1. In 2012 the price index was calculated at 157.6 with 2009 as the base year. In 2013 the price index increased to 168.3. What was the inflation from 2008-2009?

A. 6.8%

B. 6.4%

C. 10.7%

2. In the fictional country of Alpha-land the economics statistics department has been busy calculating the price index for a basket of goods from 2013 to 2017. January 2013 is the standardized price index, at 100, for a basket of consumer goods in the country. The price index increased in 2014 to 105.7, in 2015 to 110.3, in 2016 to 114.1, and in 2017 it increased to 121.2. You have been called to the country to help establish the rate of inflation for those years. What is the inflation rate in Alpha-land for 2014 to 2015?

A. 5.7%

B. 4.4%

C. 14.1%

3. In the fictional country of Beta-land the economics statistics department has been busy calculating the price index for a basket of goods from 2009 to 2013. January 2009 is the standardized price index, at 100, for a basket of consumer goods in the country. The price index increased in 2010 to 110.3, in 2011 to 115.7, in 2012 to 120.5, and in 2013 it increased to 125.7. You have been called to the country to help establish the rate of inflation for those years. What is the inflation rate in Beta-land for 2012 to 2013?

A. 4.1%

B. 4.9%

C. 4.3%

Suppose ASU decides to sell tickets to its three 2020 football home games. Market research suggests differing demand schedules for younger fans (ages 21 and under) and older fans (ages 22 and up). The demand schedules are shown below.

Sun Devil Stadium has a capacity of 53,599.

Age 21 and under

Price Quantity

$100 4,000

$80. 4,500

$60. 6,500

$40. 7,500

$20. 8,500

Age 22 and up

Price Quantity

$150. 15,000

$120. 20,000

$100. 25,000

$80 35,000

$60 45,000

$40 60,000

$20 75,000

A. Show the overall demand schedule for ASU games. Show your work.

Price                                          Quantity Demanded

B. If ASU set one price for all fans, what price would it charge and how many tickets would it sell per game? Show your work

C. Calculate the consumer surplus at the price determined in part b. Show your work.

D. (2 pts) If ASU were to charge a different price for younger fans than it charged for older fans, what prices would they charge each group? Show your work.

Ages 21 and under:

Ages 22 and up:

e. Is ASU better off charging one price for all fans or charging different prices to different age groups? Support your answer.

3. A market consists of two segments, A and B. An individual in segment A has a demand function of q = 60 − p. An individual in segment B has a demand function of q = 60 − 2p. Suppose that each segment consists of one consumer. There are no costs of production.

a. Suppose that a monopolist must charge the same price to both segments. What is the profit-maximizing price? What are the profits? Briefly explain your approach (maximum 100 words).

[25 marks]

b. Now suppose that the monopolist can observe whether an individual belongs to segment A or B. What price does the monopolist charge to segment A, and what price to segment B? Do profits increase compared to (a)? Which consumers gain by price discrimination? Briefly explain your results (maximum 100 words).

[25 marks]

c. Next, assume that the monopolist cannot observe to which segment an individual belongs. Is price discrimination still possible? If yes, what type of price discrimination can be used. Describe and explain your results (maximum 250 words).

[25 marks]

d. Suppose that the segments A and B become more heterogeneous over time. Demand in segment A is now q = 500−p, whereas demand in segment B remains at q = 60−2p. Should a policy maker ban price discrimination? Justify your answer (maximum 250 words).

[25 marks]

Consider a continuum of consumers distributed along a line of length 100. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. There are two firms, one located at each end of the line. For simplicity, assume that firm A is located at 0 while firm B is located at 100. Firm A’s mill price is pA and firm B’s mill price is pB.

A consumer located at x buying from firm A pays a full price of: pA +  .

A consumer located at x buying from firm B pays a full price of: pB +  ,

where t > 0 is a parameter measuring transportation costs and x ∈ [0, 100]. For simplicity, assume that the marginal cost of production is constant and given by c > 0. Firms choose prices simultaneously.

1. Identify the marginal consumer and obtain the system of demand functions facing these firms. Briefly discuss your results.

2. Write down the payoff functions and obtain the system of best-response functions. Are firms’ prices strategic substitutes or strategic complements? Briefly discuss the intuition behind your result (maximum 100 words).

3. Solve the system of best-response functions to find the Nash equilibrium prices, quantities and profits. In light of your results, briefly discuss whether the following statement is correct: ’If firms were able to, they would reduce consumers’ transportation costs t to zero.’

4. Now assume that firm A operates at a marginal cost of 25 and firm B operates at a marginal cost of 50. Everything else remains the same. Explain whether the following statement is correct (maximum 200 words): ’Firm A will obtain higher profits than firm B in equilibrium because even though both firm A and B sell to half of the market in equilibrium, firm A will be able to charge higher prices because of its competitive advantage.

(e)

Now assume that in a stage prior to price competition, the two firms can endogenously choose where to locate along the line. The location decisions are taken simultaneously. By the time they choose prices, they know each other’s locations. For simplicity assume that firm A locates at a distance a from 0 and firm B at a distance b from 100 and that c = 0 for both firms. Everything else remains the same as above.

What is the most appropriate game-theoretic solution concept to use for this game? Justify your answer

Derive the solution to this game, explaining the method that you have followed and discussing the implications of your result in terms of product differentiation

Consider a continuum of consumers distributed along a line of length 100. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. There are two firms, one located at each end of the line. For simplicity, assume that firm A is located at 0 while firm B is located at 100. Firm A’s mill price is pA and firm B’s mill price is pB.

A consumer located at x buying from firm A pays a full price of: pA +  .

A consumer located at x buying from firm B pays a full price of: pB +  ,

where t > 0 is a parameter measuring transportation costs and x ∈ [0, 100]. For simplicity, assume that the marginal cost of production is constant and given by c > 0. Firms choose prices simultaneously.

1. Identify the marginal consumer and obtain the system of demand functions facing these firms. Briefly discuss your results.

2. Write down the payoff functions and obtain the system of best-response functions. Are firms’ prices strategic substitutes or strategic complements? Briefly discuss the intuition behind your result (maximum 100 words).

3. Solve the system of best-response functions to find the Nash equilibrium prices, quantities and profits. In light of your results, briefly discuss whether the following statement is correct: ’If firms were able to, they would reduce consumers’ transportation costs t to zero.’

4. Now assume that firm A operates at a marginal cost of 25 and firm B operates at a marginal cost of 50. Everything else remains the same. Explain whether the following statement is correct (maximum 200 words): ’Firm A will obtain higher profits than firm B in equilibrium because even though both firm A and B sell to half of the market in equilibrium, firm A will be able to charge higher prices because of its competitive advantage.

(e)

Now assume that in a stage prior to price competition, the two firms can endogenously choose where to locate along the line. The location decisions are taken simultaneously. By the time they choose prices, they know each other’s locations. For simplicity assume that firm A locates at a distance a from 0 and firm B at a distance b from 100 and that c = 0 for both firms. Everything else remains the same as above.

What is the most appropriate game-theoretic solution concept to use for this game? Justify your answer

Derive the solution to this game, explaining the method that you have followed and discussing the implications of your result in terms of product differentiation

Consider a continuum of consumers distributed along a line of length 100. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. There are two firms, one located at each end of the line. For simplicity, assume that firm A is located at 0 while firm B is located at 100. Firm A’s mill price is pA and firm B’s mill price is pB.

A consumer located at x buying from firm A pays a full price of: pA +  .

A consumer located at x buying from firm B pays a full price of: pB +  ,

where t > 0 is a parameter measuring transportation costs and x ∈ [0, 100]. For simplicity, assume that the marginal cost of production is constant and given by c > 0. Firms choose prices simultaneously.

1. Identify the marginal consumer and obtain the system of demand functions facing these firms. Briefly discuss your results.

2. Write down the payoff functions and obtain the system of best-response functions. Are firms’ prices strategic substitutes or strategic complements? Briefly discuss the intuition behind your result (maximum 100 words).

3. Solve the system of best-response functions to find the Nash equilibrium prices, quantities and profits. In light of your results, briefly discuss whether the following statement is correct: ’If firms were able to, they would reduce consumers’ transportation costs t to zero.’

4. Now assume that firm A operates at a marginal cost of 25 and firm B operates at a marginal cost of 50. Everything else remains the same. Explain whether the following statement is correct (maximum 200 words): ’Firm A will obtain higher profits than firm B in equilibrium because even though both firm A and B sell to half of the market in equilibrium, firm A will be able to charge higher prices because of its competitive advantage.

***The code is provided below***

When trying to compile the code below, I'm receiving three errors. Can I get some assistance on correcting the issues?

I removed the code because I thought I corrected my problem. I used #define to get rid of the CRT errors, and included an int at main(). The code compiles but still does not run properly. When entering the insertion prompt for the call details, after entering the phone number, the program just continuously runs, instead of prompting next for the date, then time, & language. After the call insertion is complete, the program is suppose to go to Idol state and then route the call to an available agent at the prompt. Program is also suppose to display various statuses such as recently routed calls and stored calls.

Can I get some assistance on correcting the issues so the program runs properly? Also, with cleaner code without using #define?

#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS

#include<iostream>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <ctime>
#include<string.h>

using namespace std;

int i = 0;

struct call
{
    int phno;
    char date[100];
    char time[100];
    int id;
    char lan[100];
    struct call* link;
};

struct call* front = NULL, * rear = NULL;

class Queue
{
public:
    void insert();
    void delcall();
    void status();
};

void Queue::insert()
{
    struct call* p = new call();
    srand(time(NULL));
    time_t curr_time;
    time_t my_time = time(NULL);
    tm* curr_tm;
    time(&curr_time);
    curr_tm = localtime(&curr_time);

    cout << endl << "Inbound Call - Insert to Queue" << endl;
    cout << "Insert Phone Number: ";
        cin >> p->phno;

    strftime(p->date, 50, " %B %d, %Y", curr_tm);

    cout << "Insert Date: ";
        cin >> p->date;

    strcpy_s(p->time, ctime(&my_time));

    cout << "Insert Time: ";
        cin >> p->time;

    cout << "Insert Language: ";
        cin >> p->lan;

    p->id = (rand() % 10 + 1) + i;
    i++;
    p->link = NULL;

    if (rear == NULL)
    {
        front = p;
    }

    else
    {
        rear->link = p;
    }
    rear = p;
}

void Queue::delcall()
{
    if (front == NULL)
    {
        cout << endl << "ACW: No call to route to Agent" << endl;

    }
    else
    {
        cout << endl << "Recently routed call to agent is:" << endl;
        cout << "Phone #: " << front->phno << endl;
        cout << "Date: " << front->date << endl;
        cout << "Call Time: " << front->time;
        cout << "Caller ID: " << front->id << endl;
        cout << "Caller Language : " << front->lan << endl;
        if (front == rear)
        {
            front = rear = NULL;
        }
        else
        {
            front = front->link;
        }
    }
}

void Queue::status()
{
    int j;
    struct call* temp = front;
    if (front == NULL)
        cout << endl << "ACW: No call to route to Agent" << endl;
    else
    {
        cout << endl << "Caller Information" << endl;
        do
        {
            cout << endl << "Stored call details are:" << endl;
            cout << "Phone #: " << temp->phno << endl;
            cout << "Date: " << temp->date << endl;
            cout << "Call Time: " << temp->time;
            cout << "Caller ID: " << temp->id << endl;
            cout << "Caller Language: " << temp->lan << endl;
            temp = temp->link;
            cout << endl;
        } while (temp != NULL);
    }
}

int main()
{
    cout << "          Demo Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) ";
    cout << endl << "-----------------------------------------------------------" << endl;
    cout << endl << "ACW (Average Call Waiting/System Idol)" << endl;
    cout << endl << "New call enters the Queue";
    cout << endl << "Call leaves the Queue and routed to Agent";
  
    int p;
    char ch;
    Queue ob;
    do
    {
        p = (rand() % 3 + 1);
        switch (p)
        {
        case 1:
            ob.insert();
            break;

        case 2:
            ob.delcall();
            break;

        case 3:
            ob.status();
            break;

        }
        cout << endl << "ACW/System Idol" << endl;          
        cout << "waiting...[y/Y]: ";
        cin >> ch;
    } while (ch == 'y' || ch == 'Y');

}

What price do farmers get for their watermelon crops? In the third week of July, a random sample of 40 farming regions gave a sample mean cost of 6.90 (in dollars per 100 pounds of watermelon). Suppose that the population standard deviation of the cost in July is 1.65 (in dollars per 100 pounds of watermelon). Is the sample data sufficient to show that the population mean cost of watermelon crops in July is more than 6.00 dollars per 100 pounds of watermelon? Use α = 0.05. -

Find the H0 and H1 Find the P-Value

1. In one market, supply is inelastic. In a second market, supply is elastic. An increase in demand will cause the equilibrium price to change by ______________ and equilibrium quantity to change by ______________ in the first market than in the second market.

a more: more

b less; more

c less; less

d more; less

e not change because supply is inelastic

2. One market has an elastic demand for the good. In a second market, the demand is inelastic. Everything else is the same in the two markets. An increase in supply, will ______________ the equilibrium quantity the most in the ______________ market.

a increase; first

b decrease; first

c increase; second

d decrease; second

e increase; we cannot tell in which market the change will be the greatest, it depends upon the elasticity of supply

3. Consider two goods. The first makes up a large part of one’s spending; the second, a small part. The first does not have many substitutes, while the second has quite a few. What is likely true about the elasticity of demand of the first good compared to that of the second?

a the demand for the first good is likely to be more inelastic

b the demand for the first good is likely to be more elastic

c one cannot tell as the larger portion of spending makes demand elastic and the lower number of substitutes makes demand inelastic.

d one cannot tell as the larger portion of spending makes demand inelastic and the lower number of substitutes makes demand elastic.

4. If buyers and sellers both expect prices to rise, what will happen to quantities sold?

a The equilibrium quantity will decrease.

b The equilibrium quantity will increase.

c The equilibrium quantity will be unlikely to change.

d The equilibrium quantity could decrease, increase, or remain the same.

5. An increase in the cost of producing GM SUVs will be most likely to cause which of the following to happen to the prices of Toyota SUVs?

a The price of Toyota SUVs will not change.

b The price of Toyota SUVs will increase.

c The price of Toyota SUVs will decrease.

d One cannot tell what will happen to the price of Toyota SUVs.

1. Alvaro creates a covered call. A covered call consists of one long share of stock and one short call option on the stock. The spot price of PND stock is 100. The call option he will use has a strike price of 105 and one year to expiration.

The price of the call option is 9.68 . The continuously compounded risk-free rate is 4%.

1. What is Alvaro’s profit at the end of one year if the price of PND at that time is 102?

2. What is the breakeven stock price for the portfolio?

3. What is the minimum profit of the portfolio?

4. What is the maximum profit of the portfolio?

5. What ending stock price would result in a profit of 6.00?

7) Create the following using Java.

Create a scanner
Declare double variables for price and tax
Declare character variable reply

Create do while loop
Inside of do loop
Prompt the console to display headline Product Price Check
Prompt the user to enter initial price and relate to scanner
Prompt the user to enter the tax rate and relate to scanner
Calculate price which is equal to price multiply (1+tax/100)
Display in console the cost after tax which is price

Check if user want to enter another product by (y/n)?
Declare replay equal to scanner .next.charAt(0)

The global demand for cocoa can be represented with the following equation:

P=50 - 0.25Q, where P is the price (dollars per 100 lbs.), and Q is quantity. Furthermore, assume that cocoa can be produced at a constant marginal and average cost of $10 per unit of Q.

Cocoa producers have formed a cartel, aimed at realizing the monopoly price for cocoa.

Given the demand equation and marginal cost specified above, what is the monopoly price and quantity?