In a small town there are two places to eat: 1) a Chinese restaurant and 2) a pizza place. Everyone in town eats dinner at one of the these two places or eats dinner at home.
Assume the 20% of those who eat in the Chinese restaurant go to the pizza place the next time and 40% eat at home. From those who eat at the pizza place, 50% go to the Chinese restaurant and 30% eat at home the next time. From those who eat at home, 20% go to the Chinese restaurant and 40% to the pizza place next time. We call this situation a system. This system can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chainwith three states.
In: Advanced Math
(Tragedy of the Commons) Canterbury is a small pastoral town with a grassy area known as the “commons.” The town’s two farmers may freely graze their cattle on the commons. In the spring each farmer simultaneously and independently buy (identical) cattle for $10 a head. The farmers must send their cattle to the commons during the spring and summer to feed and fatten them up. At the end of summer the cattle are sold at the market price of $1 per hundred pounds. (The farmers are price-takers in the larger cattle market.) The problem is that the commons is a small area that can only feed so many cattle before the grazing becomes poor. To capture this idea, let Q be the total number of cattle sent to the commons. The total weight (in hundreds of pounds) of all the cattle at the end of the season is given by W(Q) = 100Q − 10Q^2 , so that weight of a single cow is W(Q)/Q = 100 − 10Q. Let qi be the number of cattle farmer i buys in the spring and sends to the commons. Assume that a farmer can send a “fractional” cow so that qi can be any number greater than or equal to zero. (You can think of this as the farmer sending the cow to the commons for only a fraction of the season.) Naturally, Q = q1 + q2. Thus, the payoff functions are u1(q1, q2) = (100 − 10q1 − 10q2) q1 − 10q1 and u2(q1, q2) = (100 − 10q1 − 10q2) q2 − 10q2.
(a) Write the game in normal form.
(b) Find farmer 1 and 2’s best response function. It’ll help to notice that the game is symmetric.
(c) Find the Nash equilibrium number of cattle each farmer sends to the commons (i.e., head of cattle purchased): (q*1 , q^2 ).
(d) Show that the equilibrium is inefficient because too many cattle are sent to the commons in equilibrium. That is, show that q*1 + q*2 exceeds the quantity that would maximize the joint payoff. (The joint payoff is (100Q − 10Q^2)− 10Q = 90Q − 10Q^2 .)
(e) What is the intution behind part (d)? Can you think of other contexts, possibly including ones we covered in class, to which the same type of analysis applies? That is, where there is "too much" of an activity in equilibrium
In: Economics
A town official claims that the average vehicle in their area sells for more than the 40th percentile of your data set. Using the data, you obtained in week 1, as well as the summary statistics you found for the original data set (excluding the super car outlier), run a hypothesis test to determine if the claim can be supported. Make sure you state all the important values, so your fellow classmates can use them to run a hypothesis test as well. Use alpha = .05 to test your claim. (Note: You will want to use the function =PERCENTILE.INC in Excel to find the 40th percentile of your data set) First determine if you are using a z or t-test and explain why. Then conduct a four-step hypothesis test including a sentence at the end justifying the support or lack of support for the claim and why you made that choice
| Price |
| 43300 |
| 22795 |
| 33700 |
| 24885 |
| 42500 |
| 25950 |
| 26645 |
| 25190 |
| 25050 |
| 25300 |
| N | 10 | |||
| Sample Mean | 29531.5 | |||
| STDV | 7601.882 |
In: Statistics and Probability
The Town of Weston has a Water Utility Fund with the following
trial balance as of July 1, 2019, the first day of the fiscal
year:
| Debits | Credits | |||||
| Cash | $ | 332,000 | ||||
| Customer accounts receivable | 201,200 | |||||
| Allowance for uncollectible accounts | $ | 30,200 | ||||
| Materials and supplies | 120,800 | |||||
| Restricted assets (cash) | 252,000 | |||||
| Utility plant in service | 7,002,000 | |||||
| Accumulated depreciation—utility plant | 2,601,000 | |||||
| Construction work in progress | 102,000 | |||||
| Accounts payable | 122,400 | |||||
| Accrued expenses payable | 76,500 | |||||
| Revenue bonds payable | 3,501,000 | |||||
| Net position | 1,678,900 | |||||
| Totals | $ | 8,010,000 | $ | 8,010,000 | ||
During the year ended June 30, 2020, the following transactions and
events occurred in the Town of Weston Water Utility Fund:
| Materials and supplies | $ | 187,000 | |
| Costs of sales and services | 361,000 | ||
| Administrative expenses | 202,000 | ||
| Construction work in progress | 221,000 | ||
Required:
a. Record the transactions for the year in general
journal form.
b. Prepare a Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and
Changes in Fund Net Position.
c. Prepare a Statement of Net Position as of June
30, 2020.
d. Prepare a Statement of Cash Flows for the year
ended June 30, 2020. Assume all debt and interest are related to
capital outlay. Assume the entire construction work in progress
liability (see item 3) was paid in entry 7. Include restricted
assets as cash and cash equivalents.
In: Accounting
Sabrina, Kris, and Kelly are the only three residents of the small town of Charleston. They are considering whether to hire a police officer to patrol the town. Sabrina values the police officer at $610 per week, Kris values the police officer at $230 per week, and Kelly values the police officer at $150 per week. The competitive wage for a police officer is $900 per week.
a. If the protection provided by the police officer to one resident does not diminish the protection provided to the other residents, then the police officer is (Click to select) a commons an excludable a rival a nonrival a nonexcludable good.
b. Suppose Sabrina proposes a tax whereby all three residents split the cost of the police officer equally.
Will the majority of them support this tax?
No, they will not support the tax.
Yes, they will support the tax.
Is this outcome socially efficient?
This outcome is not socially efficent.
This outcome is socially efficient.
c. Suppose Kris suggests a proportional tax on income to pay for the police officer. If Sabrina earns $4,000 per week, Kris earns $1,500 per week, and Kelly earns $500 per week, what proportional tax on income would just cover the cost of the police officer?
Instructions: Enter your response as a percent.
A proportional tax rate: %
Will the majority of them support the tax?
Yes, all three would support the tax.
No, all three would not support the tax.
No, two of them would not support the tax.
Yes, two of them would support the tax.
d. Is a regressive tax system likely to lead to the socially optimal outcome in this case?
No
Yes
In: Economics
a) Bargain Town is a large discount chain. The management wishes to compare the performance of its credit managers in Ohio and Illinois, by comparing the mean dollar amount owed by customers with charge accounts in both two states. A small mean is desirable.
Suppose that Bargain Town randomly selected the following small samples.
Sample of Ohio accounts Sample of Illinois accounts
no=10 no= 6
yo = $124 y1 = $68
s2o= 1681 s2o= = 484
Assuming that equal variances, independent samples, and normality assumptions hold, compute a 95% confidence interval for μo-μ1.
b) Assuming that only the independent samples and normality assumptions hold, test Ho: μo-μ1=0 versus H1: μo-μ1≠0 by setting α=0.05. Based on the test we cannot reject the Null Hypothesis.
True or False?
c) To carry our the F-test for equality of population variances, you need to first calculate the values of F, r1, r2,Fα(r1,r2)
Compute the following: F, r1, r2,Fα(r1,r2)
Carry out the F -test for equality of variances, Ho: σ2o=σ21versus H1: σ2o≠σ21 Do we reject the null hypothesis?
Select one:
a. [F, r1, r2, Fα(r1,r2) , reject Ho versus H1 ] = [2.565, 6, 9, 6, reject]
b. [F, r1, r2, Fα(r1,r2) , reject Ho versus H1 ] = [2.565, 9, 4, 6, reject]
c. [F, r1, r2, Fα(r1,r2) , reject Ho versus H1 ] = [3.473, 9, 4, 6, reject]
d. [F, r1, r2, Fα(r1,r2) , reject Ho versus H1 ] = [2.565, 8, 5, 5, we cannot reject]
e. [F, r1, r2, Fα(r1,r2) , reject Ho versus H1 ] = [3.473, 9, 4, 6, we cannot reject]
In: Statistics and Probability
You are on the police force in a small town. During an election year, a candidate for mayor claims that fewer police are needed because the average police officer makes only four arrests per year. You think the population mean is much higher than that, so you conduct a small research project. You ask 12 other officers how many arrests they made in the past year. The average for this sample of 12 is 6.3, with a standard deviation of 1.5. With your sample evidence, test the null hypothesis that the population mean is four arrests against the alternative that it is greater than four. Set your alpha level at .01.
In: Statistics and Probability
In the town of Maplewood a certain type of DVD player is sold at just two stores. 38% of the sales are from store A and the rest of the sales are from store B. 7% of the DVD players sold at store A are defective while 3% of the DVD players sold at store B are defective. If Kate receives one of these DVD players as a gift and finds that it is defective, what is the probability that it came from store A? Express your answer as a percentage rounded to the nearest hundredth.
In: Statistics and Probability
Suppose that the short-run supply and demand for pineapples in a certain town are described by the following two equations:
QS= 1,000,
QD= 2,000−200p.
Pineapples are an imported produce in this market, so the government imposes a tax of $1 per pineapple. Which of the following statements is true?
In: Economics
Suppose you and a rival are the only producers of oysters in a town. Each morning you harvest
oysters to sell in the afternoon. You both have the choice to collect 10 or 20 dozen oysters. Each dozen has a marginal cost of $10 (so the cost of 10 dozen oysters is $100). If 20 dozen oysters in total are brought to the market, they will sell for $35 each. If 30 dozen oysters in total are brought to the market, they will sell for $25 each. If 40 dozen oysters in total are brought to the market they will sell for $20 each. You and your rival must simultaneously decide how many oysters to collect in the morning.
A.Write out the payoff matrix for this game. B.Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. C.Suppose, instead, you could discuss with your rival how many oysters to collect in the morning. D. What outcome would you agree to? Is this different from the Nash equilibrium?In: Economics