In the United States, males between the ages of 40 and 49 eat on average 105.1 g of fat every day with a standard deviation of 4.5 g ("What we eat," 2012). Assume that the amount of fat a person eats is normally distributed. (a) State the random variable. (b) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats more than 110 g of fat every day. (c) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats less than 93 g of fat every day. (d) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats between 65 g and 100 g of fat every day. (e) If you found a man age 40-49 in the U.S. who says he eats less than 65 g of fat every day, would you believe him? Why or why not? (f) What daily fat level do 95% of all men age 40-49 in the U.S. eat less than?

In the United States, males between the ages of 40 and 49 eat on average 105.1 g of fat every day with a standard deviation of 4.5 g ("What we eat," 2012). Assume that the amount of fat a person eats is normally distributed. (a) State the random variable. (b) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats more than 110 g of fat every day. (c) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats less than 93 g of fat every day. (d) Find the probability that a man age 40-49 in the U.S. eats between 65 g and 100 g of fat every day. (e) If you found a man age 40-49 in the U.S. who says he eats less than 65 g of fat every day, would you believe him? Why or why not? (f) What daily fat level do 95% of all men age 40-49 in the U.S. eat less than?

please read and answer this questions please and thanks.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considered alternative sites before redesignating a proposed site for middle-income housing as one for low-income housing it should have given determinative weight to environmental factors such as crowding low-income housing into a concentrated area and should not have considered the delay that would occur in developing an alternative site as an overriding factor. Once an agency has made a decision subject to the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. Here, there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing, and the Act requires no more.

Certiorari granted; 590 F.2d 39, reversed.

PER CURIAM.

The protracted nature of this litigation is perhaps best illustrated by the identity of the original federal defendant, "George Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development." At the center of this dispute is the site of a proposed low-income housing project to be constructed on Manhattan's Upper West Side. In 1962, the New York City Planning Commission (Commission), acting in conjunction with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), began formulating a

Page 444 U. S. 224

plan for the renewal of 20 square blocks known as the "West Side Urban Renewal Area" (WSURA) through a joint effort on the part of private parties and various government agencies. As originally written, the plan called for a mix of 70% middle-income housing and 30% low-income housing and designated the site at issue here as the location of one of the middle-income projects. In 1969, after substantial progress toward completion of the plan, local agencies in New York determined that the number of low-income units proposed for WSURA would be insufficient to satisfy an increased need for such units. In response to this shortage, the Commission amended the plan to designate the site as the future location of a high-rise building containing 160 units of low-income housing. HUD approved this amendment in December, 1972.

Meanwhile, in October, 1971, the Trinity Episcopal School Corp. (Trinity), which had participated in the plan by building a combination school and middle-income housing development at a nearby location, sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the Commission and HUD from constructing low-income housing on the site. The present respondents, Roland N. Karlen, Alvin C. Hudgins, and the Committee of Neighbors To Insure a Normal Urban Environment (CONTINUE), intervened as plaintiffs, while petitioner Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc., intervened as a defendant.

The District Court entered judgment in favor of petitioners.  See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F.Supp. 1044 (1974). It concluded, inter alia, that petitioners had not violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.

On respondents' appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed all but the District Court's treatment of the NEPA claim.  See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88

Page 444 U. S. 225

(1975). While the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that HUD was not required to prepare a full-scale environmental impact statement under § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), it held hat HUD had not complied with § 102(2)(E), [Footnote 1] which requires an agency to

"study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources."

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).  See 523 F.2d at 995. According to the Court of Appeals, any consideration by HUD of alternatives to placing low-income housing on the site "was either highly limited or nonexistent."  Id. at 94. Citing the "background of urban environmental factors" behind HUD's decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring HUD to prepare a "statement of possible alternatives, the consequences thereof and the facts and reasons for and against. . . ."  Ibid. The statement was not to reflect "HUD's concept or the Housing Authority's views as to how these agencies would choose to resolve the city's low income group housing situation," but rather was to explain

"how, within the framework of the Plan, its objective of economic integration can best be achieved with a minimum of adverse environmental impact."

Ibid. The Court of Appeals believed that, given such an assessment of alternatives, "the agencies with the cooperation of the interested parties should be able to arrive at an equitable solution."  Id. at 95.

On remand, HUD prepared a lengthy report entitled Special Environmental Clearance (1977). After marshaling the data, the report asserted that,

"while the choice of Site 30 for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised

Page 444 U. S. 226

valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved, the problems associated with the impact on social fabric and community structures are not considered so serious as to require that this component be rated as unacceptable."

Special Environmental Clearance Report 42. The last portion of the report incorporated a study wherein the Commission evaluated nine alternative locations for the project, and found none of them acceptable. While HUD's report conceded that this study may not have considered all possible alternatives, it credited the Commission's conclusion that any relocation of the units would entail an unacceptable delay of two years or more. According to HUD,

"[m]easured against the environmental costs associated with the minimum two-year delay, the benefits seem insufficient to justify a mandated substitution of sites."

Id. at 54.

After soliciting the parties' comments on HUD's report, the District Court again entered judgment in favor of petitioners.  See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F.Supp. 204 (1978). The court was "impressed with HUD's analysis as being thorough and exhaustive," id. at 209-210, and found that "HUD's consideration of the alternatives was neither arbitrary nor capricious"; on the contrary, "[i]t was done in good faith and in full accordance with the law."  Id. at 220.

On appal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded again.  Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (1978). The appellate court focused upon that part of HUD's report where the agency considered and rejected alternative sites, and in particular upon HUD's reliance on the delay such a relocation would entail. The Court of Appeals purported to recognize that its role in reviewing HUD's decision was defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which provides that agency actions should be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . ." Additionally,

Page 444 U. S. 227

however, the Court of Appeals looked to "[t]he provisions of NEPA" for "the substantive standards necessary to review the merits of agency decisions. . . ." 590 F.2d at 43. The Court of Appeals conceded that HUD had "given consideration' to alternatives" to redesignating the site.  Id. at 44. Nevertheless, the court believed that "`consideration' is not an end in itself."  Ibid. Concentrating on HUD's finding that development of an alternative location would entail an unacceptable delay, the appellate court held that such delay could not be "an overriding factor" in HUD's decision to proceed with the development.  Ibid. According to the court, when HUD considers such projects, "environmental factors, such as crowding low-income housing into a concentrated area, should be given determinative weight."  Ibid. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case to the District Court, instructing HUD to attack the shortage of low-income housing in a manner that would avoid the "concentration" of such housing on Site 30.  Id. at 45. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519,  435 U. S. 558 (1978), we stated that NEPA, while establishing "significant substantive goals for the Nation," imposes upon agencies duties that are "essentially procedural." As we stressed in that case, NEPA was designed "to insure a fully informed and well considered decision," but not necessarily "a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency." Ibid.  Vermont Yankee cuts sharply against the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an agency, in selecting a course of action, must elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. On the contrary, once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot " 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to

Page 444 U. S. 228

be taken.'"  Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390,  427 U. S. 410, n. 21 (1976).  See also FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U. S. 326 (1976). [Footnote 2]

In the present litigation, there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more. The petitions for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

* Together with No. 79-181, City of New York v. Karlen et al.; and No. 79-184, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development v. Karlen et al., also on petitions for certiorari to the same court.

[Footnote 1]

At the time of the Court of Appeals' decision, this section was numbered 102(2)(D) and was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970 ed.). Congress redesignated it two weeks later.  See Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub.L. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424.

[Footnote 2]

If we could agree with the dissent that the Court of Appeals held that HUD had acted "arbitrarily" in redesignating the site for low-income housing, we might also agree that plenary review is warranted. But the District Court expressly concluded that HUD had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously, and our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals satisfies us that it did not overturn that finding. Instead, the appellate court required HUD to elevate environmental concerns over other, admittedly legitimate, considerations. Neither NEPA nor the APA provides any support for such a reordering of priorities by a reviewing court.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

The issue raised by these cases is far more difficult than the per curiam opinion suggests. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had acted arbitrarily in concluding that prevention of a delay in the construction process justified the selection of a housing site which could produce adverse social environmental effects, including racial and economic concentration. Today the majority responds that,

"once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences,"

and that, in this litigation,

"there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more."

The majority finds support for this conclusion in the closing paragraph

Page 444 U. S. 229

of our decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519,  435 U. S. 558 (1978).

Vermont Yankee does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority advances today. The relevant passage in that opinion was meant to be only a "further observation of some relevance to this case," id. at  435 U. S. 557. That "observation" was a response to this Court's perception that the Court of Appeals in that case was attempting, "under the guise of judicial review of agency action," to assert its own policy judgment as to the desirability of developing nuclear energy as an energy source for this Nation, a judgment which is properly left to Congress.  Id. at  435 U. S. 558. The Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the agency because of "a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below," ibid. It was in this context that the Court remarked that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural."  Ibid. (emphasis supplied). Accordingly,

"[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute,"

ibid. (emphasis supplied). Thus, Vermont Yankee does not stand for the proposition that a court reviewing agency action under NEPA is limited solely to the factual issue of whether the agency "considered" environmental consequences. The agency's decision must still be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and the reviewing court must still insure that the agency "has taken a hard look' at environmental consequences," Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390,  427 U. S. 410, n. 21 (1976).

In the present case, the Court of Appeals did not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions," ibid., for HUD, in its

Page 444 U. S. 230

Special Environmental Clearance Report, acknowledged the adverse environmental consequences of its proposed action:

"the choice of Site 30 for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved."

These valid questions arise from the fact that 68% of all public housing units would be sited on only one cross-town axis in this area of New York City. As the Court of Appeals observed, the resulting high concentration of low-income housing would hardly further racial and economic integration. The environmental "impact . . . on social fabric and community structures" was given a B rating in the report, indicating that, from this perspective, the project is "questionable" and ameliorative measures are "mandated." The report lists 10 ameliorative measures necessary to make the project acceptable. The report also discusses two alternatives, Sites 9 and 41, both of which are the appropriate size for the project and require "only minimal" amounts of relocation and clearance. Concerning Site 9, the report explicitly concludes that "[f]rom the standpoint of social environmental impact, this location would be superior to Site 30 for the development of low-rent public housing." The sole reason for rejecting the environmentally superior site was the fact that, if the location were shifted to Site 9, there would be a projected delay of two years in the construction of the housing.

The issue before the Court of Appeals, therefore, was whether HUD was free under NEPA to reject an alternative acknowledged to be environmentally preferable solely on the ground that any change in sites would cause delay. This was hardly a "peripheral issue" in the case. Whether NEPA, which sets forth "significant substantive goals," Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra at  435 U. S. 558, permits a projected 2-year time difference to be controlling over environmental superiority is by no means clear. Resolution of the issue, however, is certainly within the normal scope of review of agency action to determine if it is arbitrary,

Page 444 U. S. 231

capricious, or an abuse of discretion.* The question whether HUD can make delay the paramount concern over environmental superiority is essentially a restatement of the question whether HUD in considering the environmental consequences of its proposed action gave those consequences a "hard look," which is exactly the proper question for the reviewing court to ask.  Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra at  427 U. S. 410, n. 21.

The issue of whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary or capricious is sufficiently difficult and important to merit plenary consideration in this Court. Further, I do not subscribe to the Court's apparent suggestion that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether an agency "considered" environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, I cannot believe that the Court would adhere to that position in a different factual setting. Our cases establish that the "arbitrary or capricious" standard prescribes a "searching and careful" judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner.  Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402,  401 U. S. 416 (1971). Believing that today's summary reversal represents a departure from that principle, I respectfully dissent.

It is apparent to me that this is not the type of case for a summary disposition. We should at least have a plenary hearing.

* The Secretary concedes that, if an agency gave little or no weight to environmental values, its decision might be arbitrary or capricious. Pet. for Cert. in No. 7184, p. 15, n. 16.

1) Under NEPA, do you believe that the court was right in its decision in the above case?

2) Do you see any possible relationship this case presents with LULUs?)

Sprint Nextel is one of the largest digital wireless service providers in the United States. In a recent year, it had approximately 32.5 million direct subscribers (accounts) that generated revenue of $35,345 million. Costs and expenses for the year were as follows (in millions): Cost of revenue $20,841 Selling, general, and administrative expenses 9,765 Depreciation 2,239 Assume that 70% of the cost of revenue and 30% of the selling, general, and administrative expenses are variable to the number of direct subscribers (accounts). In part (a) and (b), round all interim calculations and final answers to one decimal place. a. What is Sprint Nextel's break-even number of accounts, using the data and assumptions given? b. How much revenue per account would be sufficient for Sprint Nextel to break even if the number of accounts remained constant?

In the survey of 1500 students for the united states age 18 and under, 1043 were concerned about how they would pay for college.

a) Find the mean and standard deviation of those concerned about financing college.

b) Construct a 90% confidence interval for the population proportions. Interpret your results.

c) Find the minimum sample size needed to estimate the population proportion at the 99% confidence level in order to ensure that the estimate is accurate within 4% of the population proportion.

1. In the United States, the economic agent responsible for providing the 2nd most surplus to the indirect financial market for transfer to the borrower/spenders is normally

a. governments

b. households

c. business firms

d. commercial banks

2. A 10% fall in all bond prices will cause short-term interest rates to

a. fall more than long-term bond interest rates

b. fall less than long-term interest rates

c. rise less than long-term interest rates

d. rise more than long-term interest rates

3. When calculating the expected return on financial assets, people consider all of the following except

a. actual inflation

b. tax payments

c. expected changes in the value of a dollar

d. economy's ability to adjust to expected inflation

4. A non-negotiable security is one that

a. must be accepted at face value

b. is not widely advertised

c. has no maturity date

d. cannot be resold in a secondary market

e. has only a current yield and not a capital gain or loss

1-The establishment of uniform accounting standards in the United States arose in response to the need to:

a*Return the trust within the market which had been lost due to false and incomplete information

b*Have all the companies that trade in the stock market

c*Ensure that all countries in the world use the same accounting standards

2. The main objective of making financial reports is

a*Determine if loans or other credit obligations can be paid on time

b*Keep personal records separate from business records

c*Provide relevant and reliable information for external users

3. Assets are reported in the balance sheet

a*Those that are more liquid first

b*Net of depreciation expense

c*Net in relation to long-term liabilities or realizable value

4. When presenting a Balance Sheet using GAAP:

a*Capital is presented before liabilities

b*Investments are presented after liabilities

c*Non-current accounts are presented after checking accounts

5. In which of the following situations an income must be recognized

a*When the merchandise is sent to a consignment shop

b*When the merchandise is sent to the CEO's bank who is currently in bankruptcy protection

c*Tax preparation services are delivered and payment must be made within 3 days

6. A series of equal periodic payments that begins more than one period after the payment agreement is called:

a*An expired annuity

b*An ordinary annuity

c*A future annuity

7. Calculate the cost of the equipment that would be reported in the balance sheet based on the following information:

Cost of equipment $ 100,000

Cost of equipment shipping costs $ 5,000

Electric cost of installing the equipment $ 2,000
Increase in the market value of the equipment from the day of purchase $ 3,000

a*$ 105,000

b*$ 107,000

c*$ 110,000

8. The gross profit method and the retail inventory method

a*Both are estimates of the final inventory and the cost of products sold

b*Both use the lowest cost or fair market value of the inventory in their calculations

c*Both use the present value of future cash flows.

9. The calculation of a simple interest for an investment of $ 100,000 at an interest of 6% for 5 years would be

a*Less than compound interest

b*The same amount under simple and compound interest rates, since the amount is less than $ 125,000

c*The same amount under simple and compound interest rates, since the amount is less than $ 155,000

10. When you prepare the current assets section of the balance sheet under GAAP you see that two of the balance sheets of the bank accounts are negative. Where would you look to determine how these balances should be reported?

a*Rules and procedures of the American Banking Association

b*FASB coding system

c*IFRS pronouncements since negative balances are currently passive

d*None of the above since the balance sheets should be grouped in the balance sheet

11. Which of the following is not one of the steps for the ethical decision analysis model:

a*Identify the consequences of each possible course of action

b*determine the facts within the situation.

c*Consult with the review board (ethics review board) of AICPA

11. Which of the following is not one of the steps for the ethical decision analysis model:

a*Identify the consequences of each possible course of action

b*determine the facts within the situation.

c*Consult with the review board (ethics review board) of AICPA

1. Describe how the money supply is measured in the United States and how banks, the public, and the Federal Reserve can influence it.
2. Explain what we want the Federal Reserve to be independent of, why that is important, and what parts of its structure help give it independence.
3. Explain the primary things the Fed can do to help the economy recover from a recession or slow down an expansion.
4. What is the difference between monetary and fiscal policy and what are they both trying to accomplish?
5. What can Congress do to help the economy recover from a recession? Explain the tools they would use and what they are expected to do, as well as reasons why it may not work as expected.
6. Explain the difference between a progressive, regressive, and proportional tax and provide an example of each.

People across the United States are fearful - and fed up- with crime. Dogs for protection, special locks, and security systems have never been more popular. And no wonder: Almost half of U.S. adults claim that they are afraid to walk alone at night in the vicinity of their own homes. Government spending on crime prevention has risen steadily during the past thirty years, but so has the crime rate. At the same time, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, violent crime has gone down in the last few years. New York City is a case in point: Murders in the Big Apple dropped from 2,245 in 1990 to 803 in 1997. Are we beginning to learn something more about controlling crime? Three factors seem to account for the New York turnaround. First, more police are on the streets than ever before. Second, a program of "community policing" makes police commanders directly responsible for controlling crime in their district. Third, and probably more important, police are less focused on making arrests and more concerned with preventing crime in the first place. For example, police officers have begun stopping young men for jaywalking or even spitting on the sidewalk in order to check them for concealed weapons (as a result the word is getting around that you risk arrest for carrying a gun) and even blocking off streets to traffic if that's what it takes to put local drug dealers out of business (the policy seems to work: the drug trade is down). Travis Hirschi (author of control theory) offers his own version of a community approach to crime. Hirschi notes that criminals today have two things in common. The first is age; most offenders are young. Crime rates are high in the late teens and early twenties, and they fall quickly thereafter. Second, most offenders take a short-term view of their lives. Lawbreakers, as Hirschi sees it, are people who have trouble working toward any long-term goal, including an educational degree, a career, a successful marriage, or even keeping a steady friendship. More than anything else, in fact, offenders are people characterized by low self-control. That is why, according to Hirschi, our present criminal justice system can never control crime effectively. For one thing, going to jail is too uncertain (most crimes go unpunished) and too far removed in time (catching, trying, and jailing criminals often takes a year or more) to deter the typical offender. Thus, Hirschi explains, popular calls for "stiffer sentences" actually have little effect in suppressing crime. Moreover, by the time many offenders are sent to prison, they are moving beyond the "crime years" simply because they are growing older. Statistically speaking, then, offenders aging in prison represent a crime threat already shrinking on its own. Therefore, rather than locking up adults, Hirschi argues that society needs to focus on younger people before they commit crimes. /similar to the new approach in New York City, Hirschi's approach calls for closer attention to teenagers - those at highest risk for criminal behavior. Effective crime control depends on devising policies to keep teens away not only from guns and drugs, but also alcohol and, if necessary, cars. Ultimately, though, the most effective way to control crime, Hirschi concludes, is to teach children self-control . This is a reasonability that falls upon parents. Government can help, however, by intervening in dysfunctional families and by developing strategies that help build strong-preferably two parent- families. Eliminating pregnancy among teenage girls would do far more to reduce crime, Hirschi contends, than all the actions of today's criminal justice system. QUESTIONS 1. Do you thing we need more prisons? Is that an effective way to deal with the crime problem? What else might be done? 2. Hirschi's recommendations are controversial because he opposes the popular practice of building more prisons. What do you thing? 3. If we don't lock up today's offenders swiftly and surely, how can we satisfy society's demand for retribution? 4. Do you think that New York City's new crime approach and Hirschi's suggestions attack the broader conditions that breed crime, such as poverty, racial prejudice, and weak families? Why or why not? 5. Does lethal injection illustrate the "medicalization of death"? How or how not? 6. Does lethal injection "sugar coat" capital punishment by making suffering less apparent? Is lethal injection more humane? Why or why not?

Which of the following statements regarding monetization is false?

The nation of Lower Volta announces that its exports exceed its imports. We would refer to this as a current account __________ that results in a financial __________.

Fiscal policy may be both procyclical and expansionary at the same time.

If citizens anticipate higher taxes in the wake of a fiscal stimulus, then the expenditure multiplier will be _________; and in the absence of accommodation by the Fed, the expenditure multiplier will be _________.

A variable, like the Fed’s discount rate, is an example of which of the following?