being outside.”

She and her co-workers disinfect the shop at least once an hour.

Tahmid Khan worked at Dunkin’ Donuts for two years before quitting on Monday. He is a student in computer science at City College.

“I think that it’s irresponsible to keep the store open given the circumstance right now,” he said. “It’s not safe for me or for the customers. It was a $15-an-hour job. I don’t care if I lose it.” He moved to New York three years ago from Bangladesh.

“I think the Dunkin’ Donuts franchise should be more responsible about their operations,” he said. “I just don’t think that they don’t care about the workers or the customers at all. They just care about the money.”

Jayang Tenzin works at Pho Shop, a Vietnamese restaurant. “I’m just a server doing my work from my heart,” he said. “Times like this you have to be there for each other.” Mr. Tenzin moved to New York from Tibet eight years ago. “Got to chase the American dream,” he said.

He commutes an hour on the No. 2 train from Brooklyn. “It’s very quiet. It’s like a ghost town,” he said. “I come out of work, I don’t see anybody.”

Issouf Mande has delivered for Domino’s on an e-bike for two years. “I am scared of the virus because I’m going everywhere, opening every kind of door, going to any kind of house, meeting any kind of people,” he said.

“Most deliveries I deal with the doorman or just call the person and leave it in front of the door.”

Mr. Mande moved to New Jersey three years ago from Burkina Faso. He doesn’t understand why Domino’s is still open. “I think it’s not safe,” he said. “We meet so many people in deliveries. I don’t see enough protection.”

Benjamin Loucks has been homeless for two years. “There is no money to be made,” he said. “No traffic.”